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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation explores the performance and consumption of a reinvented Japanese 
national identity surrounding the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics.  This event marked an 
important psychological turning point for many Japanese, who saw it as marking their 
reemergence into the world community.  National identity is often hidden in the daily 
assumptions and practices of members of the nation.  Prestige events like the Olympics bring 
these to the surface and make them easier to analyze as the contents for performance and 
consumption of Self, for both Self and Other, are prepared.  Furthermore, the specifics of 
Japanese national identity at this time made the Olympics a near perfect venue for this. 
 I argue that an examination of this discourse reveals several tropes of Self shared across 
the mainstream of Japanese national identity in the mid 1960s.  The first was that Japan had 
rebuilt from wartime destruction and was now a global scientific and technological leader.  
Second, the country had a mixture of Western modernity and Japanese tradition that made it 
uniquely suited to be an interlocutor between West and non-West.  The government, urban 
spaces and public manners were modern, yet culturally, Japanese engaged in a self-Orientalizing 
discourse.  Third, Japan was no longer the despised enemy from the Second World War, but was 
now a uniquely peaceful and internationalist country.  The Olympics provided the stage upon 
which to perform this identity, but also a lens through which to study it.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
“I declare open the Olympics Games of Tokyo celebrating the XVIII Olympia.” 
Emperor Hirohito, October 10, 1964 
 
 
 On October 10, 1964, Emperor Hirohito declared the Tokyo Summer Olympiad open.  
These Summer Games were important to the Olympic movement as symbolically opening 
hosting to the non-Western and non-white world.  They were also crucial to Japanese collective 
memory as a marker to the end of Japan’s time as a world pariah for its role in the Greater East 
Asian War and World War II.  These Games saw the creation, performance and consumption of 
a new national identity—some parts were new to the postwar and some were revisions of older 
strains of Japanese identity.  It is this new identity that is the focus of my dissertation. 
 This project began with a coincidence.  While I was doing readings on cultural history in 
2001 and especially a book on the first world’s fair, Beijing, and therefore China, won the right 
to host the 2008 Summer Olympiad.1  The news coverage showed an enormous celebration 
throughout the country, but it also focused on the controversy generated by awarding the Games 
to a country whose human rights record was suspect, as well as the sheer happiness of the 
Chinese.  I, on the other hand, was struck by what I saw as an enormous expression of 
nationalism—a nationalism that seemed either largely ignored or accepted as ‘normal’ due to its 
relation to sports and the Olympics.  When I turned to the historiography of Japanese history, I 
found an almost complete lack of analysis of the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics in both English 
and Japanese.2  As I began to look at the primary sources and looking for references to these 
                                                 
1 Jeffrey A. Auerbach, The Great Exhibition of 1851: A Nation on Display (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1999). 
2 The one major exception to this at the time in English was a single chapter in Yoshikuni Igarashi, Bodies of 
Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
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Games, I quickly realized that the public and national memory in Japan places a great importance 
on the 1964 Olympiad as a dividing point between pre-recovery and post-recovery Japan—a 
discourse that was active from before Hirohito officially opened the Games. 
 This dissertation, however, does not merely aim to add the brick of these Games to Lord 
Acton’s proverbial wall of history.  It does tell a story of the 1964 Tokyo Olympiad, but only in 
so far as to provide background for the more interesting issue.  In short, this is a dissertation 
about Japanese national identity in the mid 1960s rather than about the 1964 Summer Olympics.  
I argue that a new national identity was formed in the late 1950s and placed on display at the 
Tokyo Olympics that was focused around several core ideals: cutting edge science and high 
technology, modern society with traditional culture, and peaceful internationalism.  In addition, I 
argue that this identity was largely shared between state and nation, different political groups and 
economic classes.  This raises the obvious question of, however, if I am examining national 
identity rather than the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics, why is it the site of inquiry?  The answer 
involves what I see as the basis for national identity. 
 First, I must define how I understand the terms nation, national identity, nationalism and 
state—they are ubiquitous, yet frequently misused.  They are too often used vaguely or even 
incorrectly in popular and sometimes academic discourse.  Indeed, one central problem is that 
nation, state and country are often mistakenly used interchangeably.3  One sees this in the 
Olympics, for example, when flags that represent states are referred to as “national flags.”  While 
Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” is now almost cliché, I agree with his basic 
                                                                                                                                                             
There have also been a very few books published in Japanese since then marking the 40th anniversary of the Games 
and a few articles in English. 
3 For a more detailed discussion of this, see Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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definition and understand the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign.”4  The state is the political apparatus that rules over a territory 
that may, or may not, coincide with a single nation.  Country is a more amorphous term—I use it 
to represent the more abstract concept of place that combines elements of both state and nation.   
As noted earlier, national identity and nationalism are also frequently conflated.  Whereas 
I define national identity as the markers that allow us to delineate the boundaries  (or conversely, 
the shared characteristics) of an imagined community, the “ism” of nationalism is marked by 
loyalty to that mental map which provides motives for action in the course believed to be correct 
or best for the nation.  The obvious consequence is that multiple nationalisms are therefore 
possible or even inevitable from a single national identity.  For example, most Americans might 
believe that the ideal of freedom is central to the imagined community of America, but they 
might vary wildly on how exactly to define freedom or how to achieve or protect it.  Therefore, 
my task is to identify the boundaries or unifiers of Japanese national identity.  However, I must 
make clear that I am not attempting to reify the Japanese nation.  The nation is real only in so far 
as it is perceived to be real—it is constantly changing, contested and conflicting.  It is this 
perception of self and nation that I am attempting to understand. 
As has been noted in recent scholarship on Japanese nationalism, the term suffers from 
some preconceptions and misunderstandings.  The most common error is the conflation of 
nationalism with statism or perhaps patriotism, or support of and identification with one’s state 
or country.5  I was in Japan during the 2005 anti-Japan demonstrations in China over Japanese 
history textbooks.  Some of the placards carried read “Patriotism is not a crime” (aiguo wuzui), 
                                                 
4 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. and 
extended ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 7. 
5 Kevin Michael Doak, A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1. 
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reflecting concerns the communist state would shut down their protests.6  The underlying 
assumption, and most likely frightening for the government, was that their loyalty was to the 
country and nation, though not necessarily to the particular state in authority.  Moreover, almost 
anything can be justified with this rational. 
A corollary and related common error is the assumption that nationalism is the same as or 
closely related to militarism—also often associated with the state.7  Of course, a nationalism can 
be militaristic and can be promoted by the state, but is not necessarily so.  In the case of Japan, 
this misconception would preclude a national identity based on the concept of peaceful 
internationalism, which I argue in this dissertation was a central self-understanding of the 
Japanese nation in the 1960s.  Related to this conflation is the overly used term “the nation-
state.”  The very structure of the term and grammatical usage, as the subject that does something, 
assumes that nation and state move and exist as one—typically with the state deciding the course 
of action.  While it serves as convenient rhetorical shorthand, and has some utility for describing 
the rise to prominence of centralized states and the emergence of nations that roughly coincided 
in Europe, it too often obscures more than it reveals and assumes a unity in action and belief that 
rarely exists. 
The most important problems with these assumptions are twofold.  First, they assume that 
national identity and nationalism arise solely from the state.  Second, they tend to conceal 
conflict between the nation and the state.  Recent scholarship on modern Japanese nationalism 
                                                 
6 There is some evidence the initial protests were supported by the state, but eventually they grew to be too large and 
were shut down, just as the protestors feared.  Undoubtedly, the ruling elite, which has long fostered nationalism 
hoping it would create statism, has become aware that nationalism is a two edged sword for any state.  It is a force 
not easily controlled once unleashed.  For more information on the general phenomenon, see Peter Hays Gries, 
China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004). 
7 Brian J. McVeigh, Nationalisms of Japan: Managing and Mystifying Identity, Asia/Pacific/Perspectives (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 3-4. 
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has clearly demonstrated that both are incorrect.  For example, Kevin Doak has traced the 
connection between romanticism and ethnic nationalism in prewar Japan in a discourse that 
existed largely outside of the state.8  Sometimes it served to further the state’s purposes and other 
times worked against them.  Curtis Gayle has looked at Japanese national identity as formulated 
by out-of-power Marxists in the postwar period.9  The clear implication is the state does not have 
a monopoly on identity creation.  Oguma Eiji10 has traced the permutations of Japanese identity 
in his ground breaking work, A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-Images.11  He convincingly 
demonstrated the manner in which the predominant contemporary form of Japanese national 
identity, ethnic nationalism, initially took shape in the postwar through leftist efforts to carve out 
a non- or even anti- state-centric identity—only later moving to the right wing movement it is 
often associated with today.  Historically, episodes like the infamous “Blood Oath Incident” of 
1932 also demonstrate the fallacy of both assumptions.  In this case, ultranationalist civilians 
launched a plot to assassinate 20 government and private individuals in order to purify Japan of 
Western influence and restore the Emperor to absolute rule—although they only succeeded in 
eliminating two of their targets.  At their defense, they argued their loyalty to Emperor and 
nation absolved them of any wrong doing, even though they had assassinated a government 
                                                 
8 Kevin Michael Doak, Dreams of Difference: The Japan Romantic School and the Crisis of Modernity (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1994). 
9 Curtis Anderson Gayle, Marxist History and Postwar Japanese Nationalism (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
10 All Japanese names follow the linguistic practice of placing the surname first, unless the person has specifically 
used their own name in the Western order or is widely known as such.  Similarly, all words and place names use 
Japanese macrons if translated from Japanese, except in the case of words commonly used in English, such as Tokyo 
rather than Tōkyō. 
11 Eiji Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-Images, English ed., Japanese society series (Melbourne: Trans 
Pacific Press, 2002). 
 5
minister because the particular state and its leaders were the ones betraying the Emperor and 
nation.12  Clearly, nationalism does not equal support of the particular state.13 
  If we avoid the conflation of state with nation, as well as nationalism as statism, and 
accept Anderson’s definition nation, then what is national identity?  At its most basic level, I use 
the term to represent the ideas, symbols and beliefs that allow members of a nation to recognize 
one another as belonging to the same community of fate, while remaining aware that a national 
identity is fluid, often contested and always invented.14  My goal is to provide a framework of 
shared Japanese national identity, not reify it as unchanging or ‘real’ in any concrete sense.  
Rather it is based in perception, which need not be grounded in anything tangible.   
Studies of national identity and nationalism have typically, although not always, relied on 
several modes of analysis: mainly structural and intellectual, with different approaches to the 
abstract symbolic meanings.  More recently, cultural history has emerged as another method, but 
it often tends towards intellectual history with several twists.  Structuralists look at the 
mechanics of identity creation, typically with the state or capitalism as the ultimate beneficiary.  
This provides many useful insights.  However, this overlooks the emotions and ideals that are 
often at the center of a national identity or nationalism and furthermore, assumes a somewhat 
naïve garbage-in/garbage-out mechanism for society.  If that were truly the case, modern 
                                                 
12 I use “particular state” because they were not anarchists opposed to any form of state.  They were opponents of the 
particular state in charge of Japan, both in terms of how it was constituted and how it ran its affairs. 
13 This also illuminates part of a long running issue of Japanese identity—the emperor symbolically has belonged to 
both nation and state, but was the exclusive property of neither.  This has allowed groups like the Blood League to 
claim the state was not serving the interests of the emperor, and therefore the nation, while the particular state itself 
ruled in the name of the emperor. 
14 Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
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societies would never face unrest.  Ernest Gellner once even argued that scholars of nationalism 
should ignore the “prophets of nationalism” and focus on the structure of state and nation.15    
Intellectual approaches focus on concrete individuals and ideas, but often have the 
limitation of existing above or at the highest the levels of the nation itself.  This can capture 
some of the emotions and abstracts of a national identity missed in a structuralist approach.  
However, it its weakness is that there is all too rarely a one to one connection between 
intellectual and plebeian.   
On the other hand, scholars such as Anthony Smith, have focused on the symbolics of 
nationalism—emblems and symbols that unify a people.16  One must qualify Smith’s argument, 
however, by noting that while these symbols often remain nearly constant in outward appearance, 
their meaning is constantly being redefined by all agents involved.  Many of the tropes I examine 
have predecessors in the prewar period, but they have been altered and revised to fit the new 
postwar era.   
John Breuilly observed that “nationalist movements…make use of symbols and 
ceremonies.  These give nationalist ideas a definite shape and force, both by projecting certain 
images and by enabling people to come together in ways which seem directly to express the 
solidarity of the nation.”17  Breuilly specifically discussed the necessity of “repetition” of 
stereotypes through mass media and gatherings in the context of a specific nationalist movement.  
In this project, my argument is that the national identity performed on the stage of the 1964 
Tokyo Olympics was largely shared and was not the result of a single nationalist party.  
                                                 
15 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, New perspectives on the past (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 
124. 
16 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1986), 201. 
17 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 64. 
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Therefore my own approach examines these symbols and tropes of self that enable people to feel 
kinship and a shared sense of identity through a broad spectrum of mass and popular media, as 
well as NOC and government sources.18 
Of course, rarely does any study only fit into one mode of analysis, some use two or even 
all three, but most rely most heavily upon one.  These same trends can be seen in examinations 
of postwar Japanese identity.  McVeigh’s work is largely structural in its analysis, while Doak 
looks at intellectual currents.  Others have examined themes such as Japanese postwar self-
identification as victims and mix the two approaches looking at education, politics and 
intellectuals, but also incorporate works of literature and movies.19  Of course, there is a missing 
voice in this discussion—that of the nation itself. 
This is an obvious problem, but one which is difficult to solve for historians.  Scholars of 
contemporary politics and identity can turn to surveys and questionnaires, but those instruments 
are rarely available—at least with the questions we want asked—to those who work with the past.  
Another problem is one of scale: if we do not cast a wide enough net, we risk artificially 
privileging one iteration of identity over another, but cast it too wide and the answer will be so 
diffuse as to be useless as we attempt to incorporate every voice.  Furthermore, by positing a 
single voice, we also run the risk of reifying the nation as something concrete and unchanging, 
rather than contingent and constantly in flux.  However, recovering the voice(s) of the nation is 
an important task which should be attempted. 
                                                 
18 This does not make it the only identity or that there are not multiple layers of identity.  I am often struck by how 
many people self describe themselves and their own national identities in ways that are proven false by their own 
private actions.  However, it is precisely that reflexive agreement and understanding that ties them to the larger 
community. 
19 James J. Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 2001). 
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The question, of course, is how to excavate something which is so problematic and 
difficult.  There are, I believe, several answers.  First, we must look to popular culture—that 
which is produced and consumed by members of the nation.  Their tastes and interests can tell us 
much about their sense of identity, particularly when the images, discourse and tropes appear 
repeatedly across a broad spectrum of sources.  These need not necessarily be grounded in any 
concrete reality: a perceived reality is sufficient as the object of study.   
Second, I think we need to return to Anderson.  His argument that national identity is 
forged through a shared and imagined sense of community is almost a scientific law among 
scholars of nationalism today.  Carried and diffused through the spread of print media, national 
identity created the very ability to know someone you will never meet, while at the same time 
helping to create the homogeneity of taste, habit and language that is at the basis of a national 
identity.  It is this medium of the mass media that should help us to approach the voice of the 
nation.  In short, by looking at the mass media, I believe we can come closest to national identity 
as seen by the people themselves.  This is not a perfect method, but it seems better than leaving 
the nation out of a study of national identity—pretending that structures and elites of all types 
can accurately tell us about non-elites.20   
The problem with this method is the chicken-egg argument about these tropes of self—do 
the media create or reflect them?  Media studies and others have debated this issue ad nauseam 
without arriving at an answer.  The most likely answer is that it is a bit of both.  At the very least, 
media coverage must reflect what editors believe will appeal to their audience.  If we can find a 
repetition of tropes across a broad spectrum of media, this would indicate shared understandings. 
                                                 
20 I would include not only political and economic/class elites, but also intellectual and cultural elites as well. 
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Looking at the mass media for an insight into national identity is particularly suited to 
Japan.  It has an extremely high rate of literacy and has traditionally had among the highest 
levels of newspaper circulation by number and diffusion in the world.  In the year 1964, Japanese 
newspaper circulation was almost 30 million—approximately one newspaper for every three 
people or more than one newspaper per household.21  This number, however, counts 
subscriptions to a newspaper with both morning and evening editions as a single newspaper.  If 
counted separately, the number is over 40 million.  The diffusion rate of newspapers for Japan 
was at 429 copies per 1000 people, which trailed only the United Kingdom with 505 copies per 
person.  By way of comparison, the United States, which had the third highest diffusion rate, was 
more than 100 copies per 1000 people behind at 326.  In addition, the content in Japanese 
newspaper had also increased, going over 25 pages per issue in 1963 and the “Olympic Games is 
expected to cause at least a temporary additional increase in (the) number of pages in 1964.”22  
In addition, more than 2,000 magazines were also published in Japan in 1965.  In short, th
production and consumption of mass media, and therefore things that would tie individuals 
together, was comparatively high in Japan.  By looking across a broad spectrum of the mass 
media, it should be possible to map out points of intersection in discourses of self, whether 
through commission or omission.
e 
                                                
23 
The obvious criticism of this method is that reporters are elites and not remotely 
representative of the nation.  I believe I have controlled for that fact in part by looking for widely 
 
21 Shinbun Hakkōbunsū (Showa 16nen-Heisei18nen) (Sōmushō: Tōkei-kyoku), 
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/zuhyou/26-03.xls. 
22 Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai, The Japanese Press (Tokyo, Japan: Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai, 1964), 39-40. 
23 By this, I mean that the points in common can be either things that are published (positively or negatively) or not 
published (i.e., missing due to things like taboo, extralegal/legal pressure or disinterest—after all, the mass media 
functions by selling the news and items of interest). 
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shared tropes and discourses across divergent sources.  More importantly, the alternatives are at 
least as problematic and limited.  Intellectual history relies upon the true elites of society—they 
make their living talking about the issues, even if they do not relate to what members of the 
broader public actually wants, or what exists in similar political, cultural, social or economic 
contexts.24  Structural approaches face an even greater challenge as their method depends on a 
single elite, themselves, being able to discern reality or substructure through the superstructure. 
If one thinks of Clifford Geertz’s cockfight, it was the “web of meaning” that allowed 
participants to comprehend and interact within a culture.25  I use the mass media to map out a 
web of meaning for Japanese national identity.  To avoid the trap of privileging one voice over 
another, I have cast as wide a net as was practical.  The Japanese media, particularly in the late 
1950s and 1960s, was clearly divided along ideological lines.  Of the major newspapers, the 
Mainichi Shinbun was the closest to the center.  Moving left, the Asahi Shinbun was mainstream 
liberal and at the extreme left was Akahata (literally Red Flag), the official newspaper of the 
Japanese Communist Party.26  The Yomiuri Shinbun was the mainstream conservative newspaper, 
with the Sankei Shinbun as the far right newspaper.  I used these newspapers as the core 
sampling, with a further sampling of regional newspapers to look for differences from the 
Tokyo-centric viewpoint of the national dailies, although in their coverage of the Olympics there 
seemed to be little variation from the tropes.   
                                                 
24 A famous contemporary example of this is movie critics.  Critical reviews only rarely correspond with ticket sales 
because they are more aimed at fellow cultural elites rather than the masses. 
25 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, 2000th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
26 Akahata had a smaller focus of coverage than the other newspapers; it focused almost entirely on political and 
economic affairs.  Except for party related sporting and cultural events, usually mass games, the paper had almost no 
sports coverage.  As a result, the newspaper was much smaller in terms of numbers of pages and was not a daily 
newspaper until shortly before the 1964 Olympics began.  In addition, unlike the major outlets, it did not have two 
editions (morning and evening). 
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I also use a wide variety of popular magazines that cross the political spectrum, from the 
leftwing Shukan Asahi to the rightwing Shukan Shinchō.  I also look at important documents the 
government and Japanese National Olympics Committee/Japanese Olympic Committee (below, 
JNOC or JOC), Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee (OOC) and other associated groups.27  
These are all populated by members of the nation.  As my argument is that most Japanese agreed 
on several core ideals for their national identity, the important corollary is that there was broad 
agreement between state and nation as well.  The identity the government was fostering and 
promoting was, for the most part, close to that promoted and protected by members of the nation.  
As previously stated, the nation and state are not equivalents, nor are they interchangeable.  The 
top down model assumed in most structuralist arguments is also insufficient as it too often 
removes agency from members of the nation.  At the same time, the state exercises power in a 
fashion that has influence over its subjects and citizens.  In the case of the Tokyo Olympics, 
certain aspects of the trope of Japanese-ness would not have been possible without significant 
state patronage and support—in particular those related to science and modernity. 
There is one obvious gap in my research data: television coverage.  The Nihon Hōsō 
Kaisha (NHK), a fee based public broadcaster similar to the British Broadcasting Corporation, 
had the broadcast rights to the Tokyo Olympics.  These were shared to a limited extent with 
private broadcasters, but NHK was the authoritative and official broadcaster.  Unfortunately, I 
was unable to view the NHK footage due to copyright concerns.  It has not yet been released for 
                                                 
27 Unfortunately, the JOC no longer possesses detailed meeting records from the planning and execution of the 
Games.  When I inquired as to the availability of this type of source, I was told by multiple JOC employees that 
everything they had was in their official archive.  This archive is a single, relatively small room in basement of the 
JOC headquarters.  It appears that once the official records were compiled and printed, the older, more detailed 
records were discarded as redundant and to conserve space.  During my time there doing research, I personally 
witnessed several purges of materials due to this lack of space.  There were still some detailed records from the 1964 
Olympiad, but they were largely budgetary or architectural in nature—unfortunately, any detailed records that the 
JOC once might have had on topics more relevant to my research were either entirely absent or else not made known 
or available in the course of the research. 
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viewing in their archives facilities.  While I tried many avenues of approach, the answer 
remained the same: if I wanted to view the footage, I would need to pay for rebroadcast rights.  
Obviously, this was well beyond my means.  It is my intention to find a way to view the footage 
and include it in a future work. 
Taking each source broadly as a web of understanding, I looked for intersections of 
meaning, symbolism and language between the different webs.  Connor speculated one could 
find the common visuals and images in a culture’s best poets to understand its national identity 
and by looking at the speeches and materials of leading nationalists.28  This will, however, leave 
a bias towards the elite views of nation.  While I do use some of these types of sources, I largely 
looked for the common discursive assumptions and tropes of self about Japan and Japanese that 
were shared across the broad spectrum of the mass media as a means of approaching a national 
voice.29 
Traditionally, the historiography of modern Japan has often focused on political and class 
conflict.  However, most would agree that postwar Japanese have generally drawn the borders 
around their nation along ethnic lines, even if they might attach different means to this.  On the 
political left, this was a way to argue for a non (capitalistic) state identity, while creating natural 
links to other ethnic peoples also fighting against capitalistic states and Western imperialism.30  
For the rightwing, this might take the form of ethnic pride and exceptionalism, often related to 
                                                 
28 Connor, Ethnonationalism, 75-76. 
29 I recognize that this leaves out the true outliers—those who have completely rejected and attempt to live outside 
the system or do not fit easily within its bounds.  These people and groups have been the object of much study over 
the last several decades and are important subjects, but when attempting to define how Japanese national identity 
was conceived of, it is the mainstream, broadly defined, that is the important object of study. 
30 Often overlooked is the way that this formation of identity protects leftists, many of which notoriously underwent 
“conversions” during wartime and supported the state, from any wartime responsibility.  Instead, the (by their 
definition—rightwing and militarist) state and military are blamed, while the people or nation, including themselves, 
were victims and, by definition, blameless. 
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the Emperor and imperial line, as can be seen in the infamous and abundant Nihonjin-ron 
publications (theories about Japanese-ness).    
However, while this tells us something about the border of Japanese-ness itself, it does 
not explain how and in what terms Japanese defined themselves and their country.  What ideals 
(beyond ethnicity with its rather vague amalgamation of blood, culture and language), symbols 
and practices delineate the core Japanese nation?  It is my contention that while there were broad 
differences over the path Japan should take and what was right or wrong with the system, there 
were multiple important intersections in the webs of understanding that defined the Japanese 
national identity.  Japanese largely agreed on what defined and united them, and this new 
identity had largely formed by the mid 1960s.  It arguably continued until at least the 1973 Oil 
Shock, which brought a swift and painful end to the long era of high growth economics, and 
perhaps until the election of Nakasone Yasuhiro and the end of the Yoshida Doctrine.31   
At the same time, this was not simply an identity pushed or forced upon the people and 
nation.  This was an identity that could largely and uncontroversially be agreed upon by state and 
large segments of the nation.  The problem still remained of how to approach and examine this 
identity without comprehensive statistical analysis going across a decade or more or random 
selection of mass media texts.  After all, the tropes I examine, except, perhaps for the elites that 
make a living debating these issues, are largely in the everyday and commonsensical 
assumptions of people, which can be difficult to unearth under the best of circumstances.  The 
answer to this problem was where I started, with the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics. 
                                                 
31 The Yoshida Doctrine is named after Japan’s most influential Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru (1946-47, 1948-
1954).  It had three basic components: placing the highest national priority on economic growth, avoiding 
contentious international issues and relying on the United States for security.  Nakasone came from a rival Liberal 
Democratic Party faction that was much more assertive internationally and generally more favorable to changing 
Japan’s so-called Peace Constitution. 
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The Olympics are the premier world event, perhaps only rivaled by the World Cup, and 
that only very recently.  They attract huge audiences and have world wide participation that 
surpasses all other events.  At their most basic level, they are often assumed to be nothing more 
than international sporting events.  However, the reality is that they are much more important 
symbolically.  John J. MacAloon argues persuasively that Olympics are a “cultural performance 
of global proportion.”32   
It is this performance of Self for the world audience upon an unparalleled global stage 
that provides the crucial window into identity.  At least some Japanese understood this 
opportunity and wanted to utilize it.  Less than a month after the end of the United States 
Occupation of Japan, Tokyo Governor Yasui Seiichiro (1947-1959) began the process of 
reapplying to host the Olympics.33  He argued that Japan should host the Olympics to “gain the 
world’s understanding of Japan’s true form, after its peaceful recovery and international return, 
by truly showing the great desire of Japanese for peace.”34   
Typically, national identity is only voiced in intellectual ponderings or academic debate, 
or seen through structural elements such as education.  Otherwise it typically exists among the 
people and can only be seen through their habits and assumptions—often difficult to access, 
particularly for those working with the past.35  One can try asking people about what they 
remember, but this runs the real risk of telling you more about the concerns of today than it does 
                                                 
32 John J. MacAloon, “Olympic Games and the Theory of Spectacle in Modern Societies,” in Rite, Drama, Festival, 
Spectacle: Rehearsals Toward a Theory of Cultural Performance, ed. John J. MacAloon (Philadelphia, PA: Institute 
for the Study of Human Issues, Inc., 1984), 241-280, 241. 
33 Tokyo had been awarded the 1940 Olympiad, but had withdrawn its offer to host it in 1938 amid rising world 
tensions over Japan’s actions in Manchuria and China. 
34 Tōkyō-to, Dai 18-kai Orinpikku kyōgitaikai Tōkyō-to hōkokusho (Tokyo: Toppan-insatsu Kabushikigaisha, 1965), 
4. 
35 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995). 
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yesterday’s.  The other problem, particularly with well known and narrativized events such as the 
1964 Tokyo Olympics, is one can never be sure if one is hearing a personal memory or an 
internalized version of a collective memory and narrative.36  It takes a moment of national stress 
or joy to bring it to the surface among the broader public.  The Olympics are one of these 
moments.  As the world turns its eyes to a country, the debate about self-to-be-played emerges.  
It is generally only at this time that the banal comes to the surface and can be clearly examined. 
Currently, the immense and elaborate, highly stylized, Opening and Closing Ceremonies 
provide important insights into cultural performances of identity.  Unfortunately, these are a 
relatively recent phenomenon and did not take their current scale until after the 1964 Games.  
This does not minimize the large scale and symbolic importance of them at Tokyo, or especially 
at Berlin in 1936, but the more recent performances are on a different scale of order.  However, 
the Olympic Charter also calls for cultural exhibitions—the self on display, as it were, for both 
foreign and domestic consumption.  If national identity can be phrased as shared “stories we tell 
ourselves,” then Olympiads are an important stage upon which we perform the stories we tell 
ourselves (and want to believe).37  While we might be tempted to point the finger at an National 
Olympic Committee (NOC) or OOC as the puppet master pulling the strings, the nature of a 
spectacle makes this much more complex.  It is only spectacle when there are spectators who are 
                                                 
36 My favorite example of this is from my own childhood.  I once bit my sister’s toe on her birthday when I was 
about two years old.  It is a favorite family story told to embarrass me.  I have heard it countless times and can 
picture the entire scene in my head.  I can remember the color of the carpet, the couch she was sitting on and 
everything else about the scene, even down to my motivation (I wanted some of the attention she was getting).  The 
problem is that I remember absolutely nothing else from when I was two years old.  In fact, my first reliable 
memories are from several years later.  Do I actually remember it or have I heard the story so many times that I have 
internalized this collective family memory as a personal memory?  I am certain it is the latter.  I did conduct some 
interviews about the 1964 Tokyo Olympiad and I heard nearly the same narratives being repeated back to me from 
each person.  This does not mean that they are false memories, but the risk of contamination from accepted 
collective narratives seemed too high given the restraints on time and resources that I had when conducting the 
research. 
37 Robert E. Goodin, “Conventions and Conversions, or, Why Is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty,” in The Morality 
of Nationalism, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (Oxford University Press, USA, 1997). 
 16
actively participating and is defined by “the bicameral roles of actors and audience, performers 
and spectators.”38  It also “gives primacy to visual sensory and symbolic codes.”  Here I would 
add a corollary—that the symbolic codes can be written and spoken, as well as painted and 
performed. 
An Olympiad is the perfect place to examine national identity for other reasons.  
Nominally, individuals compete against each other in a variety of sporting events.  Indeed, the 
Olympic ideal proclaims that all athletes participate as individuals.  However, they only qualify 
if they belong to the international sporting federations through their national branches and are 
selected by each country’s sporting officials.  In addition, each country must also be a member of 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and have a NOC.39  Thus the Games are 
competitions between individuals who are identified by and with states and countries, while 
often participating as surrogates for the nation, which is the true secret behind the popularity of 
the Olympics.  Despite the official rhetoric of purity and individual competition, the very 
structure of the Olympics has long been recognized as for its contradictions.  Individuals are not 
only selected by each country’s NOC—or sport-by-sport organizations they recognize—, but 
they also are required to participate wearing that country’s uniform as well.  Furthermore, they 
also enter the Opening Ceremony under their state flag. 40   It is not a stretch to say the Olympics 
are all about nationalism and national identity. 
                                                 
38 MacAloon, “Olympic Games and the Theory of Spectacle in Modern Societies.” 243. 
39 This is another misuse of the word “nation” as each country, or perhaps state, has its own committee, not each 
nation—they may be the same, but they may not be as well. 
40 As I argued previously, Connor Walker is correct when he urges precision in language, particularly concerning 
terms such as state, nation and country.  I intentionally do not call the flags “national” as some countries and states 
encompass more than one nation—Yugoslavia, the USSR and Great Britain are all good examples from the 1964 
Tokyo Olympiad.  To be more theoretically and linguistically precise and accurate, the flags represent countries and 
states, which may or may not correspond to a single nation. 
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The Olympics are therefore an ideal window through which to glimpse the national voice.  
Not only is the state officially involved (in many cases, the hosting city is dependent on the 
central government for money, guidance and approval—this was certainly the case for Tokyo) 
with the OOC in planning the Games and the performance of self, but the nation is also involved 
in many ways—protesting, supporting, watching or even just discussing.  The mass media 
focuses its attention to the city and country, particularly for countries that are just emerging, or 
reemerging in the case of Japan, on the world scene.  In Japan’s case, this was especially true—
many Japanese saw this as the benchmark that they had finally reemerged onto the world stage.  
The media of all stripes was filled with discussion of the Olympics.  The tropes used track very 
closely with the identity the state and OOC was also producing, but there was little inherently 
state-centric about them and very little to suggest this was the result of indoctrination upon a 
passive nation.  Indeed, given that the same tropes can be found across the political spectrum, 
including those hostile to the conservative run state, it seems difficult to argue that they were the 
result of state indoctrination. 
Finally, the Japanese state had forbidden itself one of the most common and traditional 
methods of instilling nationalism, militarism, when it adopted its constitutional renunciation of 
armed force.  International sports, with its inherent competitive aspect, were a tempting method 
of instilling some patriotism.  Whereas many Japanese may have been uncomfortable with overt 
state centric or promoted nationalism, sports have the unique property of cleansing nationalism 
of its negative connotations and rendering it healthy in perception, if not reality.  People of all 
countries who would never dream of flying a national or state flag can be found with one painted 
on their cheek or on their garb when cheering for the athletic surrogates of their nation and state 
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at an international sporting event.41  This made the Olympics a truly unique and fitting venue for 
Japanese to create, perform and consume a reinvented national identity. 
The dissertation is divided into four main sections.  The first is a chronological history of 
the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics.  The last three are matrices of identity that I argue form the 
core of Japanese national identity, although I will not presume that this list is all encompassing 
or that there is no room for disagreement.  Instead, these are the main tropes that emerged from 
the discourse around the Games.  The first was Japan as a country of high technology and cutting 
edge science.  Second, that it was a modern country, like any Western one, but that still had its 
unique traditional culture—demonstrating that different facets of identity can often conflict.  
Finally, that Japan was now an international country with a peaceful character and goals. 
The second chapter is the closest to what one might call a history of the Tokyo Olympics.  
It provides a baseline for discussion, from applying for the Olympics to receiving them and other 
points in between.  The contents are largely factual and explanatory.  This is the first extended 
treatment of the Tokyo Olympics in English to do so, to the best of my knowledge. 
The third chapter focuses on Japan as a country of high technology and cutting edge 
science.  The most obvious example of this was the bullet train, or Shinkansen as it is commonly 
known in Japanese and increasingly in English.  However, for an Olympiad often referred to in 
the Japanese press as the “Scientific Olympics” (Kagaku Orinpikku/Gorin), it was only the start.  
The Japanese discourse was filled with other examples of Japanese production and use of 
technology.  For example, Japan built its own commercial airliner in time to ferry the Olympic 
                                                 
41 A German friend once commented on this while we were watching some international soccer.  Neither he nor his 
friends would dream of owning or displaying a German flag in their every day lives due to their aversion to state 
power, militarism and Germany’s troubled history.  However, they all had absolutely no problem painting the flag 
on their face for international sporting events to show their support for surrogates of the nation and representatives 
of the state. 
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Torch around Japan.  The JOC also imported international coaches and developed their own 
training techniques based on scientific principles to maximize Japan’s medal count, especially 
after a disappointing result at Rome in 1960.  In addition, these were the first Olympics to be 
broadcast live and in color across the world via satellite.  Finally, the Games themselves were 
aided by new technology, especially from new timing devices and computer aided result 
tabulation.  This was a way to compete with the other modern and mainly Western powers on an 
equal, or even superior, basis.  Japan had now returned to the world stage economically where it 
had failed militarily.  This identity was heavily dependent on the state for funding, planning and 
patronage—no other entity in the 1960s could have supported such large endeavors, especially 
the shinkansen.  This has echoes of early discourses of Japanese identity as Japan caught up to 
the West in science and technology in the early to mid 1900s. 
Identity is rarely pure and simple.  Many Japanese often saw themselves with a foot in 
both worlds—the modern and the traditional.  The fourth chapter focuses on the way Japanese 
tried to present themselves as modern, yet traditional.  This resembled earlier Japanese slogans 
from the mid to late 1800s of “Western technology and Eastern ethics.”  Japanese were very 
eager to have visiting Westerners recognize Japan as a fellow modern country rather than a 
backwards Oriental country.  At the same time, they presented themselves as a model to the non-
Western and less developed world.  The other side of this coin was that they marketed Japan as 
still possessing an ancient soul and culture—a trope that many in the wartime years also 
employed to emphasize Japan’s righteousness and purity.  This aspect also tended to be female, 
whereas the scientific and modern aspects were largely male dominated.  It was, as it were, a 
self-Orientalizing script.  I argue these two aspects are opposite sides of the same identity.  This 
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relied, in part, on state support, particularly as Tokyo remade its infrastructure in the mold of 
modern Western cities, but much of this was not dependent on or related to state activities. 
The final aspect of Japanese identity I argue is visible at the Tokyo Olympiad is Japan as 
a peace loving internationalist.  This was posited against Japanese wartime suffering and defeat.  
The trope portrayed Japan as reborn as something new and that the old enemy was now gone.  It 
subtly employed Hiroshima as a site of memory to emphasize their victimhood, while at the 
same time focusing on the youth of Japan.  The young represented a new and vigorous Japan that 
had recovered from the war—and not coincidently, had no memory of or part in the war.  Of 
course, this made the Japanese performance of self one that required the wartime past for 
comparison, but also denied it through misrememberance, purposeful forgetting and a single-
mindedly cheerful focus on the future. 
These are the nodes of commonality between the various webs of significance that I 
unearthed as I examined the tropes and discourses surrounding the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.  They 
were the most prevalent and also the least controversial aspects of Japan that emerged from the 
sources.  This is not to say they are a complete answer; I am quite certain there are others.  Nor is 
it to say there were not strong disagreements internally over other issues; there were.  I also do 
not try to incorporate all viewpoints, but having looked at thousands of pages of public discourse, 
focus on the most widely held and dominant tropes of identity as an analytical strategy.  This 
means I do not spend significant time or space in this work on the outliers and some dissidents, 
although their lives and outlooks are important.  But before I discuss the ideals many Japanese 
agreed upon, we must first discuss the story of the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics. 
Chapter 2 – A Host Reborn: From Uninvited Self to Honored Host 
 
“The meeting hadn’t even been going on for 30 minutes when a man dashed out.   
It was IOC Secretary General Otto Mayer and he yelled out ‘Tokyo!’”1 
 
 
 The world is a competitive place and almost everyone wants to win, whether it is in war, 
economics or politics.  There are few venues other than sports where a small country can 
compete on a nearly level field with the large and powerful.  Natural athletic potential and the 
ability to focus resources on a few elite athletes create this opportunity.  This is true for all levels 
of sports, but especially for international sports, including the Olympics.  In addition, admittance 
to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and therefore the right to participate in the 
Olympics Games marks a level of international status and acceptance that most governments 
crave.  Hosting the Olympics is an even higher reward given to only those judged as possessing a 
sufficiently strong economy to support the required infrastructure, as well as politically stable 
enough to avoid scandal and chaos.  This selection, carried out by the Westerner dominated 
International Olympic Committee, is also seen as a marker that a country has arrived on the 
world stage and is now part of the top tier of countries.2 
The first modern Olympiad was held in Athens in 1896.    Kanō Jigorō, the famous 
educator and founder of judo, became the first Asian member of the IOC in 1909 and was the 
first president of the Japan Olympic Committee (JOC).3  Japan joined its first Olympics in 1912 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Tokyo Orinpikku: sono 5 nenkan no ayumi (NHK Hōsō seron chōsajo, 1967), 7. 
2 Although the IOC is slightly more balanced geographically today, at the time of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics it was 
still dominated by Western Europe and the United States. 
3 Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games, Illinois history of sports (Urbana, IL: University 
of Illinois Press, 1992), 31. 
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at Stockholm, sending two athletes and two officials.4  It won the right to host the 1940 Summer 
Olympiad in 1936.5  This was a national prestige project that Japanese involved hoped would 
demonstrate not only Japanese national identity, but also mark Japan as a great power.  This was 
not without controversy, however, and rising tensions over Japanese expansion into China led to 
threats of a boycott from the British Empire Games Federation (now known as the 
Commonwealth Games).6  The head of the US Olympic Committee and future president of the 
IOC, Avery Brundage, opposed the boycott, arguing that “politics had no part in the Olympic 
movement” and asking “Why do athletes meddle with politics—have they no foreign 
office?”7   In 1938, given this atmosphere, as well as growing opposition to hosting the 
Olympiad from the Japanese central government due to costs during the ongoing war on the 
Asian continent, Tokyo relinquished its right to host the 1940 Games.8  As Tokyo Governor 
Yasui Seiichiro delicately wrote in Tokyo’s 1955 questionnaire for the 1960 application, “Tokyo 
                                                 
4 “JOC - Orinpikku no Gaiyō,” http://www.joc.or.jp/olympic/sanka/olympic_s2.html. 
5 For a more detailed examination of the cancelled Olympics, particularly as it relates to Japan-West relations, see 
Sandra Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics: Japan, the Asian Olympics and the Olympic 
Movement, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2008).  See also the third chapter of Jessamyn Reich Abel, “Warring 
internationalisms: Multilateral thinking in Japan, 1933--1964” (PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 2004), 
http://proquest.umi.com.proxy2.library.uiuc.edu/pqdweb?did=795932511&Fmt=7&clientId=36305&RQT=309&V
Name=PQD, 95-125. 
6 It is somewhat ironic that the globe spanning British Empire, which itself had grown through violence, would 
object to another empire trying to expand its own holdings.  The Chinese IOC member, C.T. Wang, needless to say, 
also protested and with far better justification than the British Empire possessed. 
7 Quoted in Guttmann, The Olympics, 73. 
8 The Olympiad was then awarded to runner-up Helsinki, but it too was cancelled when war erupted in Europe.  The 
Olympics were then indefinitely suspended until the London Games in 1948.  This was the first cancellation since 
1916, which was due to World War I.  To date, only the 1916, 1940 and 1944 Games have not been held since the 
return of the modern Olympics in 1896. 
 23
once had the honor to be selected as the host city for the Games of the 12th Olympiad, but to our 
great regret we ran into the misfortune of losing this chance on account of the fateful war.”9 
Following the Second World War, Japan's national sports federations were no longer in 
good standing with their international organizations, disqualifying Japanese athletes from 
international competitions, including the Olympics.  When the 1948 London Summer Olympiad 
was held, Japanese athletes were not invited, to their great disappointment and surprise.  They 
had even appealed directly to International Olympic Committee head Avery Brundage, writing in 
a New Year’s greeting that “we are quite anxious to participate in the coming London Games.”10  
Russell Durgin, an official with American Occupation’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in the 
Civil Information and Education Affairs Section was also enlisted to write an unofficial letter to 
Brundage inquiring as to the likelihood of Japan being invited.11  Brundage’s reply conveyed the 
obvious: 
The question of German and Japanese participation in the Games of the XIV Olympiad in 
London, next year, has been discussed at great length, not only by the organizations 
concerned but by the general public.12  Theoretically, the Games are open to all amateurs, 
providing there is a National Olympic Committee in their country to certify their entry.  
The question, of course, is whether or not more harm than good would come from the 
participation of the nationals of enemy countries so soon after the war.  As you know, 
                                                 
9 Answers to the Questionnaires on the Olympiad in 1960 (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 1955). 
10 Mr. Ichiro Sawada to Mr. Avery Brundage, New Year's Greeting Card, 1946, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 136, 
Japan NOC General Folder, University of Illinois Archives. 
11 Mr. Russell L Durgin to Mr. Avery Brundage, April 7, 1947, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 136, Japan NOC 
General Folder, University of Illinois Archives. 
12 Italy was not listed here by Brundage because Italian athletes were allowed to participate in the 1948 Summer and 
Winter Olympiads.  Italy was clearly not seen in the same light as the other two members of the Axis alliance. 
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human nature being what it is, there is a tremendous amount of bitterness and hatred 
abroad in the world.  The English are very badly off, as you are aware, and it would be 
very harmful to all concerned if there were demonstrations during the Games due to the 
presence of Germans and Japanese.13 
 
Brundage requested, in a handwritten postscript to the typed letter, that Durgin “please be good 
enough to keep this confidential.”  Publicly admitting the obvious truth would have meant 
admitting the role of politics in the Olympic movement. 
The Japanese instead held their own sports competition at the same time as the London 
Games and several results, particularly for swimming, were better than those of the London gold 
medalists.  The JOC refers to these as “phantom gold medals.”14  The Olympic 1500 meter 
freestyle race was won by American James McLane with a time of 19 minutes 18.5 seconds.  
Japanese swimming legend Furuhashi Hironoshin finished in 18 minutes 30 seconds and 
Hashizume Shirō would have taken the silver with a time of 18 minutes 37.8 seconds.  
Furuhashi’s time was an unofficial world record and he later set an official one in 1949 at a US-
Japan swim meet in Los Angeles.  Tragically, he was never able to win an Olympic gold 
medal—finishing eighth in his next chance in 1952. 
The Japanese continued in their quest for readmittance to the international sporting world 
and Brundage gave them his full support.  However, the obstacles were many.  In a reply to an 
inquiry by Brundage about the future of Japanese sports to Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers (SCAP), Major General W. F. Marquat, Chief of the Economic and Scientific Section, 
                                                 
13 Mr. Avery Brundage to Mr. Russell L. Durgin, April 25, 1947, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 136, Japan NOC 
General Folder, University of Illinois Archives. 
14 “JOC - Orinpikku no Rekishi,” http://www.joc.or.jp/olympic/history/003.html. 
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expressed to Brundage that the general feeling was “unequivocally in favor of readmitting the 
Japanese to international sports competitions just as soon as they are acceptable to the Allied 
powers and the necessary foreign exchange for expenses can be made available.”15  It was the 
issue of funding that Marquat emphasized, befitting his role in the Occupation.  He noted that 
“Japan is existing to such a large extent upon appropriated funds from the United States it is 
manifestly infeasible to expend proceeds from export for anything but…economic 
rehabilitation.”  Instead, he hoped to create a “trust fund” from domestic sporting events and 
contributions to fund Japanese international sports participation.16  However, most of the sports 
federations were already well on their way to international readmittance, despite Marquat’s 
financial concerns. 
The various Japanese sports federations had largely regained membership in their 
international organizations by 1950 and then immediately pursued readmittance to the IOC and 
Olympics.17  They were aided in this by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General 
Douglas MacArthur, himself, who wrote to the United States Olympic Committee, as well as 
IOC chair Avery Brundage, and asked them to urge the IOC to readmit Japan.18  MacArthur had 
a long history of involvement with sports and the Olympics.  He was Brundage’s predecessor as 
                                                 
15 While the term technically refers to General Douglas MacArthur as the head of the Occupation, in practice, it was 
often used interchangeably with GHQ.  In this case, SCAP was the designation used in the correspondence, which is 
why it is used here rather than GHQ.  Durgin, cited previously, used GHQ in his correspondence. 
16 Major General W.F. Marquat to Mr. Avery Brundage, July 7, 1949, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 136, Japan NOC 
The Japanese Olympic Committee 1937-1939, 1948-1950 Folder, University of Illinois Archives. 
17 While there is some confusion in the sources among those involved, the final decision seems to have been that 
Japanese athletic associations had not paid dues during the war and therefore were not in good standing with the 
various international athletic associations, but were still members since they had not been expelled nor had they 
withdrawn.  Therefore, they simply had to pay their dues and apply for reactivation.  Of course, this ignores the 
reality of the war and lingering animosity cited by Brundage himself. 
18 Seki Harunami, Sengo nihon no supōtsu seisaku: Sono kozo to tenkai (Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten, 1997), 108.  
MacArthur’s support was crucial as GHQ did not allow Japanese to travel freely overseas until 1950 and it was 
impossible to gain readmittance without being able to attend the IOC meetings. 
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the head of the United States Olympics Committee (USOC) and had served in that capacity for 
the 1928 Amsterdam Summer Olympiad.  Ultimately, Japan was allowed to send a representative 
to the 1950 IOC meeting as an observer, although he was accompanied by a “technical advisor” 
from GHQ.  The JOC regained admission to the IOC in 1951 and, in May of that year, was 
invited to participate in the 1952 Oslo Winter Olympics and Helsinki Summer Olympics—
participating for the first time since Berlin in 1936 and winning a total of 9 medals. 
  The Occupation officially ended on April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
came into effect and several months after the Winter Olympiad.19  This marked Japan’s 
reemergence as a sovereign country.  Less than one month after this, Tokyo Governor Yasui 
Seiichiro (1947-1959) proposed reapplying to host the Olympics, arguing that Japan needed to 
show the world its new self and identity.  A resolution to apply for the 1960 Summer Olympics 
passed the Tokyo Assembly on May 19, 1952.20  Clearly, hosting the Games was considered 
important by those involved and they acted as soon as was possible.  Indeed, many of the 
principal actors from the prewar Olympic movement remained the same and they renewed their 
push to host the Olympics.  However, the road until this point had been long and sometimes 
torturous. 
Under the Occupation, the national sports policy had been forced to match the broader 
goals of SCAP—for sports, this meant democratization.  They were ordered to abandon training 
of elite athletes and focus on the masses—“sports for everyone."  This ended when the early 
reformation policies ended with the "Reverse Course."  This occurred in the late 1940s when the 
                                                 
19 The treaty was not signed by all countries involved in the war in Asia, the most prominent one being the Soviet 
Union.  North and South Korea, as well as the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China on 
the mainland, were not invited, which served as a major source of friction between the Soviet Union and the West. 
20 Tōkyō-to, Dai 18-kai Orinpikku kyōgitaikai Tōkyō-to hōkokusho, 4. 
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United States decided Japan would be a good ally in the emerging Cold War and unraveled many 
of the Occupations early reforms—even unsuccessfully urging Japan to rearm itself with 
offensive and defensive military capabilities.21  This allowed Japanese sports policy to refocus 
on what one scholar has called "victory at all costs" (shōrishijōshugi) and "elitism" (i.e., training 
of only the proverbial best of the best) (shōsūseieishugi).22  This later coincided with th
government’s desire in the late 1950s and early 1960s to unify the Japanese nation through 
“patriotic education” and Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s policy of “making people” 
(ningenzukuri) who would benefit the state.  Elite athletes competing on international stages as 
surrogates for the nation under the (unofficial) state flag was a valuable way for the state to 
promote patriotism in a non-threatening fashion as the traditional military tropes were largely 
unavailable to them following the disastrous empire building and war.  
e 
                                                
Tokyo originally applied for the 1960 Summer Olympics, but did not receive it, placing 
dead last in the voting in 1955.  In fact, the Japanese knew they could not win the voting before it 
even began.  During a visit to Japan earlier that year, IOC President Avery Brundage had told 
those Japanese involved in the effort that “I think Tokyo is impossible…for the 17th Olympiad 
(1960).  The reason is that more than half of the participating countries are from Europe and with 
the 16th Olympiad in Melbourne, this will pose geographic challenges.”23  It was simply too far 
and too expensive in the days before cheap and readily accessible airplane travel.  As he wrote to 
Japanese athletes later that year, this was the “greatest obstacle confronting Tokyo’s desire to 
 
21 The result was the Self Defense Forces—more than a police force, but arguably less than a full fledged military, 
and constitutionally restricted from using military force beyond its borders—although this has been considerably 
loosened over time as the SDF has more recently participated in United Nations peacekeeping missions, as well as in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 
22 Seki Harunami, Sengo Nihon No Supotsu Seisaku, 86. 
23 Azuma Ryūtarō, Orinpikku (Tokyo: Waseda Shobō, 1962), 121. 
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stage the Games of the XVII Olympiad in 1960.”24  However, he also encouraged Tokyo and the 
JOC to put forward their best effort in their bid for the 1960 Games in order to create an 
awareness among the IOC members of the Japanese desire to host for a future bid.25  He 
encouraged Tokyo to apply for the 1964 Olympiad as it was more likely to win that selection.  
Beyond distance, the IOC and various NOC also had concerns about Japan’s state of readiness to 
host such a large international event, given that it, and Tokyo specifically, was a mere decade 
removed from being razed to the ground by American fire bombings—a concern shared by many 
Japanese at this early date.  In order to alleviate these fears among Olympic officials, IOC 
member and later Tokyo Governor, Azuma Ryūtarō, proposed a “change in strategy” to Tokyo 
officials in the near certain event Tokyo lost out on their bid.26  He argued the JOC should invite 
the IOC to hold its 54th Annual Meeting in Tokyo in 1958.  This would coincide with the 3rd 
annual Asian Games and would be one year before the host city of the 18th Olympiad was to be 
decided.  He believed this to be perfect timing to demonstrate Tokyo’s “superior management 
capability for athletic competitions.” to IOC members 27  The plan was adopted and bore fruit the 
next year during the Melbourne Games when Tokyo was chosen as host for the 54th Annual 
Meeting—the first time it would be held in a non-Western country. 
The motto of the 3rd Asian Games was “Ever Onward,” metaphorically looking forward 
to a promising future rather than dwelling on Japan’s problematic past, especially regarding other 
                                                 
24 Avery Brundage, “New Year's Greeting to Japanese Sportsmen from Avery Brundage, President, International 
Olympic Committee,” December 1955, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 136, Japan NOC General 1951-1964 Folder, 
University of Illinois Archives. 
25 Azuma Ryūtarō, Orinpikku, 121. 
26 He was also one of the first supporters of the bid to host the 1940 Olympics. 
27 Ibid., 122. 
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Asian countries it was hosting.  As touched upon previously, hosting the IOC Annual Meeting 
concurrently served several functions.  First, it demonstrated that Tokyo had the necessary sports 
infrastructure to host an Olympiad, always a central concern for the IOC.28  Second, IOC 
members would see Tokyo had the required organizational skills to run a large international 
sporting event.   Third, and perhaps most importantly, it provided the opportunity to influence 
IOC members for the 25 member countries that attended the meeting on an individual level.  The 
personal experience and showmanship seemed to have had an effect; Brundage later wrote that 
“we have never had a more impressive opening ceremony for an IOC session and I am sure none 
of the members present will forget the happy days in Japan.”  He continued that the Asian 
Games’ Closing Ceremony “was the best affair of its kind I have ever seen” and that it should be 
used a model to help Rome with the 1960 Olympics.  Last and certainly not least, the experience 
convinced Brundage that “Tokyo [was] ready, willing and able to stage the Olympic Games.”29  
This approval was music to Japanese ears and they redoubled their efforts to win the 1964 
Olympiad. 
The central government, particularly the foreign ministry, also marshaled its forces to 
garner crucial IOC votes for the 1964 Summer Olympics.  As with any election, the competition 
is always crucial.  Tokyo faced Detroit (USA), Vienna (Austria) and Brussels (Belgium).  This 
gave Tokyo an advantage as they expected the votes from Western countries would be divided 
among the three, but it also meant that Tokyo’s chances would decrease if it could not win at the 
start.  Olympic host city voting eliminates the lowest vote getter if the top candidate does not win 
a majority of the votes.  The assumption for the 1964 Olympics was that as each Western city 
                                                 
28 All involved knew that Tokyo needed better transportation and housing infrastructure in 1955. 
29 Avery Brundage to Azuma Ryotaro, June 19, 1958, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 50, University of Illinois 
Archives. 
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dropped out, its votes were more likely to go to another Western city than to Tokyo.  However, 
working in their favor, Brundage was known to favor Japan as he wanted to have a non-Western 
host.30  In addition, the 1960 Olympiad would be in Rome, so the other European cities were at a 
slight disadvantage as many would want them to be held on a different continent.  From the very 
start of the 1964 effort, the Japanese realized that they would need to use all diplomatic means at 
their disposal: cultural, political and economic,31 in order to secure the support of states 
represented in the IOC.32  The effort involved a variety of committees and included not only JOC 
and sports association members, but also both national and Tokyo Metropolitan politicians.  This 
also had to be pursued within the context of the Cold War—although Japan turned out to be a 
more palatable option that the other three for the IOC members from the Soviet Bloc countries. 
 The major push was started by the Japan Sports Association (JASA).33  They gave the 83 
minute color video recording of the 3rd Asian Games, “Youthful Beauty and Strength,” to the 
Foreign Ministry to be shown in Central and South America in late 1958, mere months after the 
Games had ended.  The JOC had previously identified this area as a target for recruiting the 
necessary votes to win the election, and therefore, launched a “Central and South American 
Maneuver” (Chūnanbei kōsaku).  Given the problems they foresaw for the European cities, 
Tokyo and Japan were competing with Detroit for the more than 10 votes at stake in the region.  
Among other places, it was shown in January of the next year at a meeting in Venezuela of the 
                                                 
30 The Japanese also knew he had a great interest in traditional Japanese culture and Asian art and felt this would 
help their bid.  I will discuss this further in Chapter 4. 
31 While this is in direct contradiction of the Olympic ideals, cases such as the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics have 
demonstrated this was the norm rather than exception. 
32 Hatano Masaru, Tokyo Orinpikku e no haruka na michi (Tokyo: Soshisa, 2004), 115-117. 
33 The Japanese name for the organization is Nihon Taiiku Kyōkai.  In English, both the Japan Sports Association 
and the Japan Amateur Athletic Association were used interchangeably at the time.  This seemed to vary by 
publication with little discernable pattern. 
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Central and South American Track and Field Association.34  Japanese wrestling legend Hatta 
Ichirō and Olympic Invitation Committee Head, and a member of the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Assembly, Kitajima Yoshihiko went on a tour of Central and South America later that year to 
garner support.  By all reports, they were successful and well received, although Kitajima 
tragically passed away from cancer shortly after returning to Japan.35 
The JOC, OOC and Japanese government also enlisted others for this effort and reached 
out to local citizens of Japanese descent.  In particular, they recruited the aid of Fred Isamu 
Wada, a Japanese American who had lived in both the United States and Japan.  In the late 1950s, 
he was a successful California businessman who owned his own chain of produce stores.  He had 
been involved with Japanese sportsmen when they visited the United States from the early 
postwar and he remained an invaluable liaison between the JOC and American officials, 
including IOC President Avery Brundage.  Wada had been named a member of the OOC, and in 
early 1959, he was asked by Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke36 and Foreign Minister 
Fujiyama Aiichirō to travel to Central and South America as part of the effort there to get 
commitments to support Tokyo over the other cities.37  Wada and his wife, Masako, left on 
March 29, 1964 and did not return to California until May 5th; they visited almost every country 
in Latin America during that time.  They garnered support in several ways.  Wada emphasized 
that Europe had just hosted an Olympics and therefore, Brussels and Vienna should not be 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 137. 
35 He had been treated for cancer, but apparently did not realize this was the diagnosis.  Although unusual by 
Western standards, in Japan is it common for medical diagnoses to be provided to family members who then decide 
whether to inform the patient or not.  In this case, although he had stomach surgery earlier that year, he was not 
informed about the cancer. 
36 Kishi was imprisoned as a Class A War Criminal following World War II, but never stood trial and was released 
by GHQ in 1948. 
37 Takasugi Ryō, Sofu e, atsuki kokoro o: Tōkyō ni Orinpikku o yonda otoko (Tokyo: Shinchō-sha, 1990), 347-353. 
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considered.  Furthermore, he stressed that Asia had never hosted an Olympics and that it was 
time a non-Western country was selected.  As a corollary, he promised that the JOC would 
support any bids from Latin America in return for their support—particularly important as 
Mexico was already considering a bid for the 1968 Olympics.38 
This cooperation between the political and sporting worlds set the stage for the 55th IOC 
General Meeting in Munich, where the final decision would be made.  However, before this 
occurred, the Japanese bid was put into potential jeopardy by Tokyo politics.  While the effort 
would suffer several minor scandals due to cronyism and financial matters, its biggest potential 
roadblock was the mixing of politics and sports.  The Japanese effort was being led by the IOC 
member and Japan Amateur Athletic Association (JAAA) President, Azuma Ryūtarō.  In 1958, 
the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) approached and asked him to run for the Tokyo 
Governorship.  This had the potential to upset IOC head Brundage, who would undoubtedly view 
it as mixing politics and sports.   
By most reports, Azuma was reluctant to run, but was convinced by others that if he did 
not, the Socialist Party candidate and prewar Foreign Minister (1936-1937, 1938-1939, 1940), 
Arita Hachirō, might win the election.39  According to a supporter who wrote Brundage to 
explain and head off any problems, the JAAA had been “unanimously against it” but “were 
ultimately persuaded by [Primer Minister] Kishi [Nobusuke].”    The most persuasive argument 
was that if Arita, a “leftist even in the [Socialist] Party” was elected, the “Metropolitan Police 
would be entirely under the command of the radical group to the result that public security could 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 365-367.  Mexico did win the following bid and Mexico City served as the host for the 1968 Summer 
Olympics. 
39 Arita, as Foreign Minister in 1940, officially proposed the idea of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in 
a radio address.  Although contrary to expectations, in the postwar period, he ran for office with the Socialist Party, 
including twice for Governor of Tokyo (1955, 1959), failing both times. 
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hardly be maintained.”  The undoubtedly alarmist interpretation of events had an underlying 
message: if Azuma did not win the Tokyo Olympiad might be threatened and have to be 
cancelled again.  However, Azuma’s supporter wanted to reassure Brundage that “Sport itself did 
not sell to Politics.”40  Interestingly, Azuma himself had sent a letter the previous month to 
Brundage and merely informed him that he had “resigned from the presidency of the Japanese 
Olympic Committee in order to stand as a candidate for the Governor of Tokyo Metropolis 
[sic].”41  Azuma ran unaffiliated with any party officially, but with the endorsement and support 
of the conservative, and politically dominant, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  His candidacy 
was based, in part, on his Olympic credentials and he won narrowly against Arita in the April 
1959. 
Therefore it was Tokyo Governor Azuma who led the delegation to Munich in May of 
1958.  The media coverage focused on his task and forecasts of IOC support for Tokyo.  As late 
as the day before Azuma was leaving for Munich, the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee 
(OOC) had secured the promise of support from only four countries: the Philippines, Turkey, 
Australia, and of course Japan.  The Philippines’ IOC member had announced he would not 
attend the meeting, only to change his mind a week beforehand.  The Asahi Shinbun reported 
rumors were circulating that Japan had promised to pay his travel expenses.42  This is entirely 
possible.  When Fred Wada toured Latin America to secure support, an IOC member from Brazil 
informed him that while the two Brazilian IOC members wanted to support Japan, the two 
                                                 
40 Ichiro Sawada to Avery Brundage, February 14, 1959, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 136, Japan NOC The 
Japanese Olympic Committee 1951-1964 Folder, University of Illinois Archives. 
41 Azuma Ryūtarō to Avery Brundage, January 24, 1959, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 50, Azuma Ryotoro Folder, 
University of Illinois Archives. 
42 “Chūmoku no IOC sōkai chikazuku - Gorin kaisaichi, 27nichi asa kimaru,” Asahi Shinbun, May 19, 1959, 
evening  edition. 
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thousand dollars required for the trip to Munich was beyond their means.  Wada told him that if 
the local Japanese Brazilian community could not come up with sufficient donations that he 
would personally make up the difference.  When Wada informed the local Japanese (Brazilian) 
Committee (nihonjin-kai), they reportedly supported his promise of support and told Wada to 
“leave it to us.”43  While this type of financial promise was almost certainly against the rules, the 
Japanese involved were willing to pursue any and all avenues to achieve victory. 
The JOC was somewhat confident that they could win on the first round of voting.  
Azuma reported that IOC members were well aware the Olympics had never been held in Asia, 
as well as that Tokyo had lost the opportunity to host the Games almost 30 years previous and 
this would work in their favor.  They needed a majority of the 64 total IOC votes—but there 
were also 10 announced absences, leaving only 54 votes available.  According to news reports, 
they had a goal of 30 votes on the first round of voting, but estimated a possibility of 33.  This 
was in no small part due to reports that the Soviet Bloc intended to support Tokyo over the 
European and American cities.  The unofficial estimate was as follows:44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Takasugi Ryō, Sofu e, atsuki kokoro o: Tōkyō ni Orinpikku o yonda otoko, 388-389. 
44 “Chūmoku no IOC sōkai chikazuku - Gorin kaisaichi, 27nichi asa kimaru.” 
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 IOC Members Absences Support Tokyo 
Europe 27 0 12 
Soviet Bloc 8 1 7 
Australia 3 1 2 
Central/South America 11 5 6 
North America 4 0 1 
Africa and Asia 11 3 5 
Total 64 10 33 
Figure 1-1: Estimated Votes for Tokyo’s 1964 Olympic 
Host Bid at 1958 IOC Meeting in Munich, Germany 
 
Governor Azuma and former Governor Yasui departed for Munich on January 20th to 
massive media coverage.  The whole country was watching them and waiting for the result.  
When the results came in a week later, they were better than expected.  Japan had won 34 votes 
in the first round and was awarded the 18th Summer Olympiad, to be held in 1964.  They had 
indeed picked up the Soviet and Eastern European votes.  JASA acting head Takeda Tsuneyoshi 
admitted in a phone call with the celebrating delegation that things had gone “just as predicted.”  
The delegation itself related that they were being congratulated on the streets of Munich.   
The reaction in the media was surprisingly muted.  While the mass media had covered the 
bid and meeting with great anticipation, and clearly welcomed the decision, almost all coverage 
immediately turned to concerns.  The “sports facilities [are] completely inadequate for hosting 
the Olympics Games.”45  In addition, the “transportation system, hospitality facilities” and other 
areas were all “difficult problems…to overcome.”  The business newspaper, the Nihon Keizai 
                                                 
45 “Orinpikku Tokyo kaisai no kettei,” Asahi Shinbun, May 27, 1959, sec. editorial. 
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Shinbun even worried that at the next IOC meeting, the Japanese IOC members’ promises would 
have turned to be “lies.”46  Although the JOC had made a habit of referring back to the 1940 bid 
and cancelled Games in not always subtle reminders that Tokyo was owed another Olympics, the 
mass media had rarely referred to it until this point, the moment of redemption.  At this, the 
moment of redemption, they referred to it as the fulfillment of their “deepest desire of 27 
years.”47 
In fact, the largest worry was money.  Media reports estimated that a minimum of 200 
billion yen (approximately US$556 million in 1959) would be necessary.48  Everyone was 
asking the same question: where would all that money come from?  According to the JOC, the 
money was to be allocated from three categories of sources: the central government, Tokyo itse
and funds gathered from other sources.  One such source was the sale of memorabilia, includin
a special brand of cigarettes, “Olympias,” as well as other commemorative packs (see Figure 1-
2).  In a book for public consumption concerning the Olympics, the JOC offered up these items
as ways the Games were being paid for—and as a subtle hint of how readers could financiall
support them.
lf 
g 
 
y 
                                                
49  The packs of Olympias carried the 5 Olympic Rings logo and raised over 322.6 
million yen.  Stamps, telephone book advertising and proceeds from racing events and racing 
associations (horse, cycling, small car and yachting) brought in the most revenue at 968.7, 959.9 
and 800.1 million yen respectively.  In total, over 6 billion yen were raised through fund raising 
 
46 “Gorin Tokyo taikai kettei ni atatte,” Nihon Keizai Shinbun, May 27, 1959, sec. editorial. 
47 “Orinpikku, Tokyo ni kimaru made - 27nenkan no nengan, "Kaigi wa odoru" sū jukkai,” Mainichi Shinbun, May 
27, 1959. 
48 “Tokyo Gorin taikai no kettei,” Tokyo Shinbun, May 27, 1959, sec. editorial. 
49 Orinpikku dokuhon,  MEJ 4198 (JOC 62-C-0112) (Tokyo: Monbushō, 1963), 18. 
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efforts.50  However, by far the most controversial decision was to push for raising money 
through sports gambling. 
 
Figure 1-2: “Kin’en Tabako ‘Orinpiasu’ (Commemorative cigarettes).”  
Source: author’s photo, Prince Chichibu Sports Museum. 
The issue arose over allowing sports gambling, called totokarucho, from the Italian word, 
totocalcio (English: total).  It was a system where participants would buy a sheet with the day’s 
sporting events.51  They would have to select win, lose or draw for each event.  Those who chose 
all correctly would win rewards.  Originally a system for betting on Italian soccer, it was 
practiced in 16 countries, including several Communist ones, in the late 1950s.  In the case of 
                                                 
50 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964: The Official Report of the Organizing Committee (Volume 1) 
(Tokyo: Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, 1966), 63. 
51 The system still exists today, better known as “Toto” and is an important source of funding for sports in Japan.  
Baseball and soccer results are the major sports involved currently. 
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Japan, it would apply to baseball and sumo.  It had been proposed as a possible way to pay for 
the Olympics even before the bid was successful, but was tabled in the face of strong 
opposition—especially from those who felt it violated the spirit of the Olympics.  The editors of 
the Tokyo Shinbun wrote that “we cannot agree with using this sort of method in relation to 
something like the Olympics that is supposed to be a pure event.”52   Given the strong opposition, 
Azuma had to backtrack and upon returning from Munich announced that totokarucho was not 
appropriate for funding the Olympics.53  In the end, they settled upon an “Olympic Lottery” to 
raise badly needed funds.54  This lottery put the Olympic emblem on lottery tickets and a two 
percent “donation” would be sent to the Olympic Organizing Committee (OOC).55  From 1960 
to 1964, it raised 362.3 million yen.56  However, this was a drop in the bucket compared to the 
true cost of hosting the Tokyo Olympiad. 
                                                
The media had estimated hosting the Olympics would cost at least 200 billion yen, but 
that proved to be a wildly inaccurate underestimation once all related projects were concluded.  
If one only counted expenses directly related to the Games, the total was approximately 26 
billion yen ($72 million).  The OOC and JOC incurred expenses of approximately 10 billion yen 
and government expenditures for sporting facilities across several prefectures57 were another 16 
 
52 “Tokyo Gorin taikai no kettei.” 
53 “Kotoshi no dekigoto (totokarucho Gorin kōenkai mondai),” Sankei Shinbun, December 11, 1959. 
54 “Hyaku zyū oku-en kakaru Tokyo gorin - Kaneatsume no hōhō kimaru - Yaku hangaku o takarakuji,” Mainichi 
Shinbun, June 30, 1960, evening  edition. 
55 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 65. 
56 Ibid., 63. 
57 Events were held in Tokyo, Saitama Prefecture and Kanagawa Prefecture—in addition, Yokohama, capitol of 
Kanagawa Prefecture, separately funded facilities related to the Games.  The central government also funded 
improvements and construction of national facilities such as the National Stadium and National Gymnasium. 
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billion yen.58  However, the infrastructure and beautification projects, as well as a subsidy to 
encourage hotel construction dwarfed the relatively small 26 billion yen.  These costs totaled 
over 960 billion yen ($2.67 billion), almost five times higher than original public estimates.  
Over 33% of this cost was assigned to construction of the New Tokaido Trunk Line (i.e., bullet 
train line).  The two other largest costs, at approximately 20% each, were the new Tokyo 
highway system and the extensions of subway lines.  This was a staggering sum, although the 
JOC argued in its official report that “it is proper to express the total expenditures for the Tokyo 
Olympic Games as 26 billion yen.”59  However, the IOC had another answer for critics of the 
other 960 billion yen associated in most minds with the Olympics.  They argued this Olympics 
would see up to 10,000 foreign athletes and staff from almost 100 countries and there would not 
be another foreseeable chance like this.  Therefore, the transportation infrastructure and various 
facilities for “communication, environmental hygiene and tourism” all needed to be improved 
and prepared—even without the Olympics they would have been necessary eventually.60  Indeed, 
the majority of the infrastructure projects benefited Japanese—other than transportation between 
housing and sporting venues or transportation from ships or airports to housing and stadium 
construction, foreign visitors would not see most of the improvements.61 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 62, 65-66. 
59 Ibid., 66. 
60 Orinpikku dokuhon: kōtō gakkō-seinen gakkyū muke, MEJ 4194 (JOC 62-C-0112) (Monbushō, 1963), 15.  A 
similar message for teachers to share with their students also appeared in, Mokudai Tetsuo, ed., Kyōshi no tame no 
Tōkyō Orinpikku shiryō (Tokyo: Orinpikku Tōkyō Soshiki Iinkai, 1961), 21. 
61 However, as is the case for most Olympics, the OOC had (ultimately unfulfilled) dreams of vast numbers of 
tourists who would not only tour Tokyo, but also Kyoto and Osaka on the new bullet train.  See Chapters 3 and 4 for 
a further discussion of the symbolic meanings attached to some of these projects. 
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Of the almost one trillion yen, only 6 billion yen came from fundraising efforts.62  The 
rest came from Olympic taxes and government funding.  The LDP, the ruling party for almost 
the entire postwar period, including the entire 1950s and 1960s, strongly supported the Olympic 
bid from the beginning.63  However, when the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee was 
decided, the LPD expressed great dissatisfaction with the selections.  The committee was a group 
of 24 members of whom 20 were chosen on September 2, 1959.  This included seven bureaucrats 
from the central government, four people who worked for Tokyo, three from JASA, two from 
broadcasting/communications, two political figures (one from the Socialist Party and one from 
the LDP), two academics, two from the financial world, one from the JOC and one unidentified 
member.64  The composition of the group sparked an immediate political backlash along two 
fronts.  First, there were many people with deep relations to various Olympic competitions and 
sports who had been left out.  Second, there was not enough representation of the political sphere.  
The second seems to have been the more serious offense.  LDP Secretary General Kawashima 
Shōjirō went straight to the JASA President Tsushima Juichi and told him they needed to reselect 
the members with more members from political parties.  Kawashima warned Tsushima that for 
the Olympics to succeed, it would “need the cooperation from a variety of fields” and that 
“ignoring the political parties’ position” needed to be rethought.  In short, the political parties, 
especially the LDP wanted more power over the event, especially as they would be footing most 
of the bill.   
                                                 
62 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 63. 
63 Technically, the conservative Liberal Party was in power in the 1950s until 1955 when it merged with the 
conservative Democratic Party to form the Liberal Democratic Party.  This new political party remained in power 
until 1993, when it lost an election to a coalition of opposition parties. 
64 “Mazu 20shi kimaru - Orinpikku Tokyo taikai soshikii,” Asahi Shinbun, September 3, 1959. 
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The OOC’s preferred solution was simply to add more members, which would push the 
Committee to around 30 members rather than remove people already announced as members.65  
This power play and proposed solution was roundly criticized in the media.  Most argued that 
adding members made the OOC unwieldy without clear lines of responsibility.  More important, 
it was seen as a violation of the spirit, if not law, of the Olympics.  The Tokyo Shinbun urged 
those involved to reflect on the first clause of the Olympic Charter, which forbid politics from 
mixing with sports and reminded them that an Olympiad was awarded to a city and not a country, 
although even it had to admit the state had an important role to play in preparations.66  The Asahi 
Shinbun further argued that while the “the power of the government and political parties was 
necessary,” this only required communication between the sports and legislative bodies—politics 
and sports needed to be kept separate.67  In the end, the total number was only increased by one, 
but the original seven bureaucrats were replaced with political party members.68  This was a 
stark reminder of who possessed the real power in the relationship between sports official
organizations and the central government, as well as demonstrated the desire to control and be 
associated with such an important and likely positive national prestige project.  The final 
composition of the OOC was:
 and 
                                                
69 
From the sporting world:  Takaishi Shingorō—IOC member; Tsushima Juichi—
President of the both the JOC and JASA; Tabata Masaji—JOC Secretary General and 
 
65 “Orinpikku Tokyo taikai, soshikii jinji ni yokoyari - "Kokkai giin o fuyase",” Tokyo Shinbun, September 4, 1959. 
66 “Orinpikku kenshō ichidoku o,” Tokyo Shinbun, September 6, 1959, sec. editorial. 
67 “Orinpikku soshikii no jinsen,” Asahi Shinbun, September 10, 1959, sec. editorial. 
68 “25iin ga hongimaru - Tokyo orinpikku soshikii,” Asahi Shinbun, September 12, 1959. 
69 The committee members changed over time—this list reflects the composition at the start of the process after its 
political reorganization. 
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JASA Director70; Takeda Tsuneyoshi—JOC standing member; and Fukunaga Kenji—
President of the Saitama Prefectural Amateur Sports Association (JASA subdivision).   
From the political sphere: Matsuda Takechiyo—Minister of Education; Fukuda 
Tokuyasu—Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office; Nakamura Umekichi—
House of Representatives (LDP); Ōkubo Tomejirō—House of Representatives (LDP); 
Yanagita Shūichi—House of Representatives (Japan Socialist Party); Yasui Ken—House 
of Councilors (LDP); Shigemori Toshiharu—House of Councilors (JSP); Azuma 
Ryūtarō—IOC member and Governor of Tokyo (officially unaffiliated, but LDP 
supported), Suzuki Shunichi—Vice-Governor of Tokyo; Uchida Michiharu—Speaker of 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly (unlisted affiliation); Kitada Ichirō—Vice-Speaker of 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly (unlisted affiliation); Katō Yoshio—member of the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly and LDP Secretary General of the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Assembly (LDP); and Uchiyama Iwatarō—Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture (unlisted 
affiliation).   
From the business world:  Adachi Tadashi—President of the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry; Ishizaka Taizo—President of the Federation of Economic 
Organizations; Honda Chikao—President of the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors 
Association; and Nomura Hideo—President of NHK.   
From the academic and scientific fields:  Asanuma Inejiro—academic (gakushiki 
keikensha); Matsunaga Tō—academic; and Yasui Seiichirō.   
                                                 
70 For unknown reasons, the official report leaves out his role with JASA.  The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 
1964, 60. 
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There were also three men appointed as auditors:  Hori Takeyoshi—President of 
the Tokyo Bankers Association; Ōta Tetsuzo—President of the Japan Certified Public 
Accountants Association; and Sakurada Takeshi—President of Nisshin Spinning.   
These were the 25 official members of the OOC and the 3 additional auditors.  Following the 
reorganization, the LDP held a dominant position, although the JSP was also represented. 
While the political elites eagerly struggled for power and control over the Olympic 
Organizing Committee, and everyone worried about the costs, the ordinary citizens were more 
ambivalent or even negative towards hosting an Olympics.  The Broadcast Public Opinion 
Research Lab of the Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK), Japan’s public television organization, 
compiled a study of public opinion concerning the Olympics, Tokyo Olympics: That Five Year 
Course.  They examined a variety of surveys, including their own in order to measure changes 
over time and place from 1959 to 1964.  The Statistical Mathematics Research Laboratory of the 
Ministry of Education asked Tokyo residents if they “thought it possible or not to carry out a 
magnificent Olympics?”  While 61% replied “yes” in May 1959 and only 24% replied “no,” by 
the May 1960 survey, more Japanese felt it impossible than possible.  Two years after the 
original survey, the mood bottomed out with only 36% felt it possible and 57% believed it was 
not possible.  Clearly the mood had shifted.71  The number of those who were confident that it 
would be a smashing success as opposed to a moderate success did not reach 20% of the 
optimists until 1964, indicating that even those who were predicting success were often less than 
certain.72 
                                                 
71 Tokyo Orinpikku: sono 5 nenkan no ayumi, 38. 
72 Ibid., 39-40. 
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There is likely a direct link between contemporary political events and the dropping 
public confidence in hosting a successful Olympiad.  The United States-Japan Security Treaty, 
signed at the end of the Occupation, laid out the relationship between the two countries.  When 
Prime Minister Kishi took office in 1957, he led an effort to renegotiate the treaty.  The 
negotiations took several years, but the revised treaty was finally signed in January 19, 1960.  
However, this was unpopular among the opposition, who used parliamentary tactics to delay 
ratification.  This came to a head in June when the LDP called a snap vote with only LDP 
members present and ratified the treaty.  This controversial act sparked massive demonstrations 
through mid June.  Hundreds of thousands participated in demonstrations across the country over 
the treaty and the LDP’s tactics.  They forced President Dwight D. Eisenhower to cancel a 
planned visit to Japan after his press secretary had to flee by helicopter from demonstrators that 
were threatening to overturn his limousine on June 10.  Five days later, a young female protestor 
was crushed to death during a demonstration.  These two events seemed to have caused many 
Japanese to take a step back.  Although the demonstrations died down swiftly after this and were 
never again an issue before the Tokyo Olympiad, Kishi was still forced to resign on July 19, 
1960.  He was replaced by Ikeda Hayato, who famously promised to double Japanese incomes 
within ten years.  Thus it is no surprise that Japanese confidence in successfully hosting the 
Olympics was lower in May 1960—confidence in the system itself was at a low.   
If this controversial treaty renewal and the demonstrations had happened in the previous 
year, it seems likely that Tokyo would have lost its bid.  As it were, the massive scale of the 
demonstrations, and the forced cancellation of President Eisenhower’s visit, must have worried 
the OOC.  Unfortunately, although perhaps predictably, there is no trace of this in the JOC or 
OOC records.  Even more surprisingly, there seems to be no intersection of the Tokyo Olympics 
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and the demonstrations in the mass media.  There were certainly more immediate political 
concerns, especially considering the tactics of the LDP, the actions of the demonstrators and the 
death of a protestor, but if the demonstrations had not died down, this would have seriously 
affected Tokyo’s ability to host the Olympiad without issue.  One only needs to look at the 
events of Mexico City in 1968 to see an example of this.  However, the discourses of the two do 
not appear to have intersected in the mass media. 
The Prime Minister’s Public Relations Office also conducted a series of surveys 
regarding Olympic support and sentiment.  It ran in three stages—surveying the public in 
October 1962, March 1964 and December 1964.  The survey examined national sentiment and 
that of Tokyo separately—this allowed a comparison between the nation and those who 
personally experienced both the positive and negative aspects of hosting the Games.  When 
asked the purpose of the Olympics, 43% nationally and 51% in Tokyo replied that it was for a 
“country or ethnic nation (minzoku) to meet and show (shimeshiau) its power.” 73  This was 
almost double the other most common responses—only around 20% of each replied that it was a 
competition between individuals, which was then and is now the official stated policy of the 
IOC.74  Almost 50% of respondents nationally wanted to go and see the Olympics (Tokyoites 
were at over 60%, most likely reflecting their proximity to the events).75  On financial matters, 
the majority had not participated in fund raising efforts, but their responses to further questions 
on funding revealed serious doubts.  The survey asked whether or not they supported spending 
                                                 
73 Sōridaijinfu naikaku sōridaijin kanbō kōhōsitsu, “Orinpikku Tokyo taikai ni kansuru seron chōsa,” in Tokyo 
Orinpikku: sono 5 nenkan no ayumi, 253. 
74 See Chapter 5 for a further discussion of the conflict between nationalism and universalistic individualism 
(bringing together individuals in peaceful competition to promote world peace) of the Olympics. 
75 Ibid., 252. 
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government funds on a large scale “given that this opportunity will not come a second time.”  
While one might expect the support for this would be higher in Tokyo, where citizens would 
more directly and personally reap the benefits of the infrastructure spending—of course, they 
would also bear the brunt of the inconveniences related to construction—, the survey revealed 
the opposite, albeit by a relatively narrow margin.  Nationally, 19.8% supported large scale 
spending, while only 15.1% did in Tokyo.  On the other hand, clear majorities in both, 59.8% 
and 71.8% respectively, felt that expenditures should be appropriate to the contemporary 
condition of Japan.  The remaining 10%-15% either could not pick or did not know.76 
While the Japanese nation was not always confident the Olympics would be successfully 
held, the government continued to push ahead with their preparations.  First, the issue of sporting 
events had to be decided.  As of May 1959, there were twenty-one Olympic sports: athletics (i.e., 
track and field), archery, rowing, basketball, boxing, cycling, canoeing, fencing, football (soccer), 
gymnastics, handball, (field) hockey, modern pentathlon, swimming and diving, equestrian 
events, shooting, (men’s) volleyball, water polo, weightlifting, wrestling, and yachting.  
However, the JOC and affiliated sports federations were pushing to add several sports at the 
same time there was an IOC push to reduce the number of sports.77  First and foremost, they 
wanted to add judo and were successful at doing so at the 1960 Rome IOC General Session by a 
vote of 39-2.78  Later that year, the total number of sports was reduced to 20 when archery and 
handball were removed from the roster of sports.  At the 59th IOC General Session in Moscow, 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 254. 
77 The 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics has a somewhat different list, but hosted 28 sports. 
78 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 43. 
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women’s volleyball was also added—on the condition that the total number of volleyball teams 
didn’t exceed 16 allotted to the sport.79   
While official medal counts do not exist, the addition of these sports was undoubtedly 
related to Japan’s relative strength in them and a desire for more victories.  The Japanese 
women’s volleyball team, known colloquially as the “Oriental Witches” (Tōyō no majo), was 
dominant on the world stage.  Judo was a Japanese sport which had been internationalized 
following World War II; it offered up four gold medals the Japanese expected to win.80  Adding 
these two sports provided five additional gold medal opportunities for Japanese athletes. 
At the same time, planning for the necessary facilities was underway.  The most 
important symbolically was the Olympic Village.  The original plan called for the main village to 
be constructed on a US military base, Camp Drake, in neighboring Saitama Prefecture.81  Its 
location was hardly ideal geographically as it was some distance from the main stadiums.  While 
the plan had been discussed with the US military, it came with a major condition.  It could be 
used on a temporary basis during the Olympics, but would need to be returned within 60 days 
afterwards and in its pre-Olympic condition.  Both the location and attached condition made it 
infeasible for use.  In its place, the Washington Heights housing base was offered up for 
permanent transfer back to the Japanese on the more acceptable condition that the Japanese 
government build replacement housing near other US bases.82  For the OOC, this was a much 
preferable location, although government acceptance of the plan was needed and later received.  
                                                 
79 The end result was 10 men’s teams and 6 women’s teams. 
80 The sport had three weighted divisions and one unweighted division. 
81 Japanese officials preferred the eventual location, Washington Heights, but believed receiving it was not within 
the realm of possibility. 
82 Ibid., 43. 
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The OOC believed this location, dubbed “Yoyogi Olympic Village”83 was “ideal” 
environmentally, geographically and in terms of facilities.  It was next to the Meiji Park, close to 
the National Stadium and National Gymnasium and already had existing facilities from the US 
military usage.  On the other hand, it was also in a major traffic area and great care would have 
to be taken to make sure everyone arrived at the events in a timely fashion.84  Concretely, this 
was the return of important real estate located near the center of Tokyo.  Symbolically, this was 
land next to the Meiji Shrine—dedicated to the Meiji Emperor who was the head of state during 
Japan’s crash course in modernization and early imperialism.  The return of such a visible base 
in the capitol was a further recognition of Japan’s sovereignty after the American Occupation. 
As the plans and construction progressed and the Olympiad grew nearer, Japanese public 
support also increased.  In March 1964, the Public Relations Office survey revealed that 75% of 
Japanese and almost 80% of Tokyoites were interested in the Olympics, but still approximately 
half of the respondents were not waiting eagerly, but were merely somewhat interested—perhaps 
better phrased as not disinterested.  Similarly high figures, 74% and 86%, felt the Olympics 
would be a “great plus” to Japan.  Still, only less than 40% were convinced that the Olympics 
would be held without problems and almost half of Tokyoites admitted to worries (nationwide 
only 28.1% felt the same way—once again, perhaps demonstrating the distance between them 
and the ongoing mad dash to complete the various projects).   
                                                 
83 In Japanese, it was actually called Yoyogi senshu mura or Yoyogi Athlete(s) Village, but the standard English 
terminology was used in all English documents. 
84 Tokyo orinpikku junbikyoku, “Orinpikku Tokyo taikai kankei sankō shiryō” (Nihon Taiiku Kyōkai, January 
1963), Japan Olympic Committee Archive, 33-34. 
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The survey also revealed a different 
concern often expressed in the Communist 
newspaper, Akahata, as well as other more 
centrist publications: 44% of Japanese were 
worried about the stability of prices (bukka 
no antei).  The increase in traffic accidents 
and concerns about juvenile delinquency 
followed at 42% and 32%.  The Olympics 
themselves were a distant fourth at 19%.85  
Akahata connected the rising cost of living, 
especially food, to the infrastructure 
expenditures for the Olympics—or at the 
very least, that money would have been 
better off being used on the working class and 
their problems.  The following editorial cartoon 
illustrates the concern.  The athlete struggles to get the groceries into a bottomless basket labeled 
“rising prices” while female spectators watch his effort (see Figure 1-3).86  There seemed to be 
no way for the working man to get ahead, especially with the state’s resources being poured into 
the Olympics. 
Figure 1-3: Matsuyama Fumio, 
“Bottomless Basket Competition.”   
While the Japanese public might have felt interested in the Olympics by March 1964, it 
was not their predominant interest.  NHK carried out its own survey starting in June 1964.  
                                                 
85 Sōridaijinfu naikaku sōridaijin kanbō kōhōsitsu, “Orinpikku Tokyo taikai ni kansuru seron chōsa.” 258-261. 
86 Matsuyama Fumio, “Hei-nashi basuketto kyōgi,” Akahata, October 13, 1964, sec. editorial cartoon. 
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Unlike the national scope of the Prime Minister’s Office, NHK focused on two locations: Tokyo 
and Kanazawa.  Tokyo was chosen for obvious reasons.  Kanazawa, a medium sized city on the 
Sea of Japan, was chosen to represent a regional city that would experience relatively little direct 
impact from the Games.87  While the governments survey had revealed widespread interest in the 
Olympics, the one from NHK demonstrated that, at least in March 1964, it was comparatively 
speaking, a relatively distant interest—when asked to rank topics they are interested in, citizens 
in both Tokyo and Kanazawa ranked it a distant sixth (2.2% and 1.7%) behind things like family, 
work, hobbies, politics and even general apathy!  This more nuanced survey also showed a 
slightly lower level of interest in the Games: 71% in Tokyo had moderate to high interest and 
69% in Kanazawa.88  However, almost 95% of all subjects considered the Olympics a “happy 
event” for Japan with only a small percentage calling it “inconvenient” (4.3%) or “very 
inconvenient” (1.4%) in Tokyo (1.8% and 0.5% for Kanazawa).89  While they were not devoting 
their life to following the preparations, the evidence clearly demonstrates they saw it as a 
positive for their country.  By this time, confidence in successfully hosting the Olympiad had 
also skyrocketed.  Whereas previously many Japanese harbored doubts, by June 1964, around 
90% of those surveyed in Tokyo and Kanazawa felt it would either be “successful” or “mostly 
successful.”90   
                                                 
87 Tokyo Orinpikku: sono 5 nenkan no ayumi, 105. 
88 This might be a reflection of the possible answers.  The PR Office’s survey only offered “interested,” 
“uninterested” and “I don’t know” for possibilities.  NHK offered “very interested,” “somewhat interested,” “not 
very interested” and “I don’t know.”  The targeted non-Tokyo subject was also greatly reduced from national to a 
chosen ‘polar opposite’ of the metropolis. 
89 Ibid., 128-129. 
90 Ibid., 132. 
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The final survey before the Olympics, taken just days before it began, revealed a much 
heightened level of interest—as might be expected.  Now more than 80% in Tokyo confessed to 
strong to moderate interest and Kanazawa had jumped from below 70% to almost 90%.  In a 
clear contrast from previous results, a clear majority reported waiting in great anticipation of the 
Games beginning (62.4% and 78.0% respectively).91  The nation had overcome its initial 
misgivings and was now strongly supportive of the Tokyo Olympics.  Now it was in the hands of 
the athletes and officials to perform their roles as surrogates of the nation and state. 
A total of 118 countries were extended invitations and 98 applied for participation.  
Ecuador and Barbados withdrew early in the process; North Korea and Indonesia withdrew at the 
last moment over the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) controversy.92  This left a 
record 94 countries as participants—a result of decolonization and the emergence of new 
countries, largely across Asia and Africa.  A total of 5,558 athletes took part in the Olympiad—
4,826 men and 732 women.93  The athletes were accompanied by almost 2,000 officials from 
their home countries and 686 international sports judges and referees, who worked with over 
6000 Japanese counterparts.94  The number of athletes was less than had participated in the 1960 
Rome Summer Olympics, even though the total number of countries participating increased by 
10.95  This was almost certainly due to the distance and expense of sending athletes to an 
                                                 
91 Ibid., 152. 
92 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of GANEFO. 
93 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 215. 
94 Ibid., 174-175. 
95 Japanese press reports listed all totals as higher than any other Olympics, but this was incorrect according to the 
officially reported numbers.  The press was most likely relying on projections and intended attendance.  For 
example, see“Sijōsaidai no taikai - subete kirokuzukume - sosoitda icchō 800 okuen,” Yomiuri Shinbun, 
October 10, 1964. 
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Olympics in Asia.  Poland, for example, sent 235 athletes to Rome, but only 147 to Tokyo.96  
The athletes were housed in a variety of locations.  The vast majority was housed in the Yoyogi 
Olympic Village, but there were 4 detached villages near competition sites located outside of 
Tokyo.  Spectators were housed in a variety of locations, including over 1,000 in ships in Tokyo 
Bay.  The athletes began arriving at the Olympic Village early—50 people from 8 countries 
arriving on September 15, 1964; the first day it was open for business.97  Less than one month 
later, the 18th Olympiad began. 
Tokyo and all the assembled Olympians awoke to crystal clear blue skies on Saturday, 
October 10, 1964.  The weather was perfect and put to rest fears of rain.98  The Sacred Flame 
had arrived from its long journey from Greece.  The four separate torches were reunited the ni
before in a special ceremony in front of the Imperial Palace.  This morning, it would be run the 
last leg to the National Stadium.  At 1:45 p.m., Emperor Hirohito entered the National Stadium 
filled with approximately 75,000 spectators and was escorted to this royal box.  Following the 
Japanese national anthem, the opening procession of athletes began.  After a greeting from IOC 
President Avery Brundage, Emperor Hirohito declared the 18th Olympiad open—Tokyo and 
Japan’s 34 year wait was over.  The path to this point was a “difficult history” that was now in 
the past.
ght 
                                                
99 
 
96 The Games of the XVII Olympiad, Rome 1960: The Official Report of the Organizing Committee (Organizing 
Committee of the Games of the XVII Olympiad, 1960), 160.  The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 214-
215. 
97 The Official Report incorrectly lists the first day of entrance as September 26, perhaps recognizing formal 
entrance by entire delegations or leaders. 
98 Ironically, Tokyo had originally been worried about not enough water as it struggled through a water crisis during 
the summer preceding the Olympics.  The mass media was full of articles discussing this.  However, in the days 
before the Olympics, rain was a very real concern. 
99 “Orinpikku no kaimaku,” Yomiuri Shinbun, October 10, 1964, sec. editorial. 
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Japan collected its first gold medal on day three of the Olympics when the featherweight 
weightlifter, and Self Defense Force member, Miyake Yoshinobu set Olympic records with his 
lifts.  The wrestlers, after a disastrous showing at Rome, redeemed themselves by winning 5 out 
of 16 possible gold medals.  The men’s gymnastics team won the team gold as well as three 
individual gold medals, including the all around individual and was closely followed by the 
public.  There was one boxing gold as well.  The wrestling and men’s gymnastics teams were 
both expected to do well and had large followings, but there were three additional sports in 
particular that Japanese followed closely.  The first, swimming, had been a Japanese strength in 
the postwar, but the team failed to capture a single gold. 
Judo had been added just for the Tokyo Olympics.100  There were three weight classes 
and an unrestricted class, which was the most prestigious.  Japanese had hopes of winning all 
four gold medals.  The Japanese captured all three of the weight limited classes, as was expected.  
They hoped to win the open category group as well.  However, the standing world champion was 
Dutchman Antonius Geesink.  He had shocked the Japanese at the 1961 World Championship in 
Paris by winning the tournament.  The Japanese media obsessively covered the men competing 
to challenge him, wondering if they could beat the giant.  He towered over the opposition at 
nearly two meters in height (see Figure 1-4).  In the championship round, he defeated Japan’s 
Kaminaga Akio after a nine minute bout.  While they did not win all four gold medals, they did 
win three gold and a silver. 
                                                 
100 Judo was not included in the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympics, but would return at the 1972 Munich 
Summer Olympics.  Female competitors were added as an exhibition sport at the 1988 Seoul Games and as a medal 
sport at the 1992 Atlanta Games. 
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Undoubtedly the most followed 
Japanese Olympians were the ‘Oriental 
Witches.’  They had dominated on the world 
stage under the leadership of their coach, 
Daimatsu Hirofumi.  Drawn mostly from the 
Nichibo Textile Manufacturing company team, 
their practices were notoriously grueling and 
brutal, but ultimately effective.101  They had 
also pioneered a new technique known as the 
“rolling receive” where the player would roll 
through a diving reception and emerge on her 
feet, ready to continue.  Including the 1964 
Olympics, they had a 175 match winning streak.  
Their rivals were the Soviets and they met in the 
gold medal round on October 23, in what one 
newspaper called a “showdown of destiny.”102  The final match was surprisingly easy as the 
Japanese swept the Soviets in straight sets.  The next, and final day, of the Olympics, they were 
front page news on multiple newspapers as the final proof of Japan’s success.  Nearly 80% of 
Figure 1-4: “Well, come on!”  
Source: Asahi Gurafu, November 6, 
1964, 54.  The final between Geesink 
and Kaminaga. 
                                                 
101 For further information on the Daimatsu’s training methods, see Igarashi, Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War 
in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970, 155-163.  He discusses in detail how Daimatsu drew upon his wartime 
experiences to form the base of his coaching.  Ikegami argues this was a “nostalgia for bodies in pain.” 
102 “Saigo no seishun kakete: Kawanishi-san shizuka ni manikyua,” Yomiuri Shinbun, October 23, 1963. 
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respondents to the NHK survey listed volleyball as “especially memorable,” the highest rating of 
any sport.103 
The sports fever was contagious.  NHK carried out a survey of Tokyoites during the 
Olympics.104  While only slightly more than 60% had said they were looking forward to the 
Games in early October, during the Olympics, 84% of those surveyed said they looked forward 
to it everyday.  The percentage of people who believed the Games were being held very or 
somewhat successfully also jumped to over 95%—and the subset who felt it was proceeding very 
well jumped from 58.6% to 69%.  An astonishing 97.8% expressed satisfaction with the Opening 
Ceremony and felt it met all their expectations.  Almost all traces of doubt or disagreement with 
hosting the Olympics had disappeared within Tokyo once they had begun. 
The Tokyo Olympics were an unqualified success in terms of medals.  Japan won 16 gold, 
5 silver and 8 bronze medals—a total of 29 medals.  This was a new record in gold and total 
medals won.  The 16 gold was the third highest number, behind only the Americans and Soviets.  
The 29 total Japanese medals put them in fourth, behind the Soviets, Americans and unified 
Germans. 
The Olympics were certainly successful in a purely athletic sense with an unprecedented 
number of medals.  They were also, by the time of the Games, strongly supported by a clear 
majority of the nation and closely watched—especially the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, 
and events in which Japan was favored to win.  Japanese nationwide were clearly engaged and 
identifying with the Games as host, not just members of the nation who lived in Tokyo.  
However, what image did Japan perform for domestic and international consumption?  The next 
                                                 
103 Tokyo Orinpikku: sono 5 nenkan no ayumi, 87. 
104 They did not survey Kanazawa during the Olympics, so there is no comparative data available. 
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three chapters examine this issue as a way to tease out Japanese national identity.  The first is 
Japan as a land of cutting edge technology and science. 
Chapter 3 – Fastest,  Highest, Strongest: From Ruin 
to Cutting Edge Technological Leader 
 
“The Bullet Train is an ‘airplane that runs on rails’”1 
 
 The motto of the Olympics is “faster, higher, stronger”, but in the case of the 1964 Tokyo 
Olympics, it might well have been “fastest, highest, strongest.”  The world’s fastest train, 
passenger airliners, a new satellite era for television, and the strongest athletes Japan had ever 
turned out as a result of new scientific training methods.  Science and technology formed one of 
the central tropes within the discourse of the Tokyo Games and Japanese national identity in the 
1960s.  This was partly a question of timing, but also of synergy between the Olympics, sports 
and Japan’s postwar recovery.  There is little doubt that the development of technology and 
science were poised for an explosion during the rapid economic growth of the mid 1950s.  The 
1964 Olympics were also perfectly timed to push forward long-stalled projects such as the 
Shinkansen, showcase new ones, such as the YS-11, Japan’s own commercial airliner, and 
implement new experimental technologies like satellite transmission.  The perception of Japan as 
a technologically and scientifically advanced country was a trope widely shared across the 
political and social spectrum, forming part of shared imagined community of the Japanese nation.  
It was also the trope most clearly related to the state, particularly in regards to funding.  The 
1964 Tokyo Olympics were the perfect venue to help create and reinforce this idea, and were 
often referred to as a “Festival of Science” (kagaku no saiten).2 
                                                 
1 “Tsugi no yume ha nijikanhan: Tokyo-Osaka - kūkō gaisha hisō na taikō,” Yomiuri Shinbun, August 26, 1964. 
2 For example, see Honda Mitsuo, ed., Tōkyō Orinpikku: Memories of the XVII Olympiad Tokyo 1964 (Tokyo: Sekai 
Bunka-sha, 1964), 130. 
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 The idea of Japan as a technological and scientific country was by no means new, nor 
was this type of self image unique to Japan.  For example, Carol Gluck has convincingly argued 
that the train was an ideologically important symbol of Japan’s modernity in the late 1800s.3  
Indeed, many of the post-Meiji Restoration leaders saw the world as a Darwinian competition for 
survival and catching up with the West was a near obsession.  Even those who rejected a 
Western cultural modernity4 still often preached for a pursuit of “Western Technology, Eastern 
Spirit.”5  Others, such as Fukuzawa Yūkichi argued for a complete rejection of Asia—he saw 
joining the West as Japan’s future.6  The race for technological achievement is hardly something 
unique to Japan.  It is something that governments, corporations and individuals often strive to 
accomplish.  It not only marks one as modern, but is crucial for a competitive advantage in the 
world, a country or a job market.  Japan and the Japanese were no different than any other state 
or nation in this way.  Technological prowess also fit the Yoshida Doctrine of competing 
economically where Japan had lost militarily in the first half of the 20th century. 
Historically, the level of Japanese technology in the years preceding the World War II 
was equivalent to those of the West—Japan possessed the ability to produce cutting edge naval 
warships and aircraft, among other things.  However, following the destruction of Japan’s 
economic base and urban cities in the war, certainly no one would have ranked it among the 
                                                 
3 Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985). 
4 The pursuit of modernity as a cultural and material concept will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
5 For example, the writings of Sakuma Shōzan clearly mark this idea and a rejection of the Mito School’s “Revere 
the Emperor, Repel the Barbarians”, which lost out after the overthrow of Tokugawa bakufu. 
6 Yūkichi Fukuzawa, "Datsu-a Ron," Jiji Shinpō, March 16 1885. 
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technological leaders of the war.  Indeed, Japanese products were known for being cheap, not 
advanced.  One American tour book for Japan from 1958 noted that this had changed: 
the Japanese have in the past been known as makers of cheap goods.  During the past 
couple of years there has been a great deal of emphasis on quality (emphasis in original).  
The mass producers of things-which-fall-to-pieces have come in for censure and ridicule.  
Quality has improved a great deal.7   
However, this was far from the case at the end of the Occupation. 
As explained previously, weeks after the Occupation ended in 1952, Tokyo decided to 
launch a new, and ultimately unsuccessful, bid for the 1960 Summer Olympic Games.  
According to the Tokyo Metropolitan Official Report, it was done to “gain the world’s 
understanding of Japan’s true form, after its peaceful recovery and international return, by truly 
showing the great desire of Japanese for peace.”8  There was no trace at this point of a trope of 
science and technology in the official documents or the mass media as Japan was still rebuilding 
and struggling in the immediate postwar.  Harvard historian of Japan and future ambassador to 
Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, wrote in 1957, “The economic situation in Japan may be so 
fundamentally unsound that no policies, no matter how wise, can save her from slow economic 
starvation.”9  Reischauer was, however, already slightly behind the times and history proves that 
his prediction was mistaken.  It was during the late 1950s that the movement towards a return to 
the world as a technologically advanced nation was taking place. 
                                                 
7 John C. Caldwell, Far East Travel Guide (New York: The John Day Company, 1959), 65. 
8 Tōkyō-to, Dai 18-kai Orinpikku kyōgitaikai Tōkyō-to hōkokusho, 4. 
9 Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan, revised ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 51. 
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 It is fitting that the single most recognizable and enduring symbol of the Tokyo Olympiad 
was a project that began in the war years, was cancelled during the war and then revived in the 
1950s, having lost nearly all traces of its wartime associations in the public mind.  The Super 
Express, more commonly known in English as the “Bullet Train,” was the technological 
centerpiece of the Olympics and was so successfully integrated into the selling of Japan that even 
today it remains one of the central images of Japan across the world.  It was not designed with 
the Olympics in mind, but it was scheduled to be finished in time for them. 
 The project was actually a very old one.  Planning started in 1939 for a high speed train 
line to connect Tokyo to Shimonoseki at the far western tip of Honshu, the main island of Japan.  
The original plans spoke of a “new trunk line” (shin kansen) and the train was referred to as a 
Super Express (Chōtokkyō) in the planning and meetings, but the Japanese media immediately 
dubbed it the “Bullet Train” (Dangan Ressha) as they imagined it going as fast as a bullet 
through Japan.10  It was designed to move troops and supplies quickly from the center out to the 
Empire with eventual plans to connect it to the Asian continent via tunnels from Shimonoseki 
and returning on a grand loop through Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan.  Although the 
original domestic route was scheduled to be finished in 1953, it faltered during the war due to 
shortages and shifting priorities.11  The project was cancelled and its engineers and workers were 
reassigned to other areas deemed more vital to the war efforts, although the land purchased for 
the project was kept and in some cases work had even begun. 12 
                                                 
10 Takahashi Dankichi, Shinkansen o Tsukutta Otoko: Shima Hideo Monogatari, 7th ed. (Shōgakukan, Ltd., 2001), 
58-59. 
11 For a more detailed treatment, please see Maema Takamori, Dangan Ressha: Maboroshi-no Tōkyō-hatsu Pekin-
yuki Chōtokkyū (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihon sha, Ltd., 1994). 
12 In fact, many of the engineers transferred from the project were either sent to work with naval aviation and 
research.  Many of them returned in the postwar and continued their earlier work, while bringing back with them 
new knowledge from their wartime posts and duties. 
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In the postwar period, the plan was brought back using much of the land bought for the 
original project.  The project continued to falter due to a lack of funds until the Olympic bid was 
being carried out in the mid 1950s.  The Trunk Line Exploration Group, with engineer Shima 
Hideo, estimated in 1957 that it would require slightly more than 300 billion yen over 5 years.  
Japan National Railways president Sogō Shinji13 told them it was too expensive and needed to be 
cut in half, although eventually a sum of 197.2 billion yen was settled upon in the Diet in early 
1959, mere months before the Olympic bid was to be decided.14  While the Olympics 
undoubtedly played a role in getting the financing, there was also an undeniable need for more 
capacity along the Tokaido Line between the Kansai and Kanto regions—by the mid 1950s, this 
single line was carrying more than one fourth of all train traffic in Japan!15  In the early days, the 
project faced considerable opposition due to its projected cost and one can only imagine the 
problems for the project if the real estimate had been publicized.  During the darkest days, some 
involved with the planning felt that the dream in “Super Express of Dreams”16 was more 
impossible daydream or pipedream than anything else.17   
Japan National Railways broke ground on new construction in 1959.  The whole country 
followed its construction, especially as it neared completion and the Olympics approached. 
                                                 
13 Shima Hideo and Sogō Shinji are generally considered to be the “fathers” of the Shinkansen, with Shima handling 
the technical aspects and Sogō dealing with the politics of the project. 
14 Takahashi Dankichi, Shinkansen o Tsukutta Otoko: Shima Hideo Monogatari, 188. 
15 Suda Hiroshi, Tokaido Shinkansen 30-Nen (Tokyo: Taisho Shuppan, 1994), 17. 
16 In the postwar period, the press dubbed the train the “Super Express of Dreams” (Yume no Chōtokkyū). 
17 Maema Takamori, Dangan Ressha: Maboroshi-no Tōkyō-hatsu Pekin-yuki Chōtokkyū, 16-17. 
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 The Super Express of Dreams 
seemed to catch the public imagination 
as no other postwar project had up until 
that point and even during the 
construction of the line, its metaphysical 
connections to Japan were never far 
from the surface in the mass media 
tropes.  Figure 2-1 demonstrates this.  
The photo carefully placed the 
construction against the backdrop of Mt. 
Fuji—the railway bridge under 
construction served as a frame for one of 
the most well known symbols of 
Japan.18  The accompanying text, which 
discussed the location and positioning of 
the track at this point in the railway li
did not mention the mountain perfectly framed by the elevated track—it assumed this 
relationship was understood as part of the nation’s shared mental map.
ne, 
 
                                                
19  This was a common
Figure 2-1: “Tōkaidō Shinkansen” 
 
18 “Tōkaidō shinkansen,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi Picture News), January 4, 1963, 9. 
19 This photo was later reused in a 1964 special shinkansen issue of the Asahi Gurafu and it does mention Mt. Fuji.  
While one might suspect using Mt. Fuji as a representation of Japan in the mainstream or rightwing media is 
unsurprising, in fact, it also showed up on a regular basis in Akahata, the bastion of the Communist Party.  For 
example, it was featured in a seasonal photograph on the cover of the 1961 New Year’s Day edition of the 
newspaper.  (Ariga Ichirō, “Fuyu fuji,” Akahata, January 1, 1961.)  Mt. Fuji was often used in editorial cartoons as 
well as a visual shorthand for Japan. 
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shorthand—in editorial cartoons, pictures and texts, Mt. Fuji was often symbolically used 
interchangeably as a stand for Japan.  For example, its special importance could also be seen 
later in the same New Year special edition in an article on how Japanese light motorcycles were
the best in the world.  The author wrote he had learned in elementary school in a song that Mt. 
Fuji was Japan’s best mountain, but now people come from around the world to see it as the 
world’s most b
 
eautiful volcano.20  The Shinkansen project operated within this larger trope of 
Japan a
 
 
ould 
out the state and was an  embodiment of the trope of Japan as a 
country
this 
                                                
nd technological advancement. 
When the first train was rolled out, it was greeted as the “Birth of a Star.”21  Indeed, the
new Super Express of Dreams was a star and crowds gathered wherever it could be seen, even 
before it officially began serving the public.  In fact, one man was even arrested when he blocked
the tracks.  He claimed he hadn’t seen it yet, so he wanted to stop it and get a better look.22  This 
was to be part of Japan’s new face.  Funded by the government, using taxpayer money, it w
have been impossible with
 high technology. 
In the months leading up to the Olympics, the shinkansen’s technology was widely 
disseminated and discussed.  It had many new features, some still in use today, such as the 
Automatic Train Control (ATC), which alleviated the need for drivers to manually adjust speeds 
of rapidly moving trains by watching for flags, signs and lights alongside the tracks.  While 
might have been possible with the older trains, it would have been nearly impossible at the 
speeds the shinkansen was going.  Instead, the system received speed limits for sections of track 
 
20 Iizawa Tadashi, “Ōtobai: nippon "sekai-ichi",” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi Picture News). 
21 “Sutā tanjō,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi Picture News), May 4, 1962, 17. 
22 “Shinkansen bōgai otoko o taihō,” Asahi Shinbun, September 6, 1964. 
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and automatically adjusts the train speed correspondingly.  The side benefit was a decrease in
chances of driver error.  Media reports compared it to flying an airplane as the driver’s a
looked more like a cockpit than a train engine.
 the 
rea 
 
and pictures of it appeared in nearly every mass media publication. 
23  The shinkansen also employed a new 
centralized control system for monitoring all trains, the Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) which
managed the system from one control room. (See Figure 2-2)  While not as exciting as the high 
speed of travel, they entered into the mass media discourse as examples of Japanese technology 
 
                                                
Figure 2-2: “The CTC for the Tōkaidō Shinkansen has started.”  Source: Sankei Shinbun, 
August 16, 1964. 
 
23 “Tsugi no yume ha nijikanhan: Tokyo-Osaka - kūkō gaisha hisō na taikō.” 
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These were necessary and much 
celebrated advancements given Japan National 
Railway’s dismal safety record in the 
immediate postwar where it was at least 
partially responsible or related to over 1800 
deaths.24  Of course, while JNR and its 
successors East and West Japan Railway have 
been linked to more deaths since, the 
shinkansen has rarely been associated with a 
fatality.  The shinkansen still faced significant 
criticism over its cost. One man wrote a letter 
to the editor and expressed that while he was 
initially impressed with the Shinkansen, he now 
wondered how much it cost and if it was worth it 
since he couldn’t even afford his own home and 
was worried about rising prices of daily 
necessities.25 
It was not only the speed and design that 
defined the trope of high technology.  The 
shinkansen also had new, scientifically designed ergonomic chairs.  Kobara Jirō, a professor of 
architecture at Chiba University, conducted experiments to find the “least tiring, efficient 
Figure 2-3: “Examine the x-rays of the 
bone structure while seated.  Compare 
that on the Shinkansen Kodama train 
(bottom) with that of the top and you’ll 
see the difference.  Especially the 
lumbar vertebrae are different.  This 
graphic is a compilation of more than 10 
x-rays.”  Source: Asahi Gurafu (The 
Asahi Picture News), September 25, 
1964, 44. 
                                                 
24 Christopher P Hood, Shinkansen: From Bullet Train to Symbol of Modern Japan, Routledge contemporary Japan 
series 5 (London: Routledge, 2006), 22. 
25 Murata Hideyo, “Tsuppashiru tōkaidō shinkansen,” Akahata, sec. Katei fujin. 
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chairs.”26  He used an experimental chair with many moving parts to find the structure that 
would place the body in its most natural resting state while sitting.  The result was supposed to 
be a scientifically superior seat for passengers on the world’s fastest trains.27  To prove the point, 
they x-rayed people sitting in the chairs to visually demonstrate the difference in posture—
providing the viewer with evidence to judge for themselves in a society that now saw itself as 
scientifically advanced.  The trope was clear: everything about the Shinkansen—a new symbol 
of Japan—was  advanced and scientific, down to the very seats themselves. 
Unfortunately, the final price tag was closer to the original estimate rather than the one 
given to the public.  In the end, the project cost a total of 380 billion yen, more than even the 
original internal estimate.  Just under 29 billion yen (80 million dollars) of that enormous sum 
came from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, which had been 
established following World War II to finance the rebuilding of Europe.28  As a result, the two 
men credited with pushing the project forward, engineer Shima Hideo and former company 
president Sogō Shinji, were not invited to the unveiling. 
The Super Express cut the trip from Osaka to Tokyo from approximately 6.5 hours to 4 
hours.  It had a maximum speed of 210 km/h (130 mph), which made it the fastest train in the 
world—a claim that appeared in nearly all reports on it across the political spectrum.  It was 
                                                 
26 Kohara Jirō, “Ningen kōgaku o dezain ni ōyō [Human engineering put to practice in design],” Asahi Gurafu (The 
Asahi Picture News), September 25, 1964, 44-45. 
27 This was part of a larger trend towards using science in designing for the human body.  A year earlier, the same 
journalist published an article in a design magazine on scientists performing research into the best way to measure 
the stresses on a human body in relation to posture and interior design—particularly as it related to seating.  They 
used definable, measurable tests to determine this, such as electromyography, which measures the electrical 
potential generated by muscle cells.  This provided objective standards by which to measure which postures, and 
therefore which chair designs, best fit the human body—at least in theory.  Kohara Jirō, “Interia dezain to ningen 
kōgaku,” Dezain, July 1963, 49-55. 
28 Suda Hiroshi, Tokaido Shinkansen 30-Nen, 24. 
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called a “plane that runs on rails.”29  A later Mainichi Shinbun special volume on the high 
growth period referred to the Tokaido Line Shinkansen as a “fitting” symbol of the “high growth 
period.” This “new era of speed” was marked by the “rapid progress of Japanese manufacturing 
technology.”30  Here is an example of how the opportunity of the Olympics created the break 
needed, through utilizing the discourse of the national importance of the Olympics, to create one 
of Japan’s main symbols of technological achievement, which in turn helped create and shape 
the contemporary and future discourse of Japanese national identity. 
In the end, the Super Express of Dreams was finished in time for the Olympics, as 
promised.  It opened for the public use on October 1st, a mere 9 days before the Games began, to 
great fanfare and public excitement—as some of the Western press had already arrived to cover 
the Olympics, they were also able to cover the new world’s fastest train.  One of the first riders 
and biggest backers of the Super Express, even for the prewar Bullet Train, was Prince Chichibu, 
who was also one of the main supporters of the Olympics and amateur sports in Japan.31  The 
grand opening was attended by Emperor Hirohito and his wife, Michiko.   The visual association 
of Mt. Fuji with the Shinkansen continued in the press accounts of the first trip.  A photo in the 
Yomiuri Shinbun captured diners looking out the window of the train at the clearly visible 
mountain.32  One could eat a meal on the world’s fastest train while it passed by Japan’s most 
recognizable symbol. 
                                                 
29 “Tsugi no yume ha nijikanhan: Tokyo-Osaka - kūkō gaisha hisō na taikō.” 
30 “Shin spēdo jidai no makuake,” in Ketteiban Showa shi (Showa 39-45 nen), vol. 16, 18 vols. (Tokyo: Mainichi 
Shinbunsha, 1984), 32. 
31 Dankichi Takahashi, Shinkansen Wo Tsukutta Otoko: Shima Hideo Monogatari, 7th ed. (Shōgakukan, Ltd., 2001), 
228.  The official Olympic museum and an important sports archive in Japan are named after him and located under 
the National Stadium which hosted the track and field events, as well as the Opening and Closing Ceremonies. 
32 “Shasō ni Fuji-san o minagara byuffe de shokuji o suru,” Yomiuri Shinbun, October 1, 1964, Evening  edition. 
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 The JOC and Japanese government showcased the Shinkansen to the foreign visitors at 
the Games as an example of Japan’s world-class technology.  They hoped not only to impress 
foreign visitors, but also to convince them to travel in Japan and spend money on sightseeing.  
The Tokyo platform even changed its sign from Hikari and Kodama, names of the first two route 
names, to “Welcome to Tokyo Olympics 1964” in English and Japanese, although it’s very 
doubtful many, if any of the foreigners there for the Olympics originally entered Tokyo on the 
Shinkansen.  However, the discourse makes it quite clear that the Shinkansen, and what it stood 
for, were closely linked in the trope of Japan as a country of high technology.  It was a highly 
successful imagery in reinforcing this trope.  Even today, the bullet train is inarguably one of the 
most widely recognized emblems of Japan, especially with the iconic Mt. Fuji in the background 
of the image. 
The Tokyo Olympiad was marked by the use of another high technology transportation 
that contributed to this trope.  The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) launched 
a program in 1954 to create a domestically designed and manufactured commercial airliner. The 
project was undertaken by the Nihon Aircraft Manufacturing Company (NAMC), a consortium 
of seven Japanese firms including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Fuji Heavy Industries.  The 
plane, known as the YS-11, was finished in 1962 and made Japan one of a handful of countries 
able to build its own commercial planes.33  It was a twin propeller plane with a carrying capacity 
of 60 and a range of 2,000 kilometers.   
When the decision was made for an airplane based Olympic Flame relay rather than a 
land transportation route, those involved in the OOC and NAMC had hoped to have the YS-11 
carry the Torch for its entire journey.  While an air route was the logical alternative, it was surely 
                                                 
33 The acronym comes from the first letters of the Japanese words Yu (transportation) and Setsu (provide). 
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no coincidence that they made this decision in 1962, just as original development of the plane 
was finished.  It would have been a public relations coup, for Japan and the manufacturers, and 
strong statement about Japan’s technological progress.  Unfortunately for those involved, this 
was not to be and the OOC was forced to use an American DC-6B for all of the foreign legs of 
the route “due to a number of problems which presented themselves.”34  In fact, the problem was 
with the completion of the aircraft.  The man behind the plane and head of NAMC, Shōda Taizō, 
had hoped to use the Olympic Torch Relay as a sales pitch for the aircraft, but it was unclear 
whether it would be ready in time; in addition, flight testing was still incomplete at the time 
when the decisions had to be made.35  When the plane did finally and successfully pass 
inspection and its official “model certification” was set for August 25, 1964 from the 
Transportation Ministry, the Yomiuri Shinbun noted that “the dream of taking the Sacred Flame 
by [a plane of] domestic production” now looked achievable. 36 The YS-11 could now be used 
for the all important domestic legs of the journey. 
There were four domestic legs of the relay and all began in Okinawa on September 9, 
1964.  A single YS-11 took the Flame to Kagoshima, Miyazaki, and Hokkaido.37  It was 
appropriately named the “Sacred Flame” (Seika) and this was a successful first official usage of 
the plane.  Originally mocked as a plane that “wouldn’t fly” and “wouldn’t sell,” the “YS-11 had 
                                                 
34 “The Official Report of the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, Tokyo 1964,” 1966, 245.   
35 Aragaki Hideo, “Aragaki Hideo rensai taidan-Toki no sugao: Shōda Taizō 'Seika yusō ga samatta kokusanki YS-
11, umi no oya',” Shūkan Asahi, September 11, 1964, 18. 
36 “YS11-ki 'gōkaku': seika kūyu ga hatsu shigoto,” Yomiuri Shinbun, August 22, 1964. 
37 Two of the four domestic paths began in Hokkaido—one ran along the Pacific Ocean and other along the Japan 
Sea. 
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finally stood on its own,” according to NAMC’s test pilot, Nagatani Eizō.38  While it might have 
been lightly taken during development, upon completion and in concert with its use for the 
Olympics, its reception could not have been better. 
Although it was not in general service, and would not be for several years, it was greeted 
as a masterpiece of Japanese technological skills.  The Sankei Shinbun introduced it with nearly a 
full page of coverage.  They called it the “Wings of Japan,” noting this was the first domestically 
made plane since the war (allowing that the engines had actually been made in England) and 
wondering when Japanese would be able to ride it across their country.39  The pictures 
accompanying the articles often didn’t depict it in flight, which would logically seem to be the 
more dramatic imagery.  Instead, they portrayed the plane during assembly, which emphasized 
the advanced Japanese skills and hard work behind the plane.  In the broader discourse, nearly all 
coverage emphasized the word “domestic production” (kokusan) either in the title or subtitle; no 
one could possibly have missed the message and importance of the aircraft.  This was the result 
of Japanese technology, industrial production and ingenuity.  Japan had now joined a very small 
and elite club of countries that could produce their own commercial passenger airplanes.  In case 
there was any doubt, the creators of the plane were clear on their evaluation: the technology 
behind it was first rate and equal to the best in the world.40  The YS-11 and the Shinkansen were 
clear evidence that the trope of self for Japan was not just wishful thinking, but was grounded in 
material reality, making it all the more potent. 
                                                 
38 “Ōnin hatashita YS-11,” Sankei Shinbun, September 9, 1964. 
39 “Seika o hakonda "nihon no tsubasa" YS-11,” Sankei Shinbun, September 16, 1964, Evening  edition. 
40 Aragaki Hideo, “Aragaki Hideo rensai taidan-Toki no sugao: Shōda Taizō 'Seika yusō ga samatta kokusanki YS-
11, umi no oya'.” 19. 
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 The YS-11 coverage revealed another 
device that captured the Japanese imagination: 
Sacred Flame carriers.  These were not the 
individuals carrying the Torch along the route, 
but rather the devices that kept the flame lit.  
There were several different devices.  The 
torch itself had to fulfill several technical 
specifications.  First, combustion had to last 
for 14 minutes domestically and 6 minutes 
internationally.  Second, torches should be 
easily ignited and resistant to wind and rain.  
Third, they had to be “easily disposed of after 
use.”41  A carrying case was also constructed to 
transport the Sacred Flame and was “designed on the 
principle of the coal-mine safety lamp.” 42  In 
addition, the Flame needed to be transported safely on the airplane (see Figure 2-4) and in chase
cars during the ground relay (see Figure 2-5) and devices were created for these purposes.  The
last three were covered widely in the mass m
Figure 2-4: The Sacred 
Flame Dais was also 
prepared inside the YS-11.  
Source: Yomiuri Shinbun, 
September 3. 
-
 
edia. 
                                                 
41 Further discussion on the designer of the torch, a military veteran, can be found in Chapter 5. 
42 “The Official Report of the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, Tokyo 1964.” 246. 
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 The “Sacred Flame Dais” was 
constructed to safely transport the Flame 
while on an airplane.  The device had to 
insure two things: that it didn’t extinguish 
during takeoff, landing or turbulence, and 
that it wouldn’t cause a fire on board during 
flight.  In addition, it would relieve a person 
from needing to carry it for hours on end.  
The Yomiuri Shinbun carried a picture of the 
dais on a test flight of the YS-11 Seika as it 
prepared for the Relay.  While the article 
associated with the picture was mostly about 
the plane and its role in the relay, the image 
itself emphasized the dais and role it would 
play in protecting the plane’s namesake.43  
The evening edition continued the coverage 
of the YS-11—this time the photograph showed 
the exterior—focusing on the nose, which 
displayed YS-11 and the Tokyo Olympic mark 
(i.e., a rising sun over the Olympic rings).44  In 
Figure 2-5: Sacred Flame Carrying 
Device.  Source: author’s photo, Prince 
Chichibu  Sports Museum.  The miner’s 
lamp carrying case can be seen hanging 
underneath the device. 
                                                 
43 “Hare no hi motsu "soratobu seikadai": kokusan YS-11 ki kyō shiken hikō,” Yomiuri Shinbun, September 3, 
1964. 
44 “Tesuto hikō jōjō: YS-11 ki, 'seika' kinai de akaka to,” Yomiuri Shinbun, September 3, 1964, evening  edition. 
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the foreground, an official was holding two Olympic Torch Safety Lamps, which would have 
hung in the dais in Figure 2-4; one can be seen hanging on the balancing device in Figure 2-5.  
The text noted that the Safety Lamps successfully kept a test flame burning brightly.  The 
technology of safety with the new Japanese technology of flight, all for the Tokyo Olympiad. 
 The Olympic torch carrying mechanism for the chase-cars was also the product of 
Japanese ingenuity.  The device held the backup flame in case the torch being carried was 
extinguished and the balancing mechanism provided an unmanned method of preventing it from 
toppling over.  It was modified from a similar device used by soba restaurants to deliver food on 
the back of motorcycles and scooters.  The picture (Figure 2-5) that accompanies the device in 
the display case at the Prince Chichibu Memorial Sports Museum shows a crowd of onlookers 
peering intently into the vehicle at the device.45  Not only was it Japanese technology, albeit not 
necessarily cutting edge, but it was adapted from soba restaurants, which serve traditional 
Japanese food. 
 The YS-11 was not the highest altitude technological wonder of the 18th Olympiad, that 
honor belonged to the satellite.  The Tokyo Games was the first to be broadcast live via satellite 
across the globe.  In addition, it could be watched on the new color televisions that were just 
entering the mainstream due to their cost.  The idea that the Olympics could be broadcast live 
around the world first appeared in May 1959, as the delegates were in Munich.  The Yomiumi 
Shinbun called it a “dream plan” and wondered if it could be made into reality.46  Several days 
earlier, it had stated that color TVs were the natural progression of technology and predicted in a 
cartoon (see Figure 2-6) that “[All the world’s children] will be able to see the Olympics at the 
                                                 
45 Unknown, Seika unbanki, Prince Chichibu Memorial Sports Museum. 
46 “Jinkō eisei de terebi chūkei: 'Tokyo gorin' nama hōsō,” Yomiuri Shinbun, May 28, 1959. 
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same time.”  Note that all the children 
are in stereotypical ethnic garb to 
make clear the global reach of this 
new technology—they carefully 
included figures from each inhabited 
continent.  This new technology, 
which Japan had a fundamental role 
in and would be broadcasting, would 
peacefully bring the world together to 
celebrate the Olympics together, both 
live and in color on their televisions. 
Figure 2-6: “Able to see the Olympics at the 
same time.” Source:  Yomiuri Shinbun, May 24, 
1959. 
 The United States took the lead in the project as they worked to launch satellites into 
space and tested the technology.47  Japan and the US signed an agreement in early 1961 to 
develop a system capable of transmitting live footage around the world.48  In November 1962, 
they agreed to coordinate and work together to develop the technology.  In Japan, NHK took the 
lead and was running experimental transmissions by this time.  The National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) was its US partner.  The first live intercontinental television 
transmission via satellite was sent from the US to Japan on November 23, 1963.49  The first, in 
the early morning was a test pattern and it was to be followed by a taped message from the 
United States President to the Japanese people.  The plan was to broadcast it live across all radio 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 While this is generally discussed in the context of TV broadcasting, it is also taking place in the context of the 
Cold War, which is why Akahata and leftists generally opposed this testing. 
49 The satellite was US made and called “Relay 1.” 
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and television stations in Japan.50  However, it was not the broadcast the Japanese were 
expecting.  President John F. Kennedy had been assassinated the day before and instead of a 
taped message, they got dramatic live coverage of the aftermath of his assassination.51 
 The Japanese news coverage was complex.  While on the one hand, they rejoiced in the 
historic test and Japanese participation in it, they were also stunned and saddened by the 
assassination of President Kennedy.  The Yomiuri Shinbun marked the historic occasion of the 
first trans-Pacific broadcast, but also its painful contents.52  The Asahi Shinbun concurred, 
calling it a brilliant success and noted that this looked very promising for the technology’s use
the Olympics in 1964.
 at 
 
e the 
                                                
53  The Sankei Shinbun noted that, within Asia, “only Japan” had the 
ability to do this.  It added that this was a remarkable peaceful use of space when missiles and
rockets were more typically associated with war than television broadcasts and hoped for a 
peaceful use of space.  The Sankei Shinbun also saw this as not only a “revolution of 
communication technology,” but also as a great influence for “international mutual 
understanding.” 54  It added in a separate evaluation of the successful test that this gav
Japanese great hope for broadcasting the Olympics live across the globe, unintentionally 
mimicking the Yomiuri Shinbun’s earlier prediction and hope.55  The Communist newspaper, 
Akahata, disagreed with the Sankei Shinbun and the other mainstream media conglomerates, and 
 
50 “Nikai ni watatte hōsō: asu nichibei hatsu no terebi chūkei jikken,” Sankei Shinbun, November 22, 1963. 
51 “Uchū tsūshin,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi Picture News), December 13, 1963, 54. 
52 “Editorial,” Yomiuri Shinbun, November 23, 1963. 
53 “Editorial,” Asahi Shinbun, November 23, 1963. 
54 “Editorial,” Sankei Shinbun, November 23, 1963. 
55 “Terebi chūkei ni seikō: taiheiyō koe senmei na gazō,” Sankei Shinbun, November 23, 1963. 
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warned that this test and the plan to broadcast the Olympics was a façade—the real purpose 
spying and military communications.  However, even Akahata agreed this was a task worthy of 
attention.
was 
ant role in its success. 
                                                
56  In short, all the media coverage noted the groundbreaking nature of the experiment, 
carefully emphasizing that Japan had played an import
Japanese technology was central to the ongoing story—informing the public, for example, 
that every piece of the antenna used to send the signal to the satellite was produced 
domestically.57  Although they later had to embarrassingly wait for the United States to put up 
two more satellites to guarantee world wide coverage, it was still seen as a successful 
partnership.58  The satellite “Syncom 3” was launched on August 19, 1964 and was the first 
geosynchronous communication satellite.  Japanese press coverage delved deeply into the 
science of its orbit and how it arrived there—precision was key for this scientific development 
that was so crucial to their trope of Self.59  This was a formative moment when Japan could play 
a technological partner with the United States—one that would transform the nature of 
communications and the Olympics.  The polling data provided previously demonstrated that 
Japanese saw their country as less developed than the US—this partnership would have had a 
 
56 “Editorial,” Akahata, November 23, 1963  Obviously, Akahata’s prediction at the time proved to be false.  
However, in more recent times, satellites have been used for espionage and warfare.  One only need look at the 
development of GPS guided smart bombs and cruise missiles, or reconnaissance aircraft being controlled remotely 
over vast distances to see their prediction was prophetic in the long term, even if it was wildly incorrect for the 
Tokyo Olympics.  In fact, Syncom 2 and 3 did serve as communication relays for the military for the beginning of 
American involvement in Vietnam in the mid 1960s—although that was not their only function. 
57 “Kagaku no shinpō no tame ni: sekai no nihon toshite,” Yomiuri Shinbun, August 17, 1964. 
58 The third and final satellite, Syncom 3, was not launched until August 19, which led to considerable Japanese 
anxiety.  In addition, NBC’s decision to not broadcast the Olympics live was also a source of consternation in the 
Japanese mass media—it undermined the trope of Japan as technologically advanced and the public relations value 
of the Olympics. 
59 See, for example,“Akarui Gorin chūkei: NASA happyō Shinkomu hobo seishi de,” Yomiuri Shinbun, August 22, 
1964, evening  edition. 
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positive effect on a self-image as technologically advanced.  This was an important point for that, 
but also as a historic milestone for sports and technology.  For the first time in history, it was 
possible to see a near future when the entire world could watch a single live event together.  The 
1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics were that moment and event. 
 The role of television was important in how Japanese experienced the Olympics.  
Televisions were central to the growing group of middle class Japanese—possessing them was a 
marker of status.  They were part of what many have called the two sets of three regalia (a play 
on the three traditional imperial regalia: jewel, mirror and sword).  In the 1950s, the three regalia 
for middle class life were the black and white television, washing machine and refrigerator.  This 
was replaced in the 1960s by a second set of three: the color television, air conditioner and car.  
While television buying is typically said to have occurred in two event related booms—the 1959 
Imperial wedding (black and white) and 1964 Tokyo Olympics (color)—there was, in fact, little 
spike in the sales around the Games themselves—it was part of a larger upward trend in 
television ownership.60 
The NHK polling data makes it clear that Japanese were watching the Olympics.  When 
polled immediately after the Olympics ended, at least 95% of those surveyed in both Tokyo and 
Kanazawa had viewed the Opening Ceremony—and over 40% had watched it twice: once live 
and again later in delayed broadcast digest form.61  Of the approximately 5% who reported they 
had not watched it, 92.3% in Tokyo and 79.4% in Kanazawa wished they had.  The figures for 
                                                 
60 For a further analysis of this and the creation of an electronics industry in Japan, see Simon Partner, Assembled in 
Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer, Studies of the East Asian Institute (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1999).  I would like to thank him for challenging me to rethink this historical 
assumption at a presentation of my preliminary research findings at the Modern Japanese History Workshop at 
Waseda University. 
61 Tokyo Orinpikku: sono 5 nenkan no ayumi, 193. 
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the Closing Ceremony were lower, but still over 80%.62    During the two weeks of the Games, 
workers would gather around a central television set to watch popular events—bringing work to 
a halt.63  Schools also had gatherings so the students could watch the momentous event.64  The 
Ministry of Education, in fact, encouraged schools to provide opportunities for students to watch 
the Olympics at school or see the events in person, but as a matter of policy forbid students from 
missing school to watch events from home on their own television sets.65  Given that most 
Japanese could not go to the actual events due to distance or ticket cost and availability, 
television was the medium through which they experienced the Olympics, which further 
reinforced the trope of high technology, the Games and Japan.  The companies manufacturing 
and selling televisions were also well aware of this synergy and used it in their advertising 
campaigns. 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 196. 
63 “Orinpikku de dare ga ichiban yorokondaka? Gorin kikanchū no sararīman no seitai,” Heibon Panchi, November 
2, 1964, 27. 
64 Nihonmatsu-shi Nihonmatsu kita-shōgakkō - Satō Tameji, ed., Seika: Orinpikku Tokyo taikai kinen bunshū 
(Fukushima City, Japan: Iwase Kōhan Taipu-sha, 1964), 9. 
65 “Gorin terebi miru tame kyūkō wa ikisugi: Monbusho ga chūshi o tsūtatsu,” Yomiuri Shinbun, September 5, 
1964. 
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The advertisements in print 
mass media for television in August 
through October 1963 were 
relatively few.  However, as the 
Olympics drew near, particularly 
from August 1964, their frequency 
skyrocketed.66  The advertisements 
used the Olympics, officially when 
possible and with unmistakable 
imagery when not possible.  Toshiba, 
for example, urged Japanese to buy 
“for that day” and employed the 
rising sun symbol surrounded by 
“Tokyo 1964,” a slight modification 
of the official Tokyo Olympiad mark, 
and also referred to the “Tokyo Games” 
(Tokyo taikai) in an advertisement run multiple times in the Asahi Shinbun in August (see Figure 
2-7).67  The televisions being advertised were below a multitude of athletes in the midst of 
competition and representing every race of humanity.  They emphasized the technology behind 
their televisions—“Experience the drama in Hi-Fi” and “Watch the moment of victory in 
widescreen” because you did not want to miss this “once in a lifetime festival.”  Behind these 
Figure 2-7: Toshiba Television Advertisement 
                                                 
66 Akahata was the only exception as they did not run the same kind of advertisements; this is not unexpected given 
that this was the official newspaper of the JCP. 
67 See, for example,“Tokyo 1964 Toshiba terebi,” Asahi Shinbun, August 2, 1964. 
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beautiful images, the advertisement claimed was an electronic lens, just like a high quality 
camera—viewers could “experience the emotion” on their television just like reality the camera 
was capturing as the “technology was the same.”  To reinforce this, the camera was located in 
the midst of the athletes and directly above the largest television set.  Consumers were being told 
they would not miss being at the actual events since the technology could deliver that same 
reality to their homes.  If they needed it, Toshiba even offered a small portable television for 
their study. 
Another Toshiba advertisement running in August in the Sankei Shinbun stated that while 
“Rome was in black and white”, “Tokyo would be broadcast in color”—reminding the reader of 
this new technology and which country was deploying it.68  Of course, Toshiba was employing 
this trope to sell their own color televisions.  A color broadcast is of little use without a television 
that can produce a color picture.  The advertisement boasted the viewer could see the “Rising 
Sun Flag” (hi no maru), the Sacred Flame and the green of the field of play exactly as it appeared 
in person.  As a final point of emphasis, it boasted that, even in America, Toshiba’s television 
technology was called “Wonderful.”  Other manufacturing companies also used the official 
symbols employed Olympic motifs to sell their product.  Matsushita Electric, more commonly 
known at National or Panasonic in retail electronics, also ran advertisements for their televisions.  
Its also used the Rising Sun Tokyo 1964 emblem, but superimposed images of competing 
athletes and flags on the television screens.  It promised that its “large screen” 19 inch set was 
superior with its “memory tuning” (jinkō zunō sōchi—memochūningu).69  Sony offered up not 
                                                 
68 For example,“Yunikarā Tokyo 1964 Toshiba karā terebi,” Sankei Shinbun, August 12, 1964. 
69 “Tokyo 1964 ato 42nichi! kangeki wo...tōkon wo...heiwa wo...shinzen wo... Nashonaru terebi,” Yomiuri Shinbun, 
August 29, 1964. 
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only larger televisions, but also small, portable ones that utilized its best transistor technology.70  
Retailers also used the Olympics to sell televisions.  The department store, Daimaru, advertised 
its stock of televisions from a variety of makers and urged consumers to “watch the dynamic 
drama of the Olympics on a large size television.”  The top half of the full page advertisement 
was a hurdler caught in mid-jump and the graphic had rounded corners like television screens of 
that era.71  The advertisements reinforced the trope, but at the same time used it for profit driven 
commercial purposes. 
The advertisements even appeared in US occupied Okinawa; there they reminded 
Okinawans that due to the new direct microwave connection with the mainland, they could 
watch the Olympiad live as it was happening at the National Stadium in Tokyo and appeared 
during September in the Okinawa Taimusu newspaper.  This direct microwave connection to the 
mainland was opened on September 1, 1964, just days before the Olympic Torch was scheduled 
to arrive.  Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato had a special message for that first day.  He expressed 
his “indescribable pleasure” at being able to greet the Okinawans through their television sets.  
He described this new technology as a tool to tie Okinawa and the mainland together more 
tightly.  Now Okinawans would be able to see the Olympics as they happened on the mainland 
and this was the “best possible gift the mainland could give.”72  The new technology would bring 
still American occupied Okinawans and mainland Japanese closer together as they shared the 
Olympics live, reinforcing Japan’s claim on Okinawan territory and loyalties. 
                                                 
70 “Sony: 10gatsu 10nichi gogo 2ji anata ha doko ni irasshaimasu ka?,” Yomiuri Shinbun, August 21, 1964, evening  
edition. 
71 “Daimaru: Otaku no terebi 'kaikae' '2daime' no chansu!,” Asahi Shinbun, August 8, 1964, evening  edition. 
72 “Denpa de musubu hondo-okinawa: maikuro kesa kaitsūsiki - hondo kara no okurimono - Ikeda shushō ga 
messēji,” Okinawa Taimusu, September 1, 1964, evening  edition. 
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Even the Communist Party, through its newspaper, Akahata, participated in the trope of 
high technology consumption as status marker and object of desire.  They gathered donations 
such as television sets, washers, radios and transceivers from supporters as prizes to be offered 
by lottery for people attending the Akahata festival in late September.73  The festival was a 
combination of amateur sporting event and performative mass games.  It was sometimes placed 
in competition with and favorably compared to the Olympics by the Japan Communist Party and 
used the same high end, technologically based consumer goods associated with the Olympics as 
rewards for their own supporters—there was certainly no reflexive anti-consumerism in regards 
to their own activities. 
Companies did not only use the Olympics to sell their products; they also used the them 
as public relations tools to demonstrate their own part in moving Japan forward technologically.  
In the preface of a book published for employees, as well as the general public, Hitachi, Ltd. 
noted that, among other goals, Japanese wanted “foreign sports teams and visitors…to more 
deeply know about things like [Japanese] technology and manufacturing.”74  It continued that 
Hitachi itself had contributed the latest in lighting technology for indoor score boards to help the 
athletes train and for the success of the Games. 
 All technology was not just for the consumer or traveler.  When the JOC and JAAA 
learned they had won the right to host the 1964 Summer Olympics, they realized they needed to 
change their athletic training program.  They would be humiliated if they did not perform well in 
front of their home crowd—in addition, as the host nation, the rest of the world would be 
watching their performance much more closely than usual.  They knew their current methods 
                                                 
73 “Terebi, sentakuki nado: kizō tsuzuki shōhin no yama - Akahata matsuri no chūsenyō,” Akahata, September 21, 
1964. 
74 No author, Tōkyō Orinpikku: seikō e no baipasu (Hitachi, Ltd., 1964), 1. 
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were not producing the quality of athlete needed, so they launched on a radical new solution.  On 
January 18, 1960, the IOC founded the Tokyo Olympic Athlete Training Policy Headquarters 
(Tokyo Orinpikku Senshu Kyōka Taisaku Honbu).  Its core purpose was to launch and run a five 
year long program to increase the competitiveness and medal count of Japanese athletes through 
any and all methods available and was widely covered across the media spectrum. 
 The approach the Athlete Training Policy HQ pursued was a mirror image of that pursued 
by the Meiji government on its mad dash to modernization in the late 1800s.  When the 
Tokugawa Shogunate was toppled in 1868, the new leadership of Japan launched on a crash 
course as they attempted to learn all that the West (i.e., what they saw as the modern world) had 
to offer.  They brought in Western advisors and studied abroad.  Their successful efforts enabled 
Japan to defeat one of the Great Powers, Russia (albeit, the weakest of the Western countries), 
mere decades later, in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War.  This announced Japan’s presence on 
the world stage as a major player.   
The Athlete Strengthening Policy (Senshu kyōka taisaku) was intended to do the same 
thing.  It was tasked to search out the best athletes Japan had to offer, train them in the most 
effective manner possible and produce gold medals for the state and nation.  Its motto was “Lift 
the Rising Sun!” (Hi no maru o ageyo!), referring to raising the Japanese (unofficial) state flag 
upon medaling.75  It was staffed by coaches, trainers and scientists.  Its charter stated the goal of 
“the Athlete Strengthening Policy Headquarters was to plan how to strengthen athletes who 
would be competing in the 1964 Tokyo Games.”  In order to do so successfully, the following 
programs needed to be enacted and certain goals needed to be met: 
1) Create a comprehensive athlete strengthening plan. 
                                                 
75 The Rising Sun flag was not the legal and official Japanese flag at this time, although it was widely used as such 
throughout the postwar period.  It was not legally made the official flag until 1999. 
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2) Assist in related sports organizations’ athlete strengthening. 
3) In order to elevate coaches’ teaching skills, create an organization for hosting. 
meetings, research and other necessary things. 
4) Send coaches overseas and invite foreign coaches as necessary. 
5) Consult with related sports organizations in order to create a structured. planned 
athlete strengthening [plan]. 
6) Create a sports research lab and chart out research investigations. 
7) Gather strengthening policies from other countries and research them. 
8) Publish materials related to the athlete strengthening 
9) Do whatever else is necessary to achieve [the overall goal]76 
 
The need for this program was reinforced at the 1960 Rome Games, which was generally 
viewed as a failure.  Many of the Japanese medal favorites, especially the wrestlers, failed to 
medal and they were urged to “reflect” on their losses.77  Track and field and swimming were 
complete disasters.  In fact, Japan’s gold medal count in the three previous Summer Games had 
been a dismal one at Helsinki and four each at Melbourne and Rome.  The JOC needed its 
athletes needed to perform better.  Those involved in the sporting world were increasingly aware 
of a “performance gap” between themselves and the top world competitors, who tended to be 
from the West.78  They saw three basic problems facing them.  First, they needed more and 
better coaches.  Second, they needed logical and effective training methods and tools.  Third,
they needed better training facilities as Japan’s were inadequate.
 
ern, 
                                                
79  The emphasis was on mod
 
76 Tōkyō Orinpikku Senshu Kyōka Taisaku Honbu Hōkokusho (Tokyo: Nihon Taiiku Kyokai, 1965), 46. 
77 Uraoka Itarō, “Orinpikku ni monoōsu: nihon senshu fushin no genin,” Toki, October 1960, 58. 
78 I am defining the West broadly here—it includes both Eastern and Western Europe, as well as Canada and the 
United States.  From the Japanese perspective, the Soviets were also Westerners. 
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scientific training and evaluation methods.  They were explicitly “creating athletes.”80  Of course, 
it would not hurt that there would be more than double the Japanese participants from Rome. 
The new sports training had many aspects.  Scientific researchers were employed to test 
the limits of the human body to determine the best and most effective ways to train.  They 
attached sensors to athletes’ bodies as they ran on treadmills to measure vital statistics and 
oxygen flow.81  They brought in some of the world’s best athletes, such as marathoner Abebe 
Bikila, as test subjects.  They also utilized new training techniques, such as circuit training (i.e., 
interval training which intermixes strength exercises with aerobic exercises) for the judo 
athletes.82  Sports counselors and individualized medical advice were given for the first time.  
Finally they used new technologies to aid in training, such as mechanical pace makers for 
distance runners.   
Perhaps the most important change was the centralization of training national athletes.  
For the first time, these surrogates for state and nation were having their training conducted in a 
single program through a single organization, albeit with the cooperation of their traditional 
organizations.  This allowed them to increase the number of associated coaches as well.  There 
were only 34 coaches in 1960, but by 1964 there were 339.  At the same time, the number of 
athletes was decreasing as they weeded out the weaker ones.83  Many of these ideas for 
restructuring and new approaches to sports came from Western scientists and coaches.  
                                                                                                                                                             
79 Tōkyō Orinpikku Senshu Kyōka Taisaku Honbu Hōkokusho, 58. 
80 Ibid., 63. 
81 “Kagaku ōyō no torēningu-hō,” Asahi Jānaru, April 9, 1961, 43. 
82 Tōkyō Orinpikku Senshu Kyōka Taisaku Honbu Hōkokusho, 279. 
83 Ibid., 62. 
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Centralization had long been the key to Soviet bloc athletic prowess, as opposed to the British 
model of elite amateurs.  The knowledge was gained not only from research, but also through 
coaching exchanges and study.  They pursued training information from both NATO countries 
and from the Soviet Bloc—in fact, they expressly saw it as a way to ease Cold War tensions 
between the US and USSR.84  It also demonstrated that they were looking for the best ideas, 
irrespective of their origin. 
The public was well aware and keenly interested in the Athlete Strengthening Policy.  
They followed the comments of foreign coaches who were helping train Japanese athletes—
looking for validation that their national surrogates would measure up to those of the West.85  
The new technological gadgets also attracted attention as Japan joined the new era of scientific 
training.  For example, the pace maker—like the hare at a dog race—was used to set an artificial 
pace for the athletes to keep, which allowed coaches to push them at the pace of the world’s best.  
It was described as a “robot runner”—although in reality it was little more than a remote control 
motor on a rail around the track oval.86  Its design however, looked like something from the 
future with rounded corners and an oblong body that tapered off at the back.  It was a shinkansen, 
so to speak, for the athletes training for the Olympics.  The media covered this all as a major 
subject in regards to Japanese preparations and efforts at winning medals. 
If sport is symbolic warfare, then this was science applied to symbolic war.  The Japanese 
mass media discourse of the Olympics agreed, noting that the battle of sports was called a 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 68-70. 
85 For an example of this, see Oda Mikio, “Nihon supōtsukai no kanōsei,” Asahi Jānaru, April 16, 1961. 
86 “Kagaku ōyō no torēningu-hō.” 43. 
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“scientific war” and would continue to be in the future as well.87  Science was being used to 
perfect the surrogates of the nation and state for symbolic combat—it was little wonder that the 
public found it fascinating.  Yet at the same time, such public attention to a similar program in 
the Self-Defense Forces or perhaps even the general public—using science to train the human 
body for peak performance—would almost certainly have created a large scandal.  This 
demonstrates the ability of sports to sanitize nationalism and make it palatable or even benign. 
However, there were doubters concerning the Athlete Strengthening Program from the 
very start.  One argument was that with only a little over 4 years before the Games, it was really 
too late to see that much improvement.  Second, in order to do this correctly, it would take a 
massive amount of funding.  There were approximately 20 sports and if they were going to bring 
in foreign coaches, as well as send their own abroad, this would amount to a very large 
expense.88  In fact, in the five years of the program, a little over 2 billion yen were spent.  This 
was significant sum in isolation, but insignificant in comparison to the amounts spent on sports 
and transportation infrastructure.  When the curtain closed on the Olympics, the program seemed 
very successful.  While they had not medaled in tracking and field and had another dismal 
showing in swimming, the 16 gold medals were a Japanese record.  Science had paid off for the 
athletes and nation they represented—something that the public discourse reflected. 
The Tokyo Olympics also saw another program begin based on science and ideas of 
progress.  As often happens at an Olympics, a medical report was filed recording all the injuries, 
illnesses and corresponding treatments given at every sporting venue and the Olympic Village.89  
                                                 
87 “Tokyo Gorin e no senshu kyōka taisaku,” Asahi Jānaru 2, no. 29 (July 17, 1960), 39. 
88 “Orinpikku no 'kyōka taisaku',” Asahi Jānaru, February 7, 1960, 55. 
89 The Report of the Medical Service for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad 1964 Tokyo (The Organizing Committee 
for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad), Japan Olympic Committee Archive. 
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The Japanese members of the International Federation of Sports Medicine took this a step further 
and launched the Olympic Medical Archive.  This was an attempt to medically track all Olympic 
athletes throughout their entire lives and they hoped it “should provide immensely useful data 
not only for the scientific evaluation of the role played by sports and medicine for the health and 
longevity of the human race, but also for a variety of research interests in anthropological 
sciences.”90  While the participation rate was fairly low, the range of data they collected is 
astonishing.  They tracked complete medical histories, training regimens, mental states, and 
physical abnormalities.  They also collected gynecological data regarding menstruation for 
female athletes.  This type of tracking over time obviously has important implications, both 
positive and negative.  It was endorsed by Brundage, US President Lyndon B. Johnson, and 
Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson.  Johnson stated that it will help “to bring people 
everywhere one step closer to health and well being.”  Brundage saw it more in terms of 
perfecting the human body and learning “what makes a champion tick, what physical 
characteristics that they share, which they were born with and which were acquired and 
developed.”91  Given the status of the endorsers, this archive could hardly have been a secret, yet 
there was almost no mention of it in the mass media.92  The question is did they not pay attention 
due to the sports themselves taking up the, a lack of inherent interest, or did were the potential 
                                                 
90 Azuma, Toshiro, et al., Olympic Medical Archives (Tokyo, 1964), Japan Olympic Committee Archive, preface. 
91 Ibid., unnumbered. 
92 Some of the medical and scientific meetings related to the Olympiad did receive media coverage, but the major 
study was mostly untouched. 
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implications of eugenics, etc. washed clean by its association with sport?93  Unfortunately, the 
answer is not clear. 
These new, scientifically trained bodies were faster than ever before.  Science was used 
to keep up with them as many new timing devices were employed for the first time at an 
Olympics.94  With the exception of judged competitions such as gymnastics, most of the 
Olympic sports depend on time, whether measuring the fastest times or the time left on the clock.  
The new technologies, almost all of Japanese invention and made by Japanese companies, were 
widely covered and described in great detail.  They fit and reinforced the trope Japanese were 
performing and consuming about their own status as a technologically advanced country.   
However, when the Olympics were first granted, it was not clear Japanese products 
would be up to the task.  In 1961, the Asahi Shinbun related that the “famous Swiss clock 
makers” were already approaching and urging the use their clocks for the Olympics.  Omega had 
a long standing relationship with IOC Chancellor Otto Meyer and the newspaper indicated that 
this explained Omega’s widespread use at previous Olympics.  JOC Secretary General Tabata 
Masaji told the paper that “as much as possible, we’d like to use domestic products.  That’s not 
to say we’d use bad Japanese stuff, but we’d use them if they were at the same level.”  He heard 
this was already the case for electronic clocks, but believed this was not true for stopwatches.  
They had people in the field “working on research” and hoped they’d provide something useful 
as he “did not want to put out an advertisement for foreign makers on the fields of competition.  
                                                 
93 I contacted the International Federation of Sports Medicine and was unable to locate anyone with information 
about this project—to the best of my knowledge, this archive is not currently being maintained nor is there still data 
being entered into it, although this type of data is certainly being collected in a variety of ways and by various 
organizations. 
94 Some of the following devices and technologies had been tested in international competition in the preceding 
years, but none had been used on a wide scale or at an Olympics. 
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Various Asian countries would also come to Japan and we want to increase their level of trust in 
[Japanese] production.”95  Clearly the image of Japan as a technologically advanced country was 
important, not only for pride, but also for competing on the commercial field of play. 
There was one catch—Japan did not have the computing power to compile all the results.  
For that, they had to turn to an American company.  International Business Machines 
Corporation (IBM) provided the Japanese with a data center, 8 computers in all, and a high speed 
printer.  It provided results within two minutes and was run by 3 technicians, three typists and 
five other employees.96  At this time, these computers were still too expensive for small and 
medium sized companies.97  After entry onto data cards, the resulting information was fed 
through teletype machines to a variety of news organizations and agencies to make the system 
faster and more efficient—certainly this was an increased concern now that the print media had 
to compete with live video footage.98  However, all the timing devices that were sending their 
information to the IBM data centers were of Japanese design and produced by Seiko.  While 
there were many new technologies behind these Games, there are several still in use today.  The 
photo finish with lines to determine who won was introduced at the Olympics.   
A new system for swimming was designed to eliminate any doubt about who won.  
Previously, the winner was chosen based on the judgment of the judges, which was a very 
difficult task given the speed, water and waves involved.  The solution to this problem received 
broad coverage.  As described in numerous articles, the system worked in several stages and can 
                                                 
95 “Tokei: Gorin junbi no koborebanashi,” Asahi Shinbun, December 14, 1961. 
96 “Honban e no 'unei, enshutsu': shubi ha jōjō no IBM,” Nikkan Supōtsu, September 6, 1964, 400. 
97 “Denshi keisanki kō katsuyō,” Yomiuri Shinbun, August 17, 1964. 
98 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964. 
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be seen in Figure 2-8—nearly identical graphics appeared in multiple publications during 1964.  
First, the starter gun was next to a microphone, which would send a signal directly to the clock.  
This eliminated the delay caused by the speed of sound and distances traveled.  It also eliminated 
incorrect false start rulings when a swimmer would react to the motion of the starting pistol 
before the sound reached the judges.  Second, and most importantly, the judges were replaced by 
a touch panel in the water at the end of a race.  In their place, when a swimmer touched the panel, 
it would automatically send a signal to the system and record the time. 99  This not only reduced 
the chances for errors (i.e., a misjudgment by the judges), but also was a more accurate way to 
time the race.    A scandal had erupted at the Rome Games when two swimmers (an American 
and Australian) had tied.  It had taken over 10 minutes for the judges to rule which would get the 
gold.  Both of the swimmers thought the American had won, but the judges awarded it to the 
Australian in a split decision.100  The public discourse reflected pride that this type of scandal 
absolutely could not happen at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics due to their new communications and 
timing technology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 “Hiraoyogi no mohan ha kaeru: chakujun ha issō,” Nikkan Supōtsu, September 6, 1964. 
100 “Denshishiki jidō shinpan sōchi,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi Picture News), May 22, 1964, 44. 
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Figure 2-8: “Electronic Automatic Judging Apparatus,” Source: Asahi 
Gurafu (The Asahi Picture News), May 22, 1964, 44. 
 
This increased precision and accuracy in timing technology was a recurring theme of the 
Olympic media coverage.  The new swimming touch pads enabled accurate measurement down 
to the hundredth of a second.101  This was part of a “stopwatch revolution,” as one publication 
termed it, and Japanese technology was a major driving force behind it.102   
                                                 
101 “Tokushū = Tōkyō Orinpikku: Gorin ni kisou kagaku no shin-ei,” Taiyō: The Sun, August 1964, 40. 
102 Ibid., 37. 
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Beyond the revolutionary swimming technology, track and field was also a major topic of 
coverage for Japanese sporting technology—this was the birthplace of the modern photo 
finish.103  The non-newspaper print mass media paid particular attention to this new technology 
as they had sufficient space for graphical displays of it.  Some, such as Taiyō, included intricate 
photographs of what a photo finish looked like, showing runners on the actual lined film, 
alongside diagrams of the technology itself.  The article noted that in the past, timing had been 
done by hand, which invariably led to inaccuracies due to the lag in human response times and 
the physical distance between the timer at the finish line and the starter with the gun at the start 
line.  In fact, it meant that runners were mostly likely slower than the times reflected due to that 
lag.  Advances in Japanese technology mean that at Tokyo, this would no longer be the case 
since the clock would start exactly when the trigger on the starter gun was pulled and the film 
would give an accurate finish time.104  In short, Olympic competitors’ times might be slower 
than in the past and result in fewer records being broken.  Japanese technology was more 
accurate, but might also be the cause of less excitement in terms of record breaking times. 
 
 
                                                 
103 Something resembling photo finish technology had been used at Melbourne, but it relied on angles of multiple 
cameras and was much more primitive. 
104 Ibid., 39. 
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 Figure 2-9: “Seiko can capture the world records [at the Tokyo Olympics]”  Source: 
Asahi Shinbun, September 1, 1964. 
 
Seiko used its position as the official provider of timing technology to attract customers, 
often without even advertising typical consumer products.  The above advertisement stretched 
across two pages (see Figure 2-9) and appeared in the Asahi Shinbun during September 1964. 105  
Very similar advertisements from Seiko appeared in a multitude of other media outlets.  They 
demonstrate the strategy.  The company used the timers and clocks that it provided for the 
Olympics to attract people by invoking the related trope of Japanese advanced technology.  The 
left side of the advertisement displayed clocks for boxing, field hockey, biking, rifle competition 
and more, and introduced them as the precise ones used at the competitions.  The opposite page 
had a similar advertisement from Seiko, but this time there were more technical and uncommon 
time pieces.  It also contained the only product that could potentially be sold to a consumer:  the 
hand held stop watch.  The slogan reminded Japanese that it would be Seiko’s technology, not 
that of another company, that would capture the world records at the Japanese Olympic Games.  
This not only demonstrated Japan’s scientific prowess, but positioned Seiko as its leader and 
                                                 
105 “Koko ni Seiko - toraeru sekai kiroku,” Asahi Shinbun, September 1, 1964. 
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hopeful provider of watches and clocks for Japanese caught up in this national identity and 
nationalism surrounding the 9164 Tokyo Summer Olympiad. 
Much as clocks served as one measure of science and advancement in the Age of 
Encounter, they were now a measure of Japan’s technological achievement.  These devices of 
Japanese design were timing the best athletes from the top countries in the world and did it more 
precisely than ever before. 106  The discourse of science and high technology at the Tokyo 
Olympics was a constant theme as a variety of Japanese—governmental, corporate, Olympic and 
individual—pushed forward with their own scientific endeavors and competed with the West for 
glory through such prestige projects as the Super Express of Dreams and on the athletic field.  
This trope and discourse almost always emphasized the domestic nature of the technology and 
compared it both explicitly and implicitly with the rest of the world, but especially with the West.  
While many of these efforts were state coordinated or privately run businesses, the public 
interest and support in these matters was almost always high.  There were some misgivings, 
especially about cost and timing, but most Japanese agreed with the course Japan seemed to be 
taking and actively participated in this discourse of high technology and cutting edge science. 
 
106 See Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western 
Dominance, Cornell studies in comparative history (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
Chapter 4 – Modern Place, Oriental Self 
“Tokyo, Japan’s capital, where the old and new meet and blend”1 
 
All identities are complex, fragmented and often contradictory.  The identity performed 
on the stage of the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics was an example of this.  One aspect of this 
identity was Japan has having a foot in two different worlds;  it was both modern and traditional, 
or sometimes, Western and non-Western.  In many ways, this seemly mutually incompatible 
identities were two sides of the same coin.  This bifurcation of identity was nothing particularly 
new for Japan—it was also argued and proposed from the mid 1800s as Japanese began to pursue 
Western technology.  Men such as Sakuma Shōzan and Yoshida Shōin argued for a synthesis of 
Eastern ethnic and Western learning.  The modern side of this coin could be seen in the physical 
environments of Tokyo, as the city was remade, but also in attempts to reform Japanese social 
habits to make them appear more modern and civilized (i.e., westernized).  The traditional side 
emphasized cultural identity based upon ancient connections and practices.  Although it now 
focused on the positives and largely avoided explicit criticisms of the West, it still resembled 
previous tropes that frequently employed ideas of purity and were used in comparison to a 
corrupt and decadent, culturally modern West during World War II.2   
There were different underlying meanings for different audiences, as well.  For Japanese, 
the general discourse was that they were equals to Westerners, but still culturally unique (i.e., 
they had modernized without becoming overly Westernized).  Koichi Iwabuchi argues that in 
                                                 
1 Japan Tourist Association, ed., Your Guide to Japan (Petit Guide du Japon) (Japan: Toshoinsatsu), 9.  This was 
passed out at the 54th IOC meeting in Tokyo in 1958. 
2 For an in depth discussion of this earlier discourse during the war, please see John W Dower, War Without Mercy: 
Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), especially Chapters 8 and 9. 
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more recent times, Japanese popular culture has been used to recenter Japan in an Asian 
discourse in which it is a part, but above, other Asians countries.  Japan is more modern, but also 
like them.3  The Olympics had a similar, yet broader message.  For Westerners, they were 
intended to recognize a fellow modern citizen of the world that was still culturally distinct.  Non-
Westerners, not just other Asians, were supposed to see and use Japan as a model for becoming 
modern.  Michael Adas argues the West understood scientific and technological progress as a 
measure of human worth.  This informed Westerners’ views of the non-West and helped justify 
imperialism, colonialism and theories of racial superiority.  He traces its decline after World War 
I and the use of technological advancement for mass slaughter.  However, Americans 
intellectuals revived it in the postwar under the language of modernization theory.4  The trope of 
Japanese partaking in and belonging to Western modernity was a part of this same practice—
they were taking part in this same competition for worth and judging others by it as well. 
  At the same time, performance of Japanese cultural identity was firmly rooted in a 
traditional, self-Orientalizing trope—this was the cultural Japan that Westerners were supposed 
to find appealing and different.  Self-Orientalizing scripts have been examined elsewhere, but 
they tend to focus on either Asia or internal ones, such as seeing in the rural settings, and 
supposedly therefore non-modern, a real and traditional Japan—authenticity found through 
modern tourism.5  This, of course, closely resembles the vision of Japan that later members of 
                                                 
3 Kōichi Iwabuchi, Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002). 
4 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men. 
5 Marilyn Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995). 
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the Japan Romantic School had during the wartime years.6  This was not a new process for 
dealing with modernity, but at the Tokyo Olympics, nor was it a desperate search for authenticity 
through internal tourism or a struggle against a Western opponent in wartime.  This was a 
performance of an Oriental Self for the Western Other.  This traditional cultural performance 
was almost entirely for the Western Other rather than the non-Western Other—the latter could 
partake and undoubtedly did, but Japanese seemed less interested in how the lesser Other 
consumed their traditional culture.  At the same time, this self-Orientalizing trope was very much 
aimed and consumed by the domestic audience.  This can, in many ways, be seen as participating 
in the discourse of Self as culturally and ethnically unique which are often seen in nihonjin-ron.7 
This paradoxical identity can be seen from the early stages of the application process for 
the 18th Olympiad.  When the International Olympic Committee members gathered in Tokyo in 
1958 for the 54th General Meeting, Tokyo made its formal application to host the 1964 Summer 
Games and passed out several official tourism guides.  Among them was one for Tokyo, titled 
How to See Tokyo.  This English language, 32 page pamphlet laid out the city for foreign 
consumption.  It covered every imaginable topic for a tourist.  It emphasized that Tokyo had “all 
[the] up-to-date conveniences,” especially in mass transit, and due to this, “visitors will have 
every opportunity to see and enjoy…all the charms that are traditionally Japanese.”8  The places 
to see were a mixture of the familiar modern and exotic traditional, such as baseball stadiums 
                                                 
6 Doak, Dreams of Difference. 
7 For a further discussion of this and its development, see, for example, Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-
Images. 
8 Japan Tourist Association, ed., How to See Tokyo (Japan: Toshoinsatsu). 
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and the Imperial Palace.9  The list of annual events focused on traditional culture such as the 
Girls’ Festival and sumo tournaments.   
The delegates also received another pamphlet on Japan: Your Guide to Japan.  It was 
explicit about Tokyo’s status, calling it a place “where the old and the new meet and blend.”10  
Even more than the How to See Tokyo guidebook, this one intimately intertwined the modern 
with the traditional, but expanded its coverage to all of Japan.  Traditional images of geisha and 
shrines were matched with railways, government buildings and the international airport.  The 
message was that Japan possessed modern transportation and government—similar to any 
Western country—, but still had its traditional, and exotic to Others, culture.  The JOC and OOC 
also distributed a guide to Nara and Kyoto, the ancient capitols of Japan, which focused purely 
on traditional culture and history.11  Finally, the IOC members received a souvenir guide for 
Japanese goods.  One the one hand, it listed the modern technology Japan had to offer, such as 
cameras and binoculars, noting that “Japan’s optical industry has of late made marked 
advancement…technically.”  On the other hand, it also offered “a host of beautiful souvenirs 
only obtainable in Japan” such as dolls that “[show] the characteristics of a locality or a certain 
age in history.”  Indeed, Japan was full of “art objects such as wall hangings, woodblock prints, 
historic paintings and curios…to be found everywhere.”12  This mix of old and new was what 
defined Japan in these publications meant for foreign consumption.  Japan was a place 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, Yasukuni Shrine, currently the center of great controversy over Japanese wartime responsibility and 
memory, was listed as a place to visit for foreigners.  It was described as a shrine “dedicated to the war dead” and 
possessing the largest granite Shinto gate in Japan, as well as the host of festivals. 
10 Japan Tourist Association, Your Guide to Japan (Petit Guide du Japon), 9. 
11 Japan Tourist Association, ed., How to See Kyoto & Nara (Japan: Toshoinsatsu). 
12 Japan Tourist Association, ed., Japan Souvenir Guide (Japan: Toshoinsatsu), unnumbered. 
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Westerners could place their trust in—it had modern transportation and government they could 
understand.  It was also an exotic cultural location of Other-ness for the Westerners, and non-
Westerners to explore and fulfill their desires.  However, it was not just for foreign consumption: 
domestic tourism guides from the Olympics were very similar.13  Clearly, Japan was portrayed 
as a unique mix of modernity and tradition to a variety of audiences. 
 
was 
                                                
For all the trumpeting of Japan’s modern infrastructure in the tourism guides, most 
Japanese knew that it needed drastic improvement.14  Indeed, the cost of these improvements 
was the most common source of criticism regarding the bid for the Olympics, as previously 
discussed.  Nonetheless, the mass media still reacted with shock when Alexander Campbell 
wrote in Life magazine that Tokyo “now combines the best and worst of East and West” in the 
world’s most “frenetic” town.15  The article described Tokyo as Asia’s largest human flesh 
market—Turkish baths, prostitution and more.  The London Times added that it was the “world’s
most dangerous city” in reference to the number of traffic accidents.16  It directly contradicted 
the main trope of Japan as uniquely combining Western style modernity with non-Western 
traditional exoticism.  This type press coverage was JOC and OOC’s worst nightmare—even if 
they had to admit the number of traffic accidents was too high and the transportation 
infrastructure was not yet up to par with that of the West.  For some, this suggested that now 
 
13 For example, see Tokyo Guide: Tōkyō annai (Tokyo-to kankōbu). 
14 For example, see“Dōro, hoteru nado seibi: gorin no ukeire keikaku,” Tokyo Shinbun, June 2, 1959, evening  
edition 
15 Alexander Campbell, “Frenetic Tokyo,” Life, May 9, 1960. 
16 Quoted in“Sekai ichi no 'kichigai buraku': kore de Tokyo orinpikku ha hirakeru no ka,” Shūkan Bunshun., 36. 
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not the place or time to be hosting 
Olympics, even if they rejected at least
some of the claims as mere exoticism 
and unfamiliarity with the real Japan 
beyond wh
an 
 
ere foreigners played.17   
                                                
However, the response from the 
government was not to relinquish the 
Games for a second time, but to 
improve Tokyo in a multitude of ways.  
The first order of business was to set up 
a modern city plan for Tokyo.  As 
Kurosawa Akira and others have 
argued, Tokyo only seemed to have 
master plans after disasters or before a 
“national event” like the Olympics.18  
For the first time, this plan relied on 
building highways rather than mainly on 
mass transit, although the latter was done as well—not only with the Shinkansen, but also 
completing several subway lines.  In 1950, Tokyo had approximately 6 million people and 
60,000 cars.  By 1960, Tokyo had experienced a massive growth in population and car 
ownership, which was choking out transportation.  At this point, the number was more than 9.5 
Figure 3-1: “Road Transportation Network Plan 
Map” 
 
17 Ibid., 41. 
18 Akira Koshizawa, Tokyo Toshi Keikaku Monogatari, Chikuma gakugei bunko; (Tokyo: Chikumashobo, 2001), 
290. 
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million people and over 600,000 cars.  Those ten short years saw population growth of more than 
50% and cars owned jumped by around 1,000%.19  The result was a plan that called for 22 new 
highways, dubbed “Olympic roads.”20  The plan also included local roads and mass 
transportation and an early map of it can be seen in Figure 3-1.21  These roads were planned to 
remake Japan into a modern city.  The Olympic roads were all finished on time, but it was not an 
easy task.   
Ishida Yorifusa has argued that this time period saw the emergence of high quality design 
and engineering in city planning—many of the Olympic projects, such as the roads and the  fell 
into this category.  They were explicitly aiming for this.  The roads were one of the transforming 
plans for Tokyo and the Olympics gave these projects a firm deadline, something they would not 
have had otherwise.  The number of roads (including national and local) completed for the 
Olympics between 1959 to 1964 was 37, with total extensions of 112km, at a cost of 
approximately 188.5 billion yen.22 
The highways entered into the mainstream discourse as a symbol of a new Tokyo.    
Pictures of them filled books, magazines and newspapers related to the Olympics and Tokyo.  
They were modern Tokyo in concrete, steel and asphalt.  The Shūkan Asahi called the new 
Olympic roads too expensive, but could not resist a dramatic multipage spread of color photos 
showing the highway from above as it wound its way through Tokyo.23  The Asahi Shinbun 
                                                 
19 Tokyo-toritsu daigakubushi kenkyū sentā, ed., Tokyo: seichō to keikaku (1868-1988) (Tokyo: Aigā, 1988), 171. 
20 Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, The Games of the XVIII Olympiad, Tokyo, 1964; 
Official Report. Daijūhachi, 1964, 71. 
21 “Dōro kōtsūmō keikaku-zu,” Tōkyō Orinpikku jijō, December 1960, 27. 
22 Ishida Yorifusa, Nihon kingendai toshi keikaku no tenkai, 1868-2003 (Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyūsha, 2004), 224. 
23 “Toshin o tsuranuku daikansen dōro,” Shūkan Asahi, August 14, 1964, 30-33. 
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called the highway from Haneda (Tokyo International Airport) to Shinjuku (near the Olympic 
venues) an amazing road and noted that the distance could now be covered in only 30 minutes.  
However, due to difficulties at exits, they were not sure if Tokyo fit the highways, hinting that 
perhaps Japan was not as modern as some would like to think.24  The Shūkan Yomiuri wrote that 
while some found the new highways an eyesore, that “a new era needs an appreciation of new 
types of beauty.”25  This was often spoken of as opening a “new era,” stressing the trope of 
progress and advancement that Japan had now achieved.26 
However, not everything went smoothly.  Beyond the typical issues of logistics and a 
strict deadline, there was also considerable difficulty in purchasing or acquiring the necessary 
land for the roads and other construction related to the Olympics.  This provoked resistance from 
affected home and business owners, although never on a scale that threatened the Olympics.  As 
one of those affected related, “I voted for Governor Azuma during the election.  But because of 
the Olympics that Mr. Azuma invited, I’m going to lose the land where I’ve lived for a very long 
time.  If I think about it now, it was stupid of me.”27  However, surprisingly little anti-
construction discourse entered into the larger mass media discourse concerning the Olympics, 
even though it affected more than 6,000 homes.28   
One instance where it did appear was not over the seizure of houses, but over what 
appeared to be unnecessary buyouts and evictions in Shibuya Ward near the Outer Gardens of 
                                                 
24 “Kōsoku dōro 1, 4 gōsen ga kaitsū,” Asahi Shinbun, August 1, 1964, evening  edition. 
25 “Shin Tōkyō gaido,” Shūkan Yomiuri, July 26, 1964, 19. 
26 For example, see“Kōsoku dōro jidai no makuake,” Sankei Shinbun, September 5, 1964, sec. editorial 
27 Quoted in“Tokyo Orinpikku no nikizokoro,” Shūkan Sankei, January 11, 1960, 20. 
28 “Yōchi baishū ni gaisanbarai,” Asahi Shinbun, May 10, 1961. 
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the Meiji Shrine.  In this case, approximately 10 homes had been removed to make way for part 
of the Olympic road construction.  However, there was an illegally built concrete plant remaining 
that was delaying it.  As a result, the Construction Ministry and Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
changed the original plans and designed a curve around the property rather than deal with the 
problem directly..  This would have required the compensated eviction (tachinoki) of 40 different 
homes.  This proved controversial as the Ministry originally gave different reasons for the 
change, such as improved traffic flow.  When residents found out, they were outraged; as one 
resident put it, for those that had taken buyouts and moved, it clearly seemed a case where 
“honesty [didn’t] pay” (shōjikimono ga baka wo miru).29   To avert local opposition, and perhaps 
to reduce expenses, the Ministry and Metropolitan Government returned to the original plan after 
meeting with those affected.30  The problem of people resisting eviction, however, continued, 
according to the press accounts, largely near Setagaya, and eventually, the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government resorted to threatening them with the country’s first usage of a special eviction and 
seizure law using eminent domain, before the issues were resolved in 1963.31   
However, this discourse rarely entered into the mass media.  When there was coverage, it 
is clear that there was frequent local opposition, although of varying degrees.  The reason for the 
lack of coverage is not clear, but governmental pressure does not seem to be the cause, as some 
articles did appear—and the mainstream media was generally not afraid to criticize the 
government on other matters.  Instead, it seems more likely that it was not seen as a major news 
                                                 
29 “Fuhō kenchiku, Gorin dōro o mageru: jūtakuchi e rosen henkō,” Asahi Shinbun, January 13, 1961. 
30 “Rosen, moto ni modosu. Jingu gaien Gorin dōro - ihan kenchiku tachinoki,” Asahi Shinbun, February 18, 1961. 
31 “Tachinoki kyohisha ga iten shūryō: Gorin dōro no kinkyū saiketsu mondai,” Asahi Shinbun, March 31, 1963.  
This was a national law for eminent domain and its use had been threatened for several years.  See “Kyōsei 
shutoku mo junbi ka: to kensetsu kyoku - jimoto de hatsu no setsumeikai,” Asahi Shinbun, October 31, 1961. 
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story.  This is an issue that plagues many localized protests—quite simply, if it is not in one’s 
own backyard, it is not worthy of one’s involvement or attention.  This might especially be the 
case with prestige projects like an Olympics which are often of state and national importance. 
In general, the construction of a modern highway system and the rebuilding of Tokyo for 
the second time in 20 years, the first being after World War II, was portrayed positively.  Perhaps 
the most iconic scene of Ichikawa Kon’s famous documentary of the 1964 Tokyo Olympiad was 
its opening sequence.  It begins with a rising sun image—a common metaphor for Japan.  The 
globe of the sun is replaced with a wrecking ball as Ichikawa showed Tokyo being torn down as 
the narrator listed the Olympics starting from Athens and moving to 1964—the viewer literally 
watches Japan tear down the old Tokyo then move to images of the very modern Olympic 
athletic facilities as the list moves forward in time.32  Progress brought to life in front of the 
audience’s very own eyes.  This was Tokyo being remade and refashioned into a modern 
metropolis. 
Of course, beauty is in the eye of the beholder and many felt that beyond the 
transportation and sporting infrastructure, the Tokyo government and OOC had several other 
serious issues to confront.  The city had a serious odor problem due to pollution, especially of its 
waterways. 33  It had problems with manners and garbage as well.  In response to this, the city 
began a beautification project and set out to train its citizens in proper modern (i.e., Western) 
behavior.   
The Capitol Beautification Inquiry Commission (Shuto bika shingikai) was established in 
May of 1962.  It included local officials, scholars, teachers and bureaucrats.  They quickly 
                                                 
32 Kon Ichikawa, Tokyo Olympiad (Criterion Collection) (Tōhō Kabushiki Kaisha, 2002). 
33 For a treatment of this, see Igarashi, Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-
1970. 
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established several goals, including “rais[ing] the sense of public duty” and “purify[ing] (jōka) 
the environment.”34  In order to achieve this, a series of vows was created: 
Capitol Beautification Vows (Shuto bika no chikai): 
We citizens of the capitol, are proud to live [here], will work together, taking 
responsibility to make a bright, beautiful Tokyo. 
We will uphold the Vows of Capitol Beautification here by doing the following: 
1) We will obey the rules in a well ordered fashion 
2) We will think of Tokyo as our home—we will not dirty the roads or rivers, etc. 
3) We will use public spaces like parks, stations and rides (norimono) with great care 
4) We will love flowers and other greenery, and will create a clean living environment.35 
 
The Committee named a series of “Capitol Beautification Days,” starting on October 1, 
1963; they took place four times.  They were poorly attended at first, but on the fourth time, held 
just a month before the Olympics, they finally attracted significant numbers.  Nearly 7000 
organization and 1.8 million people participated as they cleaned the roads, parks and other public 
spaces.36  Several days before, the Sankei Shinbun urged participation—cleaning the outside 
would also help the person inside.37  The city needed to be clean for its guests, especially the 
Westerners, and this would benefit Japan and the Japanese.   
                                                 
34 Shuto bika kankei shiryōshū (Tokyo: Tokyo-to Kōhoushitsu Kōhōbu Shoshika, 1965), 4. 
35 Ibid., unnumbered. 
36 Ibid., 31. 
37 “Utsukushii Gorin no tame ni: machi mo toori mo ichidai seisō sakusen o,” Sankei Shinbun, September 7, 1964, 
sec. editorial. 
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This program was part of a larger country wide push for beautification through the 
elimination of littering and extensive cleaning.  A JOC handbook distributed to the public called 
this part of a “National Beautification Campaign” (Kokudo bika undō).  As tenets, this campaign 
was about cleaning and increasing green spaces through new plantings of flowers and the like.  
However, it also urged readers to do away with crime (hanzai o nakushite) and give “education 
on sexual morality” (junketsu kyōiku).38  Beautification was both moral and physical—Japanese 
needed to behave and conduct themselves in the proper fashion. 
The JOC did its part to help out with this project as well.  In their handbook for 
elementary students that was handed out across the wards of Tokyo, they provided students with 
advice on how to help the Olympics succeed.  They reminded them that athletes and supporters 
would be arriving from all over the world; it was important for them to be welcomed to a 
beautiful Japan.  Therefore, the students needed to help by “cleaning at your own home and 
school, and from there the roads, etc.”39  They were also urged to treat the foreigners 
respectfully—beautification was not just about physical cleanliness, perhaps a particularly 
important point to make for children who had not yet fully been indoctrinated with societal 
norms of behavior. 
Japanese were repeatedly urged to be on their best behavior so as not to offend their 
guests from all over the world.  Although it was not phrased precisely as such, they were being 
asked to demonstrate modern, civilized manners, rather than provincial or uncivilized ones.  
These admonishments were often couched in terms of ‘good sportsmanship’ and a sense of 
‘fairplay.”  Readers of materials from the JOC, in discussions of sportsmanship, were told that 
                                                 
38 Orinpikku dokuhon, 59. 
39 Orinpikku dokuhon shōgakusei no tame ni,  JOC 63-C-1028 (Tokyo: Monbushō, 1964), 38. 
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acts of discrimination against other races, religions or people with different politics, the last 
undoubtedly aimed at the treatment of Communist countries and their athletes, would be 
“absolutely unforgivable.”40  Furthermore, “the Olympic venue [was] a single world of complete 
peace.”  In addition, they needed to practice sportsmanship in a civilized manner, which meant 
“clapping for everyone, whether they won or lost.”41  They were reminded that many foreigners 
would be coming; while the government was doing its part, they also needed to act properly and 
avoid uncouth behavior or Japan would acquire an undesirable reputation rather than as a 
“beautiful country” with “well mannered” (reigi tadashii) and polite “citizens” (kokumin).42 
The general public and high school handbooks stressed the need for Japanese to be on 
their best behavior and watch their manners (manā).  Japanese were told that “in Japan’s case,” 
there were many “questions” (mondaiten) and “points of worry” (shinpai sareru ten).43  In 
particular, it related that Japanese had problems with public behavior such as “spitting” and 
“urinating” on the street, as well littering.  They were also urged to follow the rules of the road—
particularly on the new highways and streets. 44 
While the new highways placed Japan into the realm of the modern city, Japanese needed 
to be educated on how to properly utilize them.  They were not used to wide roads that allowed 
                                                 
40 See, for example, Orinpikku dokuhon chūgakusei no tame ni,  MEJ 4133 (JOC 62-C-0108) (Tokyo: Monbushō, 
1962), 10.  This same admonishment was carried in the other readers of the same Dokuhon series. 
41 Ibid., 13. 
42 Ibid., 33. 
43 Orinpikku dokuhon: kōtō gakkō-seinen gakkyū muke, 52, and Orinpikku dokuhon, 54.  These two handbooks are 
virtually identical in content—only two extra blank pages in the table on contents in the latter are different, resulting 
in differing page numbers throughout the texts.  The JOC publication numbers are the same (JOC 62-C-0112), but 
the Ministry of Education numbering is different (MEJ 4194 vs. MEJ 4198).  For the sake of brevity, I will only cite 
one following this. 
44 Ibid., 58-59. 
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relatively high speeds, nor the practice of on and off ramps.  For the Olympics, this was 
important because they anticipated having foreign drivers on the roads as well.  As such, they 
implemented “international rules of the road” such as “keep left” while driving starting on 
September 1, 1964.45  This was a new law they were implementing for safety, but adopting the 
international rules seemed equally as important and was emphasized in the mass media and 
public discourse.  The Nikkan Supōtsu newspaper was more explicit and used almost a full page 
to make its argument.  Japanese needed to follow the rules about not only keeping left, but also 
avoiding drunk driving or stopping in the road to take a break.  These new laws and manners 
would allow Japan to join in with the rest of the world.46  Given that non-advanced countries 
would not have the infrastructure for highways or large numbers of cars, the assumption behind 
these statements is clear—they brought Japan into line with the modern Western world. 
 However, the tropes of modernity were not only for Western consumption.  They 
were also for other Asians who were supposed to see Japan as modern, and for Japanese to 
differentiate themselves from other Asians.  The Olympic Torch Relay is one example of this 
discourse.  The plan for the cancelled 1940 Tokyo Summer Olympics was for the Torch to be 
carried on horseback across Asia—something approaching the ancient silk route. 47  Carl Diem, a 
central figure in the mid 20th century Olympics had proposed this plan.  He had served as the 
head of the 1936 Berlin Olympics and was the architect of the first Olympic Torch Relay from 
Olympia to Berlin.  Although heavily implicated in the Nazi movement, he remained active in 
the sporting world and Olympic movement.  The route he envisioned would have retraced the 
                                                 
45 “Atarashii kōtsū rūru jicchi: tsuitachi kara kokusai kijun no dōkōhō,” Sankei Shinbun, August 30, 1964. 
46 “Dōro kōtsūhō o kaisei,” Nikkan Supōtsu, September 2, 1964. 
47 Walter Borgers, The Olympic Torch Relays, 1936-1994, trans. Eleanor and Heinrich Latz (Germany: AGON-
Sportverlag, 1996), 30. 
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route that was central to European romantic conceptions of Asia—a virtual reenactment of 
Orientalist fantasy on a grand scale.  When Tokyo was awarded the 1964 Games, this route was 
resurrected and considered at first.  However, it quickly was rejected.  A modern day journey by 
horseback over the Silk Road was simply unworkable.48  Beyond the nearly impossible logistics, 
Communist China was not an IOC member and would have never allowed the Torch to be 
relayed across its territory.    an examination of the route revealed that much of this route when 
through the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which was not only communist, but also was not 
an IOC member and would never allow the Torch to be relayed across its territory.  To make 
matters worse, the proposed path would have gone through a suspected Chinese missile base.  
Obviously, this route was unviable.  The OOC had begun with a discussion of Carl Diem’s 
“dream course” and had hoped to follow the “700 year old” Silk Road that had “tied the Orient 
and Occident together.”49 (see Figure 3-2)  Beyond its political infeasibility, it was also more 
suited towards European romanticized views of Asia rather than the romanticized views Japanese 
might hold about themselves and Asia.  It would have also been much more expensive than a 
southern route, which is what they were left to explore. 
Instead, the OOC tried to map the southern course across Asia and avoid the problem of 
China—most likely abandoning the idea of horses entirely.  The Asahi Newspaper Corporation, 
parent company of many different publications, volunteered to scout the southern route and 
determine the best path.50  Although a land route was ultimately deemed economically and 
geographically impractical, this scouting mission revealed where they saw Japan’s place in the 
                                                 
48 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 245. 
49 “Seika: shiruku rōdo o hashiru ka,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi Picture News), February 10, 1961, 50. 
50 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 245. 
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world.  As the Asahi team travelled, they sent back reports from across the Asian continent.  
While obviously used to increase readership and profit an association with the Tokyo Games, it 
was also a journey across what many saw as Japan’s metaphorical Asian past. 
The starting point of an Olympic Torch Relay is at Olympia in Greece.  This region is 
geographically and metaphorically, often seen as the cradle of Western civilization.  In the case 
of this Relay, the Torch was like civilization, being carried across a benighted Asia to the only 
Asian country capable of joining the modern world, Japan.  This is a particularly vivid and potent 
image.  Ichikawa Kon’s movie, Tokyo Olympiad, enacted and performed this very scene.  Its 
second act, which established a rebuilt and modern Japan, was the Torch Relay.  The movie 
showed it being lit on Olympia, in a reenactment of the ancient ceremony.  Next the Torch 
runner was shown striding towards the viewer through the night, which faded to a vista of the 
rising sun—an unmistakable visual metaphor for Japan.  The Torch Relay was shown going 
through a variety of Asian countries—all distinctly non-modern; even Hong Kong was not 
shown in a way to highlight any modern features.  Finally, the Olympic Flame, which started in 
the birthplace of Western civilization reached modern Japan after crossing the darkness of 
Asia.51  This is the trope of the Olympic Torch Relay as performed at the 1964 Tokyo Summer 
Games.   
 
                                                 
51 Kon Ichikawa, Tokyo Olympiad (Criterion Collection). 
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 Figure 3-2:  “Olympic Flame: will it take the Silk Road?” 
 
The six man team from the Asahi Corporation travelled from Japan to Greece, then from 
Olympia to the coast, where they left Europe for Asia.  Their first stop was Turkey.  They met 
with a customs official there and reported that their first day in Turkey had made a great 
impression upon them—not only was the scenery great, but the customs officer had showed off 
his Japanese made transistor radio over tea.52  The latter was completely unrelated to their task, 
but was almost as important as their description of Turkey and of the route itself.  It reified Japan 
as a technological leader and reassured the Japanese audience of this as well.  They did not 
restrict themselves to exploring the possible route—they made time to visit Troy while passing 
through as well.  This pattern repeated for every country along the way.  It was at least as much a 
travelogue of Asia as it was a an exploration of a possible route for the Torch Relay.  This 
travelogue revealed a trope of that Japan, visa a vie Asia, was more like the West than it was the 
countries of the rest of Asia.  In short, the continent served as a negative image for a 
contemporary Japan—Japan was everything the rest of the continent was not. 
                                                 
52 “Yūrashia tairiku ōdan 2man 5sen kiro - Orinpikku seika rirē tōsatai: Toruko,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi Picture 
News), August 4, 1961, 38. 
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The article on Turkey was accompanied by four pictures.  One showed the supposed 
ruins of Troy.  Another showed the ferry that carried them with only a few cars in sight other 
than their own, which was particularly significant given the explosive growth of car ownership in 
Japan at that time, as well as the massive highway building project for a modernizing Tokyo.  
Although the article contained descriptions of the beautiful city and mosques, the remaining two 
pictures emphasized the non-modern nature of Turkey: a Turkish woman in non-Western 
clothing riding a small donkey and another showing a herd of goats they passed on the way to 
Ankara.  The visual contrast to an Tokyo and Japan that was increasingly urbanizing could not 
have been larger or more stark for the Japanese audience experiencing the Asia continent through 
these Olympic reports.  The message of the team’s journey through Turkey was one of a largely 
alien world which was stuck in the distant past.  Furthermore, it was one that happily recognized 
Japan’s technological prowess, and perhaps even looked up to it as a place to emulate. 
The team’s next stop was Iraq by way of Syria.  They noted the changes in script to 
Arabic as, unlike Turkey, the two countries were not using any Western style characters.53  This 
caused them many problems when the roads split as they could not read the signs.  The 
expedition’s crew also had trouble sending film overseas and had to make a long detour to do 
so—something that would have seemed alien to contemporary Japanese, especially those in 
Tokyo.  The photos once again focused on old ruins, in this case the ruins of a castle from the 
Crusades, “gypsies” and several other distinctly non modern scenes.  Their journey continued in 
a similar fashion as they examined the antiquities along their path and devoted most of each 
article, and almost all photographic space, to these aspects rather than to the actual scouting of a 
                                                 
53 “Yūrashia tairiku ōdan 2man 5sen kiro - Orinpikku seika rirē tōsatai: Iraku,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi Picture 
News), August 18, 1961, 20. 
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potential land route for the Torch Relay.  This was 
an implicit and stark contrast with contemporary 
Japan; it was an Othering of Asia for a modern and 
urban Japanese audience. 
Each land had a connection to a dead or 
long gone time that was archeologically fascinating, 
and distinctly different from contemporary Japan.  
Afghanistan had mosques and ancient Buddhist 
shrines.54  Pakistan provided spectacular scenery 
and the colonial era buildings of Lahore.55  India 
brought monkeys frolicking in the road, an 800 
year old sundial and an ancient Hindu temple.56 
(see Figure 3-3)  The journey continued through 
Nepal, East Pakistan and Burma (where they ran 
into a conflict zone), but the discourses deployed 
and picture selection remained constant: show 
ancient ruins and the alien, rather than the 
common elements that the Asian country and 
Figure 3-3: “A monkey community in 
the suburbs of New Delhi—there are 
many more in trees lining the road” 
(top); “In Delhi, a sun dial, built 800 
years ago in the Muslim era, remains 
in the middle of a park” (bottom) 
                                                 
54 “Yūrashia tairiku ōdan 2man 5sen kiro - Orinpikku seika rirē tōsatai: Afuganistan,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi 
Picture News), October 6, 1961. 
55 “Yūrashia tairiku ōdan 2man 5sen kiro - Orinpikku seika rirē tōsatai: Pakistan,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi 
Picture News), October 20, 1961. 
56 “Yūrashia tairiku ōdan 2man 5sen kiro - Orinpikku seika rirē tōsatai: Indo,” Asahi Gurafu (The Asahi Picture 
News), December 6, 1961. 
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Japan might share.  Their scouting expedition ended in a final trip through Thailand, Malaya and 
Singapore—colonial era buildings made appearances, but very little else that would have 
appeared familiar to a Japanese audience.   
The trip resembled an archeological journey through history.  It emphasized the alien 
character of the Other.  In this case, it was Asian Others (defined by continent rather than race).  
While the final Olympic Torch relay did not go across land, it did follow a similar course and the 
trope remained constant.  Asia was a benighted, backward land that had only ancient glories—
Japan was the modern, older sibling that could bring the metaphorical and real torch of 
civilization from the undeniable leaders, the West, to the Orient. 
The non-Western Others who came to the Olympics provided a perfect opportunity to 
play and fulfill this role for Japan.  The Sankei Shinbun invited high school students from across 
the Asian continent to visit.  The newspaper revealed that there was an “explosive popularity” 
across Asia as students applied to visit Japan for the Olympics.57  In the end, seven were chosen 
from seven countries and they explained the reason they applied.  Most spoke of Japan having a 
special role in bring the East and West together—exactly the self image many Japanese wanted 
to believe.  One student, Francis Yeo from Singapore, wrote that he “wanted Japan to take a 
leadership role for Southeast Asian progress (shinpo) and prosperity (hanei)” because it “was the 
most advanced in the fields of engineering and science in Southeast Asia.”  Obviously, Japan is 
not part of Southeast Asia, but the overall sentiment was precisely the role that many Japanese 
saw for themselves and other Asians.  Under the tenets of the postwar Yoshida Doctrine, named 
after the powerful conservative postwar Prime Minister (1946-1947, 1948-1954), Japan focused 
on economic development, relied on the United States for security and tried to avoid 
                                                 
57 “Fukuramu 'Nihon' e no yume: bakuhatsu-teki ninki yobu,” Sankei Shinbun, August 12, 1964, evening  edition. 
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entanglement in contentious international issues.  If this policy helped to compete against the 
West where warfare had not, this new understanding and trope of Self was a remaking, of sorts, 
of the wartime Greater East Asian Prosperity Sphere—at least of Japanese leadership or as a role 
model if not in economic and military domination. 
There is further evidence of this attitude in the NHK polling data.  Citizens in Tokyo and 
Kanazawa were asked to rate Japan in relation to other areas of the world in terms of 
development.  More than 80% in both places believed Southeast Asian countries were somewhat 
to very far behind Japan.  For the new African countries (ex., Congo and Kenya), just under 90% 
of Tokyoites and 74% in Kanazawa felt they were behind.  For the Arab countries, the numbers 
were approximately 64% and 56% respectively, with significant minorities rating them equal to 
Japan for the first time (at approximately 15% each).58  However, when compared to the West 
and Soviets, the numbers reversed.  Over 70% of Tokyoites saw Europe as somewhat to very 
advanced in comparison to Japan and 67% in Kanazawa felt the same—but around 20% in both 
places were equally developed.  The Soviets were ranked almost identically to the Europeans, 
except a few more switched their answers from somewhat advanced to very advanced in 
comparison to Japan.  The United States faired very well, with over 90% saying it was more 
advanced than Japan—around 60% of which said it was much more developed than Japan.  
These numbers reveal where Japanese felt they fit into the world—almost at a level equal to 
Europe and the Soviets, further behind the US, but considerably more advanced than other non-
Westerners. 
The opposite side of the trope of modernity was a self-Orientalizing script that made 
Japan into a land of ancient culture and tradition.  This was generally speaking aimed at Western 
                                                 
58 Residents of Kanazawa replied “I don’t know” at a very high rate—23.6% to this question.  However, they also 
replied “I don’t know” at much higher rates than Tokyoites for all of this entire set of survey questions. 
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visitors and played off their preconceptions and fantasies about Japan.  This self portrayal was 
performed with little self-reflection and virtually no criticism.  Even Akahata, and by extension 
the JCP, found nothing objectionable regarding this very ethnocentric portrayal of Japan.  In 
short, this trope of identity was accepted across the mass media spectrum.  This is, of course, not 
to say that critics did not exist, but they were not widespread nor influential in the public 
discourse.  There was also a strong gendered element at play—while the modern identity, with 
its emphasis on construction and technology, was largely focused on male oriented facets of 
Japan, the traditional facets were often portrayed through female roles and imagery. 
 The self-Orientalizing script was employed from the beginning of the application process 
to the end of the Closing Ceremony.  When the IOC members arrived in 1958 for their 54th 
General Meeting, the performance of Self as Oriental was on display.  IOC President Avery 
Brundage was known as a collector of Asian art who had a deep interest in traditional culture.59  
The JOC and OOC arranged for tours of Kyoto and Nara for the delegates who had time to 
travel.60  A prominent theme and reoccurring figure in the tour was “geisha.”  At many stops, the 
men, both Japanese and foreign, were paired up with Japanese women in traditional geisha garb.  
The women performed traditional songs and dances for the visitors, even encouraging them to 
                                                 
59 His collection forms the core of the Asian Art Museum of San Francisco. 
60 “Naru ka: Tokyo Orinpikku no yume,” Shūkan Asahi, June 1, 1958, 10. 
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join in the performances (see Figure 3-4).61  
 
 
Figure 3-4: Unlabeled photo from May 1958 trip to Japan for 54th IOC General Meeting.  IOC 
President Avery Brundage joined geisha and JOC officials ‘on stage’ at a private dinner.  
The kimono clad Japanese woman was a frequently performed role at all stages of the 
Olympics.  Their most visible and common task was at stores and as “medal girls.”62  They took 
the medals on trays to the medalists’ podiums.  Given the live broadcasting and coverage of 
medalists and medal ceremonies, this would have been the most commonly broadcast image of 
non-athlete Japanese, whether male or female, with the exception of anonymous and impersonal 
                                                 
61 “unlabeled photo,” May 1958, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 295, Photographs 1957-1975, University of Illinois 
Archives. 
62 “Saa, honban e: rikujōjin saigō no rihāsaru,” Shūkan Yomiuri, September 20, 1964. 
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spectators in crowds.  The use of women in this role was not lost on the public, as can be seen 
from figure  The media also covered a boom in “geisha girls” learning English to better serve 
their potential foreign clientele.63  In this case, of course, the implication was beyond the 
professional cultural performers and included those involved in hostess clubs and beyond.  The 
above, broadly defined, feminine roles were the most common ones that would place Japanese in 
personal interactions with foreigners—certainly this general role, that of female in kimono or 
yukata, was the only role that foreigners were shown interacting with Japanese females in the 
mass media—Japanese women in modern garb or even Japanese female athletes almost never 
appeared in that context.64 
 The Japanese mass media was also obsessed with Westerners (but not nearly so much 
non-Westerner) interested with all things Japanese.  They particularly focused on non-black 
foreigners who tried Japanese traditional arts and clothing.  If the Westerners found Japanese 
interesting and different, then it must be so—a validation of the culturally unique Self through 
Japan’s Others.  For example, the Shūkan Bunshun ran a full page photo of a female athlete from 
Mexico in kimono and wig in a look at how the athletes lived in the Olympic Village.65  The 
village was actually set up to accommodate and even encourage this sort of identity role play.  
The Women’s Village had multiple times arranged for women to try on kimono and try cultural 
arts like the koto (Japanese harp), flower arrangement and calligraphy.66  There were cultural 
movies every day from when the Olympic Village opened until several days after the close of the 
                                                 
63 “Orinpikku arakaruto: kaiwa no ressun,” Sankei Shinbun, September 5, 1964, evening  edition. 
64  The kimono clad woman were certainly not all entertainers.  Many stores had their female clerks dress in kimono 
if they felt foreigners might visit. 
65 “Soko ni sumu hitobito: Orinpikku senshumura sunappu,” Shūkan Bunshun, October 19, 1964, 6. 
66 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 320. 
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Olympics.  The official handbook described the Olympic Theater as hosting “[d]aily 
performances of regular movies, cultural movies, newsreels, Japanese dancing, folk-lore 
entertainment, orchestra and band music.”67  For example, there was a movie on judo and 
another on “Architecture in Japan” on September 29.68  The Olympic Village also contained a 
tea ceremony room where athletes could participate in it at set times of the day—experienci
traditional Japanese culture that most 
Japanese themselves did not practice or 
partake in on a regular basis. 
ng 
                                                
In fact, even before the 
Olympics began, the OOC was 
employing this trope.  In the years 
before the Olympics, the OOC sent out 
an English-French bilingual Official 
Bulletin to the IOC, various NOC and 
others.  A special, pre-decision volume, 
titled Tokyo Invites, introduced “Sports 
from [Japan’s] Past” and noted that 
sports had played important parts in Japanese history from “as far bad as the 4th Century (sic).”69  
It also incorporated the Imperial family through an article on children as the keepers of national 
Figure 3-5: Mount Fuji on cover of inaugural 
Official Bulletin 
 
67 The Organizing Committee for The Games of The 18th Olympiad - Olympic Village Division, “Yoyogi 
senshumura/Yoyogi Olympic Village/Village Olympique de Yoyogi” (The Organizing Committee for the Games of 
the 18th Olympiad, 1964), 40. 
68 “Olympic Theater,” Senshumura Nyūsu - Village News - Gazette du Village, September 29, 1964, 4. 
69 “Sports from the Past,” Tokyo Invites, undated , 6.  While this bulletin was undated, it came before the first XVIII 
Olympiad Official Bulletin, which was published in 1960 based on contextual evidence. 
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cultural traditions such as flying “carp banners” on “Boy’s Day.”  Young “Prince Hiro (to be 
formal, Hironomiya Naruhito),” born earlier that year, was presented as a rather improbable 
example of this.70 
The first front cover of the Official Bulletin was Japan’s most iconic symbol, Mount Fuji, 
and described it as “known throughout the world as the symbol of Japan.” (see Figure 3-5)  It 
played to the self-Orientalizing script with its ending: “This [picture] is truly an expression of 
simple beauty that is out of this world.  This may remind you of an expression of ‘Nothingness’ 
of oriental philosophy.”71  The back cover was a copy of a letter from Baron de Coubertin and 
his remarks on Tokyo winning the bid for the 12th Olympiad, which was eventually cancelled.  
From the second installation, the format changed.  The cover was invariably a modern image, 
usually related to sports facilities.  The back cover became a display for traditional Japanese art 
as they introduced a new piece from a different style each issue.  Haniwa,72 fierce Buddhist 
temple guardian statues, a 5th or 6th century helmet, and even Hideyoshi Toyotomi’s saddle73 
appeared on the back cover.  While some had military or athletic connections, even if very 
remote, others were purely to display Japanese traditional culture such as a Noh mask and a 16th 
                                                 
70 “Children Keep Up Tradition,” Tokyo Invites, undated , 2.  Naruhito is the current Crown Prince of Japan. 
71 XVIII Olympiad Official Bulletin, No. 1 (Japan: Organizing Committee forthe Games of the XVIII Olympiad, 
1960). 
72 Haniwa (lit. clay circles) are circular terra cotta figures, often of humans, animals, houses and boats.  They were 
used in ritual practices and buried in graves as funerary objects.  They originated during the Yayoi period (300 BCE 
to 250 CE) and were particularly common during the Kofun period (250 CE to 552 CE).  They are most associated 
with the tombs of the latter. 
73 Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598) was a warrior who united Japan under his leadership following approximately a 
century of nearly constant internal conflict.  He tried to invade Ming China through Korea, but failed twice.  He died 
of illness in Japan.  His fame within Japan is such that he is often referred to by his first name without causing any 
confusion.  The three men who unified Japan, Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa 
Ieyasu (1543-1616) are three of the few people of which this can be said. 
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century reading desk.  This was a performance of an Oriental Self for the largely non-Japanese 
Other. 
The biggest and most prominent display of a self-orientalizing script was at the art 
exhibitions.  Cultural exhibitions are required by the Olympic Charter for a host city.      
Astonishingly, there was very little criticism of the artwork chosen from anyone across the 
mainstream political spectrum.74  The only conclusion this leaves is that the content was not 
widely controversial.  What comment there was from the mass media was almost entirely 
positive.  The Asahi Shinbun remarked that the organizers had selected the best works possible.75  
The Yomiuri Shinbun reported on a Polish reporter who viewed the “Old Art Treasures” exhibit 
and pronounced it a “beautiful artistic tradition.”76  Once again, foreign validation of Japanese 
tradition seemed to have a special value and it validated the tropes of Self being performed and 
reported. 
As noted above, the Olympic Charter requires the hosting city to hold cultural exhibitions.  
Prior host cities and Olympiads had often matched sports and culture, and this could involve 
non-host country involvement.  For the 1964 Games, the Tokyo Olympiad Art Exhibition 
Committee decided that only “traditional Japanese art works…would be included” and that the 
art would not be restricted to the theme of “sports art”.  Furthermore, they would not request the 
                                                 
74 One example of a criticism was from a Waseda University professor, Matsumoto Gunji.  He argued that by 
restricting the art to only Japanese art, the exhibits would be unsuitable to foreign tastes and lack the granduer of 
exhibits of past Olympiads.  However, this was not a criticism of the contents of the exhibit as being 
unrepresentative of Japanese art, but rather that foreigners wouldn’t be able to appreciate traditional Japanese 
aesthetics.  See, Matsumoto Gunji, “Orinpikku no geinō tenji: dentō geinō o wakaraseru ni wa,” Asahi Jānaru 6, no. 
12 (March 22, 1964): 98-101. 
75 “Gorin no geijutsu tenji,” Asahi Shinbun, September 29, 1964, sec. editorial. 
76 “Hajimete mita Nippon,” Yomiuri Shinbun, October 4, 1964, evening  edition. 
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participation of any participation from overseas.77  Clearly, these cultural exhibitions were 
designed to portray only Japanese art and by largely restricting it to traditional art, it also 
predefined the possible narratives that could be presented.  Strangely, although these were the 
parameters given in the Official Report, there were also official modern art and photography 
exhibitions.  However, the contents of these modern art forms were often centered on traditional 
aspects of Japan.  The traditional exhibitions covered a variety of genres, including woodblock 
prints, paintings, and performances of traditional dance and music, such as Bugaku (classical 
court dance and music).  In total, there were ten different art exhibitions, of which seven could be 
considered traditional: Old Art Treasures, Kabuki, Bunraku Puppet Show, Court Music, Noh, 
Traditional Dance and Japanese Music, and Folk-lore Entertainment.  There were also other 
unofficial art exhibits around the city.  By all accounts, they all proved very popular.   
The Old Art Treasures exhibition alone received over 400,000 visitors in the 41 days it 
was open.78  Given that there were fewer than 30,000 foreign visitors in Japan, the vast majority 
would have been Japanese consuming their own performance of identity.  There were separate 
Japanese only and trilingual programs for all viewers who came to see Japan’s ancient 
treasures.79  The exhibition contained around 870 pieces of art.80  148 were registered as 
National Treasures, 242 were registered as Important Cultural Properties and 42 were listed as 
                                                 
77 “The Official Report of the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, Tokyo 1964.”, 269. 
78 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 270. 
79 As with all Olympics, the official languages are English, French and the national language of the host. 
80 Exhibition of Japanese Old Art Treasures in Tokyo Olympic Games - Exposition des Tresors d'arts Anciens 
Japonais Durant les Jeux Olympiques de Tokyo. (Tokyo National Museum - Musee National de Tokyo, 1964); 
Nihon kōbijutsuten (Tokyo kokuritsu gakubutsukan, 1964). 
 124
Important Art Objects.81  This made it an unparalleled showcase for Japanese art.  Both En
and Japanese museum prints had detailed summaries of Japanese history from the “Pre-Buddh
Age” to the “Edo Period” to provide a context for the artworks.  However, the two versions were 
not translations of each other.  The Japanese version had more biographical data on historical 
figures than the English version, as well as other minor discrepancies.  The exhibits themselves 
covered a very diverse group of artworks stretching from prior to the 6th century through the 
middle of the 19th century.
glish 
ist 
                                                
82  They were all carefully selected and represented the best Japan had 
to offer, much as the Asahi Shinbun had noted.  They represented the best self representation of 
traditional art and oriental self to offer up not only to the Other, but also for consumption of Self. 
The unofficial art exhibition often participated in the same discourse.  The business 
oriented Nihon Keizai Shinbun co-sponsored an exhibit with the “Ukiyoe Society of Japan.”  
Titled the “International Exhibition of Ukiyo-e Masterpieces,” it purported to depict “the 
manners and customs of old Japan.”83  They selected 327 prints, representing the best of ukiyo-e.  
The declared purpose was to offer “foreign visitors as well as Japanese at large to enjoy 
outstanding examples of Ukiyoe (sic) and further enhancing their understanding this unique form 
of Japanese art.”  Furthermore, the sponsors believed it was “no exaggeration to say that Ukiyoe 
(sic) ranks among the world’s foremost works of art.”  While such hyperbole might be expected 
from a Society devoted to the art form, it fit within the larger discourse of Japan as possessing a 
unique culture to be celebrated. 
 
81 For reasons that are not clear, the English and Japanese version differ in numbers.  The above are the numbers in 
the English version of the book, the Japanese version lists 154, 254 and 40. 
82 Nihon kōbijutsuten, 4. 
83 “Orinpikku Tōkyō Taikai Iinkai kyōsan geijutsu tenji: ukiyo-e, fūzoku-ga meisakuten,” 1964, unnumbered.  The 
exhibition contained eight non-ukiyo-e art pieces, all paintings. 
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The 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics was a location where Japanese performed a 
contradictory performance of Self.  On the one hand, they insisted they were a part of the modern 
Western world—recognition as such was important and they worked hard to erase the old Tokyo 
and also reform behavior to “international standards,” which meant Western ones.  This belief in 
self as modern meant they saw themselves as more advanced than other Asians or even non 
Westerners to whom they offered up themselves as a model to follow.  At the 18th Olympiad, 
they bore the torch of civilization and progress for Asia, both figuratively and literally—at least 
in their own perception of the world.  At the same time, they engaged in an intense effort to 
portray themselves to Westerners as Oriental and an exotic Other.  This self-Orientalizing script 
was performed through both physical enactments, usually by females fulfilling the role of a 
‘geisha,’ but also through selection of art for both foreign and domestic consumption. 
Chapter 5 – Phoenix Rising: From Samurai  
to Peaceful Internationalist 
 
“The Olympic festival which hopes for peace” 
--Sakai Yoshinori, final Olympic Torch Relay runner1 
 
 
Destruction and defeat, occupation and resurrection—the challenge for postwar Japan 
was to recreate a new national identity as an international country that embraced the principles of 
cooperation and peace.  The twin pillars of this new facet of Japanese national identity were its 
postwar constitution and the nuclear horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The postwar 
Constitution positioned Japan as a uniquely peaceful, non-military country by explicitly 
renouncing war as an instrument of the state in international affairs.  At the same time, 
deployment of Japanese experiences as the only victims of atomic weapons buttressed Japan’s 
moral claim to a new, ‘peaceful’ identity on the international stage, while providing rich material 
for domestic narratives of victimhood and suffering.  It was a careful and nuanced balancing 
act—premised on inventing a forward looking Japan that was new and different from its martial 
past, while at the same time selectively remembering the past, both overtly and subconsciously, 
to erase problematic portions of it.  This reinvention of Japan as a land of peaceful 
internationalists took less than two decades. 
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the Soviet Union’s entry 
into the war against Japan immediately after, forced the Japanese government to surrender on 
August 15, 1945.  The Allied Occupation of Japan that followed ended on April 28, 1952, nearly 
eight months after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.  What some U.S. planners had 
initially envisioned as a decades-long occupation ended in less than seven years, but the 
                                                 
1 Sakai Yoshinori, “Seikai minzoku no kōten,” Heibon Panchi, September 7, 1964, 8. 
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reintegration of Japan into the world community remained.  The first steps came less than four 
months later with Japan’s admittance into the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1952, 
continuing with admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1956.  Japan’s political and media elite 
dubbed this effort kokusai fukki, or “international return”—a sustained program aimed at 
restoring Japanese position, prestige and international relations.   
While membership in major international financial and political organizations was, of 
course, important, hosting the Summer Olympics was both qualitatively and quantitatively 
different.  The scale and prestige of hosting the Summer Olympics, the world’s most important 
sporting event at the time, were orders of magnitude greater than any other international occasion, 
attracting mass attention from every corner of the globe.  Rejoining the IMF and UN was 
important symbolically and practically for Japan in the 1950s, but neither evoked much reaction 
or passion beyond the segment of the elite directly involved, and soon vanished from the public 
consciousness.  Abroad, needless to say, few beyond bankers and diplomats even noticed.  The 
Olympics however, mobilized mass participation at home and overseas, capturing international 
and domestic attention in ways that membership in an international political or economic 
organization could not. 
The Olympics were also the perfect stage for performing an identity based on peaceful 
international interaction.  The modern Olympics began in Athens, Greece in April 1896.2  The 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) had been founded two years previous, largely driven by 
Frenchman Pierre de Coubertin.  His vision for the Olympics was one of individuals from across 
the world participating in athletics.  He believed competition with fair play would help to bring 
                                                 
2 The 1896 Olympics were the Summer Games.  The first Winter Olympics took place in 1924 in France, although 
there had been discussions about holding a Winter Games from the early 1900s. 
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them and the world together.3  Olympic lore states that the ancient Games were conducted under 
a “Sacred Truce”—emphasizing their transcendence over war and politics.  In fact, the ancient 
Olympics were frequently disrupted by politics, boycotts and war.4  However, while the 
mythology of the Games might be historically inaccurate, the perception and popular memory of 
Olympic history remains that it was, is, and should be an event undertaken in peace and above 
the corruption of politics.  Of course, this trope is regularly reinforced by the IOC through its 
press releases and founding principles.  The Olympic Charter stated as one of its objectives that 
the Olympics would “create international amity and good will, thus leading to a happier and 
more peaceful world.”5  Certainly few involved with the Olympics or with interest in them are 
unaware of this image; the Japanese certainly were not.  A small Olympic encyclopedia 
published by the Japan Sports Association (JASA) in March 1964 listed the following under 
“Olympic Ideals”: 
“…The Olympics are a sporting competition between individuals and teams, not 
confrontational competition between countries.  Therefore, there are no rankings between 
countries.6  The goal is to contribute to everlasting peace by deepening of friendship and 
understanding of each other through competition by people of the world who have set 
aside their political, ethnic or religious consciousness.”7 
                                                 
3 Guttmann, The Olympics, 8. 
4 Tony Perrottet, The Naked Olympics (New York: Random House, 2004), 151-153. 
5 Mr. Avery Brundage and Mr. Otto Meyer to Takahashi Hideki, “Olympic Rules and Principles for the Hakumon 
Herald, Chuo University, Tokyo (Japan),” April 23, 1964, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 136, Japan NOC General 
1951-1964 Folder, University of Illinois Archives. 
6 Medal counts, and their predecessor, national point totals, are all unofficial and not recognized by the IOC. 
7“Orinpikku no risō,” in Orinpikku kojiten (Nihon Taiiku Kyōkai, 1964), 37. 
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 Of course, Coubertin and the IOC’s motives and methods did not always reflect their 
lofty ideals.  Indeed, contradictions, and arguably hypocrisy, have always been at the core of the 
modern Olympics, which made them doubly useful for the Japanese state.  Coubertin’s early 
interest in physical education and fitness, subjects that have long been central to the Olympics, 
was sparked by France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871).8  He believed the 
emphasis on physical education among the Germans resulted in superior fitness, an undeniable 
advantage in war.  Although the participants at the 1896 Olympics came as individuals and wore 
uniforms that were not national in nature, this was not the path the IOC chose for the future.  
After the first Olympics, athletes could only participate if their NOC was a member of the IOC 
and in good standing.  Participants were and still are chosen by their NOCs and affiliated sports 
associations, and must be nationals (natural born or naturalized) of member states.9  They must 
wear a uniform chosen by their NOC.  Furthermore, athletes are required to enter the Opening 
Ceremony under the flags of their country.  The most obvious example of the celebration of 
nation, state and country is of course the medal ceremony, where the medalists’ state flags are 
raised and the victor’s state anthem is played.  At least some in the IOC have long been aware of 
this contradiction.  Just prior to the Tokyo Olympics, Avery Brundage stated his desire to end the 
playing of the anthems, and one would assume the accompanying flags, although he was 
                                                 
8 Guttmann, The Olympics, 8. 
9 While Olympic trials, competition and previous athletic achievement are commonly regarded as the requirements 
for participation, in reality, an NOC or affiliated athletic association can disregard these objective qualifications.  
One example was Japanese female marathoner Matsuno Akemi, who was not selected for the 1996 Atlanta 
Olympics after she appealed to be selected through the media.  The Japan Association of Athletics Federation felt 
this was inappropriate conduct and did not select her even though her times were superior to at least one of those 
selected.  This clearly demonstrates the importance of national organizations in the Olympics. 
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obviously unsuccessful in achieving this goal.10  Clearly, while the lofty ideals and goals of the 
Olympics emphasize the individual, the structures and practices of the games all revolve around 
states and countries. 
The rhetoric of individuals competing, while at the same time organizing around state and 
national structures and symbols, was perfect for the Japanese state.  It was unable to marshal the 
typical tools of nation and nationalism creation, such as the military,11 due to its so-called peace 
constitution.  As Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution reads: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized12 
 
Therefore, the narrative of the non-political and individual nature of the Olympics was a 
perfect way of gathering support from the nation.  For politicians and the state, it allowed the 
usage and presentation of national motifs and storylines without the controversies over returning 
                                                 
10“Orinpikku o mae ni--Burandēji IOC kaichō o fukomu,” Asahi Shinbun, September 9, 1964. 
11 Under the “Reverse Course” by the Occupation, the Japan government was urged to rearm by the Americans due 
to the start of the Cold War.  It largely resisted and eventually settled upon creating the “Self Defense Forces” 
(SDF)—officially it was not an army and has always had a slightly problematic and vague defined existence.  It 
certainly has been difficult to use, particularly early after 1945, as a tool for fostering either nationalism or loyalty to 
the state. 
12“The Constitution of Japan,” Collection, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2. 
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to prewar militarism and nationalism.13  For a country barred actual warfare, sports can be 
particularly useful—in  many ways, sports, especially at the international level, is symbolic 
warfare between countries with the athletes serving as surrogates for the nation.  As George 
Orwell wrote, “serious sport…is war minus the shooting.”  Of course, he would have argued that 
the Japanese state could not create a nationalism using the Olympics that did not already exist, 
noting that “sport is (not) one of the main causes of international rivalry; big-scale sport is itself, 
I think, merely another effect of the causes that have produced nationalism.”14  The Japanese 
state could harness those passions through engaging in symbolic conflict without resorting to 
true warfare. 
The Japanese state had focused on peaceful economic development following its defeat in 
the Second World War under the Yoshida Doctrine.  Japan focused on economic development, 
relied on the United States for security and tried to avoid entanglement in contentious 
international issues.  This “fundamental orientation toward economic growth and political 
passivity was…the product of a carefully constructed and brilliantly implemented foreign 
policy.”15  The Olympics were the perfect form of international participation under this doctrine 
because it operated under the narrative of apolitical amateur competition.  However, Japan had 
more unwelcomed opportunities to put this new identity into practice than anyone could have 
anticipated. 
                                                 
13 The SDF’s participation in the Olympics did provoke some protest from Marxist intellectuals, but in general, there 
was very little reaction to its participation, as I will discuss later this chapter. 
14 George Orwell, Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1950), 153. 
15 K.B. Pyle, “Japan, the world, and the Twenty-first century,” in The Political Economy of Japan: The Changing 
International Context (2: Stanford University Press, 1988), 446-86, 452. 
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The Cold War and the ongoing post World War II dissolution of Western colonial 
empires framed many of the international challenges that faced the Tokyo Olympics.  Two 
countries divided by the Cold War, Germany and Korea, had ongoing Olympic difficulties 
predating the 1964 Games.  While the Soviet Union and its allies argued for separate recognition 
of East Germany and North Korea, the IOC insisted that they be represented by one team under 
the guidance of a single NOC.16  East Germany and West Germany agreed to participate as part 
of a unified team for the 1960 Rome Olympics through the Tokyo Olympics.  Similarly, there 
was a problem with North Korea, whose membership was strongly supported by the Soviets.  
North and South Korea could not successfully negotiate a unified team and in the end no North 
Korean athletes were able to participate at the 1960 Rome Olympiad.17  It received provisional 
approval again for the Tokyo Games if there was a single team for both Koreas—a condition that 
once again proved to be problematic and ultimately unsuccessful.18  In the end, North Korea did 
attempt to send a team with the full, and active official Japanese support, only to withdraw due to 
another issue. 
In 1962, Indonesia hosted the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta.  In an attempt to establish 
itself as a leader of the newly emerging countries by appealing to the Arab countries and 
communist China, it sent out blank pieces of cardboard rather than identity cards at the last 
minute to the athletes and NOCs of Taiwan and Israel.  When the IOC demanded answers, they 
were promised a never delivered investigation, which lead to the suspension of the Indonesian 
                                                 
16 Given Brundage’s strongly held anti-Communist beliefs, this policy might also reflect that the official recognized 
NOCs were held by the Western aligned side in both cases and could serve as a punishment for Soviet aligned East 
Germany and North Korea. 
17 Christopher R Hill, Olympic Politics (Manchester [England]: Manchester University Press, 1992), 192. 
18 Alfred Erich Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999), 132. 
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NOC.  In return, Indonesia, under President Sukarno, declared it would establish the Games of 
the New Emerging Forces or GANEFO, which were to be held in 1963.19  The IOC saw this as a 
direct threat to the Olympics, as it was indeed intended to be, and in return warned that any 
athletes who participated would risk disbarment from the Tokyo Olympics as the competitions 
were not sanctioned by the various international sports federations.20  Although it might have 
been a pretext to prevent real competition between the IOC and GANEFO, the participation by 
the athletes from the People’s Republic of China, which was not a member of the international 
sporting associations or IOC, meant disqualification and suspension for any athletes that 
competed against them according to the established rules. To get around this, many countries, 
including Japan and the Soviet Union, sent teams consisting of second tier athletes who would 
not qualify for the Olympics in any case.  The PRC sent its best and won the most medals, but 
had nothing to lose as its athletes could not participate in the Olympics.  However, Indonesia and 
North Korea both used their top athletes, who were subsequently banned from other sanctioned 
events such as the Olympics.  As a result of their top athletes being disqualified, as they must 
have expected, both pledged to boycott the Tokyo Games.  The Japanese government and OOC 
tried to act as mediatory and encouraged a peaceful settlement.  This was undoubtedly due to 
their hopes for a problem free and largest ever Olympiad, but they spoke invoked a discourse 
international cooperation and peace, reflecting the larger trope of Japan’s role in the postwar 
world.21  In the end, both Korea and Indonesia agreed to apologize and send teams.  However, in 
                                                 
19 The movement “Newly Emerging Forces” was leftist oriented and the name seems intentionally chosen to be 
provocative in English.  The Japanese terms most frequently used for it, Shinkōkoku, and GANEFO (Shinkōkoku 
kyōgitaikai), are much more generic and bland—simply using the generic term for “developing country.” 
20 Ibid., 128-132. 
21 “The Official Report of the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, Tokyo 1964.”, 81-82. 
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what can only be seen as a calculated step in a contest of wills, and also a desire to send their 
best chances at medals, they both sent disqualified athletes among their Olympian hopefuls.  
While the Japanese attempted once again to gain their entrance, the IOC would not budge and 
Brundage stated that they could only be included as per the rules.22  The Japanese government 
and OOC also pressed hard for their inclusion 
The Japanese press and public followed the GANEFO issue closely as the Olympics 
approached.  The response and language used was almost uniformly critical of the IOC and other 
international sporting bodies such as the International Association of Athletics Association 
(IAAF) and the International Swimming Federation (FINA) 23 for not allowing the top athletes 
from the two countries to participate.  The Hiroshima based Chūgoku Shinbun even devoted 
front page coverage to the plight of North Korea, reprinting the North Korean Central Wire 
Service’s manifesto on the issue.  It argued that GANEFO had nothing to do with an 
international sporting event like the Olympics and that the North Korean athletes were being 
treated unfairly and due to this, North Korea would not be able to send any athletes.24  The 
Chūgoku Shinbun devoted another front page when North Korea and Indonesia withdrew from 
the Olympics on the even of the Opening Ceremony, having been unable to force the IOC, FINA 
and IAAF to back down in the dispute.  The newspaper noted that it was a shame that two Asian 
countries ended up boycotting the first Asian Olympics and further worried that this issue would 
                                                 
22“Orinpikku o mae ni--Burandēji IOC kaichō o fukomu.” 
23 FINA comes from the French name for the group, Fédération Internationale de Natation. 
24“'Kitachosen, Gorin sanka miokuri mo',” Chūgoku Shinbun, September 3, 1964.  They did, of course, send the 
team, as noted previously. 
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move beyond sports and affect Japanese international relations.25  Clearly the newspaper saw 
Japan’s role in the world as that of a peacemaker. 
Akahata (Red Flag), the official newspaper and voice the Japan Communist Party, was 
the most comprehensive and strident about the issue, perhaps unsurprisingly as both Indonesia 
and North Korea were ideological allies.  It, more than other media outlets, covered the North 
Korean voice directly publishing, for example, a plea for Japanese support from North Korean 
middle distance runner Haeng Kumdan, a gold medal hopeful and elite middle distance runner, 
who was desperate to compete in Asia’s first Olympics.26  The Communist Party affiliated All 
Japan Youth Sports Festival Executive Committee27 also spoke out in favor of supporting the 
North Korean bid and called the decisions of the IAAF and FINA “unforgivable.” 28  The below 
editorial cartoon by Matsuyama Fumio (see Figure 4-1), titled “Transformed into a Chain: 
(FINA) and (IAAF) are blocking out GANEFO participants,” shows a sinister looking IAAF 
using the Olympic Rings to keep the disqualified athletes out of the Tokyo Olympiad.  The long 
nose is almost certainly used to invoke the image of a white foreigner—justifiably so as most of 
the international sports organizations were dominated by white Westerners at the time.  The 
doves flying out appear to embody the ideals of peace and harmony overlooking the whole 
debacle.   
                                                 
25“Kitachōsen, Indoneshia fusanka e,” Chūgoku Shinbun, October 9, 1964. 
26 Haeng Kumdan, “'Tokyo Gorin ni fusanka' Nihon no minasan, shiji site,” Akahata, September 4, 1964. 
27 The Japan Communist Party held a “Youth Sports Festival” and “Akahata Festival” shortly before the Tokyo 
Olympiad.  Akahata frequently compared them to the Olympics, with their own festivals being superior, including 
an editorial cartoon on September 14th trumpeting that their Akahata Festival would take place first.  The Akahata 
Festival, in particular, was more of an ethnic program than a true sports event—answering a long heard demand 
from leftists that international sporting events should have more ethnic and folk sports, mass performances and other 
similar events. 
28“Futō na seisai yurusenu,” Akahata, September 5, 1964. 
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 Figure 4-1: Matsuyama Fumio, “Transformed into a Chain: 
(FINA) and (IAAF) are blocking out GANEFO participants” 
Source: Akahata, September 16, 1964. 
 
A later column with an evaluation of the decision placed it in the context of the ongoing 
Cold War, arguing out that it was only due to the United States’ policy of recognizing Taiwan as 
China that mainland Chinese athletes were ineligible for participation, which in turn disqualified 
the other athletes.29  It warned that this situation was “not only in violation of the Olympic spirit 
of peace, equality and friendship, but it will be the greatest stain in Olympic history.”30  
                                                 
29 Needless to say, this overlooked the option of competing under the existing Taiwan China NOC in a joint team, 
just as East and West Germany did for this Olympiad, however unrealistic it may have been for the two Chinas. 
30“'Rūru ihan' wa dochira ka,” Akahata, September 20, 1964, sec. Nichiyō hyōron.  This also marked one of the 
few times that Akahata mentioned the Indonesian athletes, even though they were in the same situation as the North 
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Akahata’s readership also agreed; a letter to the editor by a 56 year old male in the sign making 
industry wrote that the IAAF and FINA should be “embarrassed” for their unjustifiable 
discrimination against the athletes and damage to the Tokyo Olympics.31  The issue of North 
Korea’s team played out almost daily in Akahata as the Communist Party voiced its ongoing 
concerns. 
While one might expect the Communist Akahata to support and be concerned with other 
socialist or communist countries, this was truly a broad based concern for Japanese as it affected 
their self image of being inclusive and peacemakers.  The ideologically ultra conservative Sankei 
Shinbun covered the issue to a much lesser extent and was more circumvent about its disapproval 
of the IOC, IAAF and FINA, but examining the language it used reveals it shared the 
Communists’ concerns.  It analyzed a speech by IOC Chairman Brundage on the matter,  
describing his announcement concerning GANEFO that “rules were rules” as “strict” and 
“heartless” towards North Korea and Indonesia.32  On the other hand, an editorial also later 
described the situation as “sad” and provided a very nuanced analysis of the situation, pointing 
out that Indonesia had started the issue by not allowing Israel or Taiwan to participate in the 4th 
Asian Games—arguing that the situation was very complicated and no one was entirely 
blameless since the international sports bodies were not showing any flexibility either.33  One 
subtle, but important difference was that the Sankei Shinbun, unlike Akahata, was careful to note 
                                                                                                                                                             
Koreans.  It is unclear why they were not linked together more often in the newspaper, but it could be due to prewar 
colonial history and ties between the two countries—although North Koreas stronger Communist credentials might 
have been the reason as well. 
31 Yamashita Shintaro, “letter to the editor,” Akahata, September 30, 1964. 
32 “Gorin no shugosha, Burandēji-shi,” Sankei Shinbun, October 8, 1964. 
33 Hirasawa Kazushige, “Ryōkoku no fusanka kanashimu,” Sankei Shinbun, October 9, 1964. 
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that the two countries were boycotting the Olympics because their disqualified athletes had not 
reinstated.  The final note from the Sankei Shinbun on the matter returned to the discourse of 
Japan’s role as peaceful internationalist, reporting that the North Korean delegation was grateful 
for the support of the Japanese people (kokumin).34   
An editorial for the liberal Asahi Shinbun laid out Japan’s role in the world quite 
clearly—one of the developed countries, but an interlocutor between them (i.e., the West) and 
the developing world.  It began by discussing the role of politics in sports, using NATO and the 
Berlin Wall as examples, then reminded the West that in developing countries it was more 
difficult to separate new nationalism from sports.35  There were several implications to this 
understanding of Japan’s role in the world.  First, like the West, it was able to keep these issues 
separate, which was the mark of a developed, modern country.  Second, unlike the West, it could 
better understand the realities of the non-West—implicit in this argument is that Japan might 
serve as a model for these countries, as argued in Chapter 4.  Finally, that due to this unique 
position, Japan was uniquely qualified to serve as a bridge between these countries.36 
Of course, for most foreigners, there was no difficulty in entering Japan and participating 
in the Olympics, beyond the time and distances involved.  The first and foremost goal of the 
Japanese was that these foreigners would enjoy their stays in Japan.  For Western visitors, they 
were to return home viewing Japan as a fellow advanced and modern country, while still 
recognizing it as part of the “Orient” for purposes of tourism, as previously argued in Chapters 3 
                                                 
34“Nihonkokumin no shiji ni kansha,” Sankei Shinbun, October 10, 1964, Evening  edition, evening edition. 
35  editorial, Asahi Shinbun, October 2, 1964.  
36  And arguably, also between the US, Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc, as Japan existed outside of NATO and 
the conflicts in Europe, although this ignores the reality of the US-Japan Security Treaty which placed Japan under 
the U.S. security umbrella for all intents and purposes.  Given that the Soviets and their allies supported and voted 
for Tokyo to host the Games over all other cities, there was some basis for this belief. 
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and 4.  For non-Westerners, they were supposed to be suitably impressed by this non-Western, 
yet completely modern and advanced country—they were to look to Japan as a model and guide 
for their own path to modernity.  For international relations, however, these goals required 
diplomacy and attention at the personal level, particularly since most of the foreign visitors 
would not speak Japanese and most Japanese did not speak other languages.  These were the first 
Olympics where the official languages of the Games, French and English, were not used by 
many citizens of the host locale—as the Official Report noted, “now the Olympic Games were to 
take place for the first time in a country where the people were in general not fluent in foreign 
languages, and where the official language of the country did not conform to the pattern of 
European languages.”37 
The Olympic Organizing Committee (OOC) therefore set out to solve this problem.  They 
could not rely on sufficient numbers or availability of government officials who would be fluent 
in foreign languages, such as the diplomats, nor could they turn to the business world which also 
had a high demand for multilingual staff itself.  In fact, the government itself put out calls for 
help, such as the Ministry of Transportation which was looking for people who could help the 
30,000 foreigners they expected to get around Tokyo—driving, translation and other 
possibilities.38  For coordination between the OOC and the various NOCs, the Japanese 
encouraged each NOC with diplomatic missions or commercial enterprises in Japan to find a 
suitable attaché already in Japan.  They offered to recommend Japanese who might be acceptable 
for those countries which did not.  
                                                 
37 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 106. 
38 “’Tanki gaido shiken mo’ Unyushō no orinpikku taisaku,” Asahi Shinbun, December 6, 1963. 
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 In the end, ten young Japanese ended up serving in this capacity, largely at the service of 
newly emerged, post-colonial countries.  There were 92 attaches provided for the 94 countries 
that participated in the Olympics; of these, 49 attachés were provided from their own embassies 
or consulates in Japan and a further 17 (including one who served as the attaché for both 
Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles)  were from commercial companies (airlines were a 
common source).39  The remaining countries were served by either the 10 Japanese volunteers 
(all members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce), people dispatched from their home country 
or other individuals.40  That such a low number of countries needed Japanese volunteers or 
people dispatched from home speaks to how reintegrated Japan was into the world economy and 
political system less than twenty years after complete economic devastation and political 
ostracization and this was not simply wishful thinking on the part of Japanese. 
While the attaches were sufficient between the OOC and individual NOCs, there was 
clearly still the problem of what to do with all the NOC officials, coaches, staff and athletes that 
would attend the Games; they would also need guides and interpreters.  In 1962, the OOC 
decided to recruit and train college students, called “student-interpreters”, for use with 
management and technical work as it was deemed they would pick up the necessary technical 
jargon more quickly than adults.41  At the same time, public calls went out for anyone who had 
                                                 
39 Some countries which had embassies used attaches from commercial companies, for reasons that are unclear.  For 
example, the United States used a sales manager from Northwest Orient Airlines and Australia used an employee of 
Qantas Empire Airways.  The numbers are also slightly confusing as East and West Germany, as well as North and 
South Korea, participated as one team, but each had its own attaché.  Thus there were 94 countries, as measured by 
participating NOCs, but 96 countries in any other method of counting. 
40 Ibid., 88-89. 
41 In addition, it seems likely that many qualified adults would already be employed and unable to help or devote the 
necessary time.  It also removed competition from businesses which would almost certainly offer better pay for 
recent college graduates.  Focusing on college students most likely reduced competition for their services as well as 
their cost. 
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the necessarily language skills, who were called “general interpreters”.42  The desired languages 
were English, French, German, Spanish and Russian—reflecting colonial, postcolonial and Cold 
War realities of language usage.  In addition, they specified a preference for recruiting “young 
and active persons”—reflecting a desire for energetic representatives of Japan, but also showing 
the goals of the Olympic movement in general for physical fitness. 
In total, almost 300 student-interpreters were selected from 18 universities.  Given that 
they were to be assigned to VIPs and those in charge of running the Games, their training was 
taken very seriously.  Special permission was sought from their universities and professors for 
them to partake in extensive training that took 18 months.43  They were specially trained in the 
sport specific technical jargon necessary to carry out their duties in the assigned sports 
organizations.  The student-interpreters were not just trained in translation—their education also 
involved watching Olympic related films and the Official Report claimed “the trainees were 
inspired with the conviction and enthusiasm of cooperating directly in the great undertaking of 
the Olympic Games.”44  Clearly, they were to be indoctrinated with the correct spirit and attitude 
towards the Games and their tasks.  The location of their final lesson is explicitly defined as 
“away from Tokyo,” which implies that the schools and training involved had been in or around 
Tokyo up until that point, and took place at “the National Youth Hostel…at the foot of Mt. 
Fuji.”45 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 106. 
43 All training was paid for by the OOC. 
44 Ibid., 106.  Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate any of the training materials for the interpreters. 
45 Ibid., 107. 
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This location can hardly have been a coincidence or randomly chosen.  Geographically 
speaking, Mt. Fuji is, of course, Japan’s tallest mountain.  However, metaphysically it is also 
central to Japanese identity—so much so that it often appeared in newspapers of the time as 
visual shorthand for Japan itself in editorial comics across the political spectrum at the time, 
from the rightwing Sankei Shinbun to the Japan Communist Party newspaper, Akahata.  It is a 
location of great importance to the indigenous religion of Japan, Shinto, and a place of religious 
pilgrimage to this day.  It is also used across the world in images of Japan.  For example, every 
Olympiad has stamps created around the world to commemorate it.  They typically feature 
athletes and the Tokyo Games were no exception.  However, images of Mt. Fuji also appeared 
on many of internationally printed stamps, one of the only non-athletic symbols used.46  Mt. Fuji 
was significant and well known enough to even appear in foreign representations of Japan.  
Given such symbolic importance, it seems clear that the final lesson was to take place under the 
gaze of Japan’s largest and most visible symbol, a physical surrogate or embodiment for the 
country and nation.  They could not have helped but feel its shadow upon them as they finished 
their training for Japan’s largest and most important international event ever. 
The conditions of recruitment and training were not nearly as dramatic for the general 
interpreters.  In their case, a public call went out in March 1964 for approximately 900 
interpreters who would be chosen by “competitive examination”.47  The OOC received over 
7500 applications in ten days; Japanese were obviously eager to participate in the program.  By 
mid-June, 904 candidates had been chosen, who now had less than four months to prepare.  For 
any who would be serving at the Olympic Village, they had even less time as significant 
                                                 
46 Sugahara Shinkichi, Olympic Games Stamps (Tokyo: Chūō kōron jigyō shuppan, 1964).  For an example, see 
Panama’s stamps for the Tokyo Olympiad. 
47 The Games of the XVIII Olympiad Tokyo 1964, 107. 
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numbers of athletes arrived early to acclimate themselves to Japan before the competition began.  
All general interpreters were required to be under 35 years of age, and in the end, nearly 70% of 
those chosen were university students.  They were split evenly along gender,48 although the 
demand was higher for men due to concerns over the long hours they were to work and they even 
occasionally assigned two women to a post to compensate for this.49 
The translators tended to appear in the discourse concerning foreigners experiencing 
Japan.  They were the guides that allowed the visitors to experience all that Japan had to offer—
culture, travel and shopping were the most prevalent.  The translators themselves spoke of 
“improving Japan’s reputation,” one of the central tropes of the Olympics for Japanese.50  The 
mass media also did not discriminate between the various official and unofficial programs—but 
mostly focused on the young female college students who acted as guides in the shopping 
districts.  This interaction between Japanese and foreigners clearly had a gendered dimension.  
Even though there were at least as many men translating and guiding, in the public discourse, it 
was a female sphere of action.  Beyond the translators, even more coverage was given to a group 
of women, called “Companions.”  Companions were 34 “young ladies of culture with linguistic 
talent and international experience” and chosen on the basis of connections and 
recommendations.51  They were used to assist IOC members and their families, as well as around 
two dozen special guests, for a total of 101, from the moment of their arrival at Haneda Airport 
                                                 
48 No gender breakdown was given for the student-interpreters. 
49 Ibid., 108. 
50“'Tsūyaku sentā' kaki iredoki,” Sankei Shinbun, October 21, 1964. 
51 While the Official Report gives their number at 34, the mass media routinely gave their numbers as higher.  It is 
unclear why the discrepancy exists. 
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until they left.52  The women were chosen from elite families, including two daughters of Prime 
Minister Ikeda Hayato, and more than half were unmarried.53  These companions, in particular, 
were held up as the finest Japan had to offer—mostly young, attractive, and multilingual with an 
international outlook.  It does not seem a stretch that focusing on and using women was also an 
method to avoid any lingering bad will towards the potentially problematic Japanese male and 
his association with wartime Japan (i.e., the military and government leaders).54  However, the 
focus on and utilization of these women and others also demonstrated the limits to Japanese 
internationalism. 
As the Olympics approached, it became increasingly clear that internationalism, when 
brought to Japan, made many distinctly uncomfortable.  The resulting discourse revealed a 
widespread fear that Japanese women would be taken advantage of by foreign men or had a 
particular weakness towards them.  This was not just in regards to the Companions, but extended 
to the general populace.  However, even the elite Companions were not immune to this fear—the 
Yomiuri Shinbun even went to far as to specifically publish that their duties would not extend 
into the evenings or involve anything beyond their official roles.  Weekly tabloids carried stories 
about how Japanese females had a weakness towards foreign males and that everyone needed to 
watch out for this.  Even the woman’s magazine Fujin Kōron (Women’s Public Opinion) got 
involved in the process.  In a special segment where intellectuals and cultural producers 
commented on their “worries” about the Olympics, several female authors and critics spoke 
                                                 
52“The Official Report of the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, Tokyo 1964.” 84. 
53 For example, see“'Tōkyō Gorin konpanion' Shushō reizyō Noriko-sanra,” Sankei Shinbun, August 15, 1964.  
There was also one “blue eyed” companion—a German woman who was living in Japan with her American husband 
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directly about their concerns over Japanese women being abused or tricked into sexual relations 
by foreign men, either through a lack of understanding of English or through the exoticism and 
eroticism of the foreign body. One cautioned that women need to “clearly say no” to the 
advances.55  In the same issue, however, several male scholars argued against this.  One English 
literature professor argued that no matter one’s English ability, the choice to have sexual 
relations or not with another person was a choice that was not linguistically based (i.e., a person 
cannot be tricked into having sex through a linguistic misunderstanding) and argued that 
statements like that above was in fact, the dangerous assumption.56 However, this was the 
minority view in the popular discourse and there was a strong undercurrent of fear and concern 
in most of the media. This was, in some ways, a continuation of an earlier discourse on sexual 
relations with foreigners.   
From before the US troops even landed in Japan following its surrender, there was 
widespread fear of the foreign male troops and the potential for mass rapes, perhaps because the 
barbaric behavior of Japanese troops in places such as Nanjing had taught that this was possible 
or even likely.  Ironically, Prime Minister Ikeda, whose own daughters were chosen as 
Companions, was one of the central figures in the Japanese government response at the time.  
Then the Director of the Tax Bureau at the Ministry of Finance, he approved the request for 
money to set up and finance places for the American troops to go to relieve sexual desire, in 
other words, places of prostitution catering to the occupying troops.  The rational was that if they 
provided these women that the troops would be less likely to commit sexual crimes against other 
Japanese women—clearly they were willing to sacrifice those who ranked lower in social and 
                                                 
55 Ishigaki Akako, “Orinpikku watashi no shinpai: Nō o hakkiri to,” Fujin Kōron, October 1964, 76-77. 
56 Maruya Saiichi, “Abunai eigo,” Fujin Kōron, October 1964, 83-87. 
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class status in the hopes of protecting their own wives and daughters.57  At the same time, 
Japanese women who chose to associate with foreign males associated with the Occupation were 
often portrayed as race traitors.  For defeated Japanese males, not only had they lost in the war, 
but now they were rendered sexually impotent as well.58   
Just as during the Occupation, the government itself got involved with the issue as the 
Olympics approached—this time encouraging places of prostitution to close.  This was done as 
part of the beautification project of Tokyo—it was an effort to clean up Japan’s image so that 
foreigners, particularly Westerners, did not see it as a stereotypical den of oriental pleasures and 
hedonism, as well as to reduce crime.  This was clearly not aimed at preventing all prostitution as 
they also carried out blood testing for sexually transmitted diseases among women who worked 
at bars, cabarets, hotels and inns, as well as Olympic workers at the Athlete’s Village.  While not 
explicitly accusing them all of prostitution, the implication was that these women were or at least 
might be involved in it or other sexual relations with the visiting foreigners.  The Second 
Subsection Chief for STD for the Tokyo Metropolitan Hygiene Office stated the policy in a 
circuitous fashion: this policy was aimed at “those workers who might have physical interactions 
with foreigners here for the Olympics.”59  The purpose seemed to be to prevent them from giving 
foreigners sexually transmitted diseases rather than barring sexual relations.  International 
relations, in all senses of the word, were acceptable, but only under the correct conditions that 
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Press, 2001), 45-84. 
59 “Hosutesu ketsueki kensa no kyōkō,” Shūkan Shinchō, May 11, 1964, 114. 
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would leave a favorable impression of Japan.  Males, however, were not tested at all, even 
though they also interacted with foreigners and logically were just as capable of “physical 
interaction with foreigners.” 
There was also a class based element to this.  While the professional sex workers were 
targeted to prevent them from practicing their trade, working class women, such as hotel maids, 
were allowed to participate and interact with foreign males, but only if they were healthy.  The 
message for middle class and upper class, on the other hand, was prevention and avoidance with 
more than a little xenophobia.  The Wellness Section of the Tokyo Metropolitan Welfare 
Department’s Women Division published an annual Handbook for Young Women.  Typically, it 
was a book of manners, health, morals and customs; from advice on behaving like a proper 
young lady and planning a wedding to instructions for a new housewife and mother.  The 1964 
edition was radically different in content than previous years. 60  There were large sections 
devoted to the upcoming Olympics.  The general message was that foreign males were potential 
predators and that proper young Japanese women needed to be on their guard.  This was 
considered to be crucial information for young ladies’ lives in 1964 and reveals that there were 
clear limits to what many Japanese were comfortable with in regards to internationalism.  The 
head of the Women Division, Nakano Tsuya told the Asahi Shinbun that foreign men believed 
Japanese women were sexually promiscuous and available.  She referred to an article in the 
London based Playboy, which reportedly claimed that 19 out of 20 Japanese women approached 
in parks and on the street agreed to dates, and said young Japanese women needed to avoid 
making “mistakes” (machigai).61 However, when the newspaper asked several women about it, 
                                                 
60 Wakai josei no techō (Tokyo: Tōkyō-to minseikyoku fujinbu fukushika, 1964). 
61 “Fujinbuchō no ureutsu: gaijin ni yowai josei,” Asahi Shinbun, September 7, 1964. 
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they did not agree with the message of the pamphlet.  A worker at the Imperial Hotel called it 
“nothing more than a black ship uproar,” referring to the black ships that Commodore Matthew 
Perry arrived in Japan on in 1853 and often used as an image of threatening foreigners.  
Nonetheless, it was a recurring theme in the mass media and was mirrored in an official 
document of the Tokyo bureaucracy. 
While there was unease over internationalism, particularly when it occurred within Japan, 
there was literally no disagreement over the nature of Japan’s motivation and role it should play.  
The Japanese discourse concerning Japan’s role in the world strongly resembled the Olympic 
theme of peaceful interaction and can be seen from the very beginning of the campaign to bring 
the Olympics back to Tokyo.  The Occupation of Japan and the signing of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty took place in April 1952, returning Japan to full sovereignty.  The very next month, 
Tokyo Governor Yasui Seiichiro (1947-1959) began the process of reapplying to host the 
Olympics.  He argued that Japan should host the Olympics to “gain the world’s understanding of 
Japan’s true form, after its peaceful recovery and international return, by truly showing the great 
desire of Japanese for peace.”62  A resolution to apply for the 1960 Olympics passed the Tokyo 
Assembly on May 19th, 1952.  It called for “exchanging our physical education culture with other 
peace-loving nations” (kokumin) and “making a contribution to the establishment of everlasting 
peace through the exchange of sportsmanship.”63  This belief was widespread across the political 
spectrum.  Even with all their concerns about the SDF, Emperor Hirohito and creeping 
militarism, members of the nation on the left also argued that Japan could have a nationalism 
based on peace for the world to see at the Olympics, although it should be divorced from the 
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bourgeois capitalistic state.64  In other words, it was the abstract country and the nation that were 
based on peace rather than the conservative led government. 
The premise and event central to the new Japanese self-image was their experiences in 
World War II—and their selective memories regarding it.  Indeed, I intentionally use the term 
‘World War II’ over other options such as ‘Greater East Asian War’ or ‘15 Years War’ to 
indicate the nature of this memory.  Historians John Dower and James Orr have argued that the 
Occupation forces emphasized a narrative that laid most of the blame for the war and domestic 
suffering on the malfeasance of the Japanese government and military (i.e., the state), which left 
the Japanese nation as a victim and redeemable.65  The terminology of the War in the Pacific or 
World War II semantically decentralized or even erased Japanese actions in China and 
Manchuria from 1931 on by emphasizing or solely recognizing the combat that took place 
between Japan and the United States following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  This largely 
absolved the Japanese nation from any responsibility for their actions across Asia, particularly in 
China and Korea.  The conservative Sankei Shinbun explicitly called for a new relationship of 
peace based on “forgetting the past” when it discussed the Olympic Torch Relay and mainland 
Chinese-Japanese relations (the Torch went through Taiwan rather than mainland China due to 
politics and China’s non-participation in the IOC).66  In fact, the result is that the Japanese nation 
became a victim of the war—the military and government (with undertones of American 
responsibility) were to blame.  Replacing guilt and responsibility was suffering and victimization.  
                                                 
64 Seikatsu Kagaku Chōsakai, Supōtsu No Shakaigaku, Seikatsu no kagaku (Tōkyō: Ishiyaku Shuppan, 1962), 101-
108. 
65 Dower, War Without Mercy; Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar 
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66 “Sekai heiwa no onegai,” Sankei Shinbun, Seika ga tsunagu series, September 7, 1964. 
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Following the end of the Occupation, particularly as the Cold War took shape, a new and 
uniquely Japanese experience took center stage in this trope of victimization: the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  While Japanese could be accused of war crimes, 
particularly in China, there was no one who could claim the Japanese had used atomic weapons 
on them—this suffering was shared by no others. 
The fear of the atomic bomb and radiation poisoning reached new heights within Japan 
after a small tuna boat was caught in the fallout of a United States hydrogen bomb test on the 
Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954.  The crew of the Lucky Dragon No. 5 took ill and eventually one 
died of radiation poisoning in September, much as tens of the thousands had following the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.67  One result was widespread panic over the safety 
of fish, which deeply hurt the important fishing industry.68  This incident led to the formation of 
the National Council for a Petition Movement to Ban Atomic and Hydrogen bombs, which led a 
petition drive that eventually exceeded 30 millions signatures by August 1955.  The movement 
then organized the first annual anti-atomic and hydrogen bomb convention in Hiroshima in 
1955.69  Given that that number is roughly one third of the entire Japanese population at the time, 
clearly there was widespread support for the anti-nuclear movement in Japan. 
However, one should not equate victim with weak or sick.  Japanese largely saw 
themselves and their country as the exact opposite:  healthy and recovered—a new country.  In 
this context, many Japanese often saw themselves as possessing a certain moral authority on 
world affairs and a moral obligation to speak out on nuclear weapons—especially given the 
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circumstances of the ongoing Cold War and accompanying arms race.  This identity was put to 
the test during the Olympics over two crises.  First, an American nuclear submarine wanted 
permission to enter a Japanese harbor for shore leave and restocking of supplies.  This cased 
uproar across the political spectrum when the government allowed it.  Even the Sankei Shinbun 
voiced strong concerns about this, noting that due to the US-Japan Security Treaty that this was 
perhaps unavoidable, but that Japan needed reassurances that the harbor call was not part of a 
larger East Asian strategy.  In addition, it argued that the US was not capable of understanding 
the depths of revulsion and fear that Japanese had towards nuclear weapons and called for 
promises of safety and contingency plans should anything go wrong.70  Clearly the role of 
victims and the atomic bombings were central to self-narratives of Japanese. 
An even greater threat emerged when the People’s Republic of China detonated their first 
nuclear weapon on August 16th, 1964.  Undoubtedly, this was intentional as the PRC’s athletes 
were disbarred from the Olympics and so they had nothing to lose.  In addition, in a day and age 
when few newspapers or TV stations had overseas bureaus, the Tokyo Games represented an 
unprecedented media event in Asia, especially given that these Olympics were being broadcast 
live via satellite and in color, all for the first time.  China was guaranteed a global audience and 
more attention than would have been possible otherwise.  All the major media in Japan spoke out 
against the nuclear arms race; even the JCP came out against it and called for a complete ban on 
nuclear weapons, although it also forcefully denounced the United States for its hypocrisy in 
criticizing China’s test.71 
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Beyond the literal infusion of a discourse of peace into everything Japan did related to its 
applications for and descriptions of the Olympics, the best expression of this identity was 
embodied in the Olympic Torch Relay.  The OOC stated that its goal for the Olympic Torch 
Relay was that the young people across Asia and the world would see it and would receive a 
lesson of peace.  How exactly that would occur is entirely unclear, but it reflects the self-
narrative of hopes for peace in the world.  The torch itself, usually written as “Sacred Flame” 
(seika) in Japanese, was frequently referred to as the “Flame of Peace” (heiwa no hi) in the mass 
media (but not in official OOC or Japan NOC documents).  The designer of the torch, 
interviewed for the regular “Ace on the Mound” column in the conservative Yomiuri Shinbun 
said that he was happy to change gunpowder into something useable for peace.72  He himself 
was a former soldier and munitions expert who was now able to use his skills for a peaceful 
purpose.  Just as Japan had rewritten its national identity and narrative from warlike samurai into 
peaceful internationalists, he was expressing his own contribution to the reinvention of Japan’s 
national character—and perhaps echoing the wishes of Albert Nobel. 
                                                
After crossing the Asian continent, the Flame finally arrived in Japan.  Its first stop was 
in Okinawa, still under American occupation at that time.  The mass media in both Okinawa and 
Japan proper all saw this as a symbolic restating of Japan’s claim to the island as its own.  They 
called for the peaceful reunification of the Okinawa with the main islands and the ending of 
Japan’s final reminder of defeat in the war.  It was also useful in juxtaposing the old wartime 
Japan with its new peaceful behavior and claims.  There were no militaristic threats, just mass 
 
72“"Kayaku o heiwa no hi ni" Tokubetsu sagyoui, mi o kiyome: seika no tōchi o tsukutta Monma Satarō,” Yomiuri 
Shinbun, August 23, 1964, sec. ēsu tōban. 
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meetings of Okinawans eagerly welcoming the Torch to Japan.73  This symbolic use of the Torch 
to make territorial claims has recently reemerged with the Beijing Games.  The Taiwanese NOC 
rejected the PRC’s request to send the Torch there on its way to Beijing.  At issue was the path 
of the trip and the order in which it would visit various countries; Taiwan objected to being 
between Vietnam and Hong Kong, arguing that it made a territorial claim by placing it in the 
domestic leg of the relay.  Beijing and the IOC had thought it was sufficiently ambiguous there 
as it was between the clearly foreign and domestic legs.74  In an echo of the Tokyo Olympics, the 
Chinese OOC is calling this relay the “Journey of Harmony.” 
The Torch first arrived on the main four islands of Japan in Miyazaki Prefecture, the self-
titled “Home of the Gods;” According to Shinto mythology, the Gods first dwelt there.  It is also 
there that the reinvention of Japan as peaceful was the most obvious.  After arriving, the Torch 
was first taken the prefectural offices to be greeted by politicians and then escorted to a Shinto 
shrine for a blessing.  After that it was taken to the “Peace Tower” for a ceremony that night in 
front of the citizens of the prefecture.  The Peace Tower was a reinvention of reality and 
rewriting of history.  It began as a wartime memorial to commemorate the 2,600th anniversary of 
the mythical founding of Japan by the first emperor, Jimmu, and was completed in 1940.  It was 
inscribed with the words “hakkō ichiu” or “all the world under one roof,” a common wartime 
slogan to signify Japanese rule over Asia and beyond, something resembling the American 
Manifest Destiny and Monroe Doctrine. 75  Following the war, the inscription was removed and 
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the tower rebranded as the Peace Tower (Heiwa no tō).  Miyazaki Prefecture published a 
commemorative book of the event.  It showed the “Flame of Peace” traveling through the 
“Birthplace of Japan” in an idyllic rural setting with flowers lining the road.76  At the Peace 
Tower (see Figure 2), the Flame of Peace was greeted by a crowd of tens of thousands of eager 
Japanese. 
 
 
                                                 
76 Miyazaki Prefecture: Prefecture Olympic Torch Executive Committee, The Flame: Tokyo Olympics Games 
(Fukuoka Shūkō Insatsu Kabushiki Gaisha), n.p. 
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 Figure 4-2:  The Peace Tower awaits the Olympic Torch.  Source: 
Miyazaki Prefecture: Prefecture Olympic Torch Executive Committee. 
The Flame: Tokyo Olympics Games. Fukuoka Shūkō Insatsu Kabushiki 
Gaisha, n.p. 
  
Just as the Tower had been remade into something peaceful to celebrate, so to had the 
Japanese, their wartime past conveniently removed and forgotten.  The ceremonies included 
another fascinating disconnect between past and present.  As the crowds celebrated the Flame of 
Peace at the Peace Tower, six SDF fighter jets did a flyby.  While this would seem to contradict 
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the message and identity of peace, the jets seem to have represented high technology and 
progress rather than military might and militarism to most Japanese.  Certainly there was no 
significant public outcry over their involvement. 
However, while most Japanese seem to have had little issue with the SDF’s role in the 
Olympics, some, especially on the left, objected to it.  They objection was not that Japan was 
militaristic, but rather that the SDF and its inclusion in the Olympics was a violation of Japan’s 
peaceful nature and constitution. The following editorial cartoon (Figure 3) from Akahata 
demonstrates this fear vividly.  Titled “Skillfully making use of the Olympics,” it spoke to the 
fear of a creeping militarism and a military that would make itself more desirably and recruit by 
utilizing its association with the highly popular Olympics.  The cartoon shows its real nature—a 
tank, with the word “militarism” on its side, covered in the trappings of the Games, driven by a 
soldier with sinister smile wearing a helmet reading Self Defense Forces.  It was precisely their 
belief in the identity and ideals that Japan was a peaceful country that made them object.   
 
Figure 4-3: “Skillfully using the Olympics”  
Source: editorial cartoon, Akahata, October 12, 
1964. 
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While the leftists’ worries were perhaps overstated and unrealized, the SDF certainly saw 
the Olympics and their own participation as a great public relations opportunity.  Following the 
disaster of the Japan-United States Security Treaty renewal, not to mention lingering resentment 
over the Japanese military and World War II, the SDF was hardly viewed favorably by most—
although that is not to say most Japanese were outwardly and actively hostile towards their 
military.  It is also likely that the Tokyo Olympics would not have been possible without its 
support as well—Koizumi Junya, director general of the Defense Agency, wrote that “people 
from a variety of fields” had recognized the vital role the SDF placed, to his great pleasure.77  
More than 7500 SDF members participated in some way—from security to transportation to 
providing the brass band for the Opening Ceremony.  Following the Games, the SDF published a 
collection of short letters from a variety of personal about their duties and experiences in Tokyo 
Olympic Strategy: Memoirs of Self Defense Force personnel who participated in support.  The 
majority focused on issues of cooperation, help and friendship, not typically things one might 
associate with a military, even one that isn’t officially recognized as such.  Air Force Captain (1st 
rank) Aizawa Yoshimasa, for example, wrote of his experience as the escorts for the few athletes 
from the new countries of Niger and  Chad.  Translators were in short supply and none of the 
SDF in his section spoke French, only English.  However, he was proud to write that while they 
couldn’t communicate with words, that communication was possible between humans using just 
“bright smiles, friendship and trust.”78  It was not the SDF’s military expertise, but their warm 
and competent support that lay behind their success, and the overall success of the widely 
popular Olympics.  Thus, not only was their support necessary, but the good feelings towards the 
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Games would almost certainly be transferred to them as well—particularly due to their high 
visibility participation in popular events like the marathon.  The nationalism fostered by the 
international competition was at the same time rendered non-threatening by the sports and this 
could be safely associated with the SDF. 
The selection of runners for the Torch Relay also reflected Japan’s new identity.  All 
were required to between 16 to 20 years of age—representing a new postwar generation that 
would look to the future rather than dwell in the past.79  The runners were all too young to have 
participated in or even remember the war.  Their young, fit bodies were the personification and 
performance of a postwar Japan, now rejoining the developed world as a peer and competitor.  
Their youth and vigor symbolically proclaimed Japan’s bright future. 
The true personification of this identity was the final Olympic Torch runner. Sakai 
Yoshinori, a student at the prestigious Waseda University, was an accomplished runner who had 
barely missed making the Japanese Olympic team that year and was regarded as a promising 
candidate for the 1968 Mexico Games.  These accomplishments were what placed him on the 
short list as the final runner; however, it was his hometown and birthday that got him selected as 
the most important Olympic Torch bearer.  Sakai was born in Sanji City, a few dozen miles from 
Hiroshima, on August 6th, 1945—the day the first atomic bomb was dropped there and the world 
entered the atomic age.  This was what caught the Japanese public’s attention, and indeed the 
world’s as well.  The Official Report carefully makes no mention of why he was chosen beyond 
his physical abilities, and probably reflects an effort to pay at least lip service to the ideal of 
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keeping politics separate from the Olympics.80  Certainly there was no doubt as to why he had 
been selected in the popular press and imagination. 
The news of Sakai’s selection was actually broken by the Asahi Shinbun several days 
before the official announcement was due.  Although it has speculated, both then and more 
recently, that the Asahi influenced the choice or even chose it to promote the connection between 
the Olympic Flame and atomic bombing to further its left-wing agenda and tendencies, a more 
simple and straightforward explanation seems the most likely.81  The Asahi corporation was the 
official sponsor of the Olympic Torch Relay and had even helped to map out potential land 
routes across the Asian continent, although they were eventually rejected due to practical and 
logistical reasons.82  It seems likely that the Asahi had multiple sources among the OOC officials 
and on the Olympic Torch Relay committee, and thus access to inside information that was not 
available to other media companies.83 
This is not to say that it did not promote the connection between the atomic bombings 
and Sakai—the Japanese mass media was full of these references, often referring to him as the 
“Atomic Bomb Boy” (Genbakko).  They excitedly reported when the foreign press referred to 
him as the “Atomic Boy” at the Opening Ceremony.84  However, at least some Americans saw 
his selection as a slap in the face to America, arguing that this was amnesia of the worst kind and 
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placed Japan as the victim.85  While the employment of a trope of victimhood was quite accurate, 
his comments seem to have made little headway in the public discourse as most Japanese agreed 
that they were victims. 
Sakai himself was involved in performing and maintaining this narrative.  In the Heibon 
Panchi magazine, a human interest story on his personal history and athletic abilities carried the 
following verse from him: 
“It was the day the atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, that I was born in the 
city of Sanji. So of course I am unfamiliar with human tragedy, and know next to nothing 
of things like war. Yet I somehow cannot believe that on that day, tens-of-thousands of 
Japanese were buried in death in an instant. For that was the very moment I received life.  
 
In the nineteen years since that day, we have been raised in a free-world completely 
remade. This is the form in which people around the world will see us. And me, born in a 
place just a few tens-of-kilometers away on the day of the atomic bomb. And here now at 
the Olympic festival which hopes for peace…”86 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4-3, the picture accompanying the verse placed him in front of the 
Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Dome, the most recognizable symbol of the atomic bombings.  Thus he 
was both a reminder of Japan’s tragic past, its new identity as peaceful due to that past and its 
vibrant new future as personified and performed by his young, athletic body. 
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Figure 4-4:Final Olympic Torch runner, Sakai Yoshinori in front of the 
Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Dome. Source: “Sekai minzoku no kōten,” Heibon 
Panchi, September 7, 1964, 8-9. 
However, this new future and an identity of peace based on wartime suffering depended 
on willfully forgetfulness and determinedly only looking towards the future.  This can most 
clearly be seen through those voices missing from the larger discourse.  The multitude of 
colonial refuges from the Korean Peninsula, China and Mongolia still living a quasi-legal 
existence in Japan were entirely absent from the mainstream Olympic discourse.  Their very 
presence raised problematic issues and memories, but by silencing them to the fringes, the 
identity of peace was easier to justify and narrate. 
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The other site of forgetting or mis-remembering was actually a celebration of Japan’s 
artistic and cultural past at the exhibitions of Japanese culture.  The exhibitions were widely 
publicized, and by all accounts, widely attended by both Japanese and foreigners, as previously 
noted.  Therefore, it is important to examine them as performances of identity for both domestic 
and foreign consumption.  For an identity based on peace, these exhibits carried a special 
significance—but this was one of silence and absence.  We must examine them for what was 
missing as well as what was on display.  After all, museums and exhibitions are rarely apolitical 
presentations of artifacts.  First, it is important to understand that there was an absence of 
criticism of the content.  While it has been criticized recently for representing an elitist definition 
of Japanese art, at the time there was nearly a complete absence of mainstream or popular 
criticism for the content regarding both inclusion and omission.87  This silence, at the very least, 
demonstrates the subject matter and portrayal of Japan was not seen as controversial or 
problematic.  Second, the representation of Japan had a very significant omission.  Any art 
produced within or about Japan’s empire building or conflict from the mid 1800s on was entirely 
missing and erased from view. 
The photography exhibition consisted of more than 150 colored photographs by 56 
Japanese photographers and focused on all things “Japanese.”88  The choice to use all color 
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part of a state guided cultural program that focused on elite art while overlooking folk (mingei) artwork that would 
show every day life and further sees a connection to conservative politicians who want to rearm Japan as they utilize 
culture to link it with cultural nationalism.  The first argument is partially correct.  However, by focusing solely on 
the Old Art Treasures section of the Exhibitions, she largely ignores the other nine which included things like 
traditional puppet shows (with their roots in street performances), photography and performances of “Folklore 
Entertainment.”  The second assertion has been complicated by recent scholarship which has demonstrated that the 
postwar ethnic and cultural nationalism has origins on the left as well as the right.  In English, see Gayle, Marxist 
History and Postwar Japanese Nationalism; Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-Images. 
88 The Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, Color in Japan (Nihon karā 1964): Art 
Exhibition During Tokyo Olympic Games (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1964). 
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photographs focused attention on the advanced nature of Japan’s photographic industry—
everything could be and was shot, developed and printed using Japanese technology.89  It also 
had the convenient effect of disallowing almost any prewar photographs.  Many of the 
photographers who works were selected had been taking photographs for decades and almost 
certainly would have had shots that predated the war.  In addition, by focusing on Japan and 
things quintessentially “Japanese,” photos from the empire were also conveniently disqualified.  
Further evidence for this bias, whether conscious or unconscious, comes from the essay in the 
souvenir and museum print of the collection.  It begins with Japanese photography being praised 
at the “Photography in Retrospect” exhibition that was held at the Modern Art Museum in New 
York City in 1958 that examined “the history of photography during the past 120 years” and 
almost glowed with pride that 61 photographs by Japanese photographers were shown.  
Logically, the essay should then move to discuss the history of Japanese photography over the 
past century.  However, the essay magically erases the prewar and wartime history of 
photography, and begins its story post 1945.90  The history begins with several undated 
references to Western influences on Japanese photography, but argues that today Japan has 
developed its own unique characteristics.  The only deviation from this narrative is a single short 
mention of the photographic realism movement in the immediate “postwar” (sengo).  This single 
usage, however, creates a stronger feeling of breakage than of linkage.  The message is that 
Japan’s photography has begun something new, while the past is irrelevant and forgotten. 
The exhibition of modern art was more inclusive and covered from 1888 forward.  It 
focused on Japan as a site of struggle between “Orient” and “Occident” as the two interacted, 
                                                 
89 Ibid., n.p. 
90 Ibid., 4-5. 
 164
stating that “the history of Japanese art appears as a typical example of this modernization with 
all its struggles, difficulty and richness.”91  One might expect to see more of this interaction and 
struggle, perhaps even depictions of Japan’s imperial expansion—after all, it was one of the 
clearest signs that Japan had caught up to the West and was attempting to build an empire as they 
had also done.  However, while the subject matter was temporally more inclusive, the past was 
shaped and mis-remembered as much as the photography had been—perhaps it is even more a 
glaring omission given that the time period was supposedly a subject of this exhibit.  The entire 
exhibition did not have a single work of art that dealt with the war or empire building.  The war 
was only mentioned a single time, and once again, only in the brief overview of the Japanese 
modern art.  This time, considerable coverage was given to pre 1945 developments, but curiously, 
it ignored important and long standing influences from continental Asia while focusing on the 
Western influences and the way in which Japanese artists had successfully fused their native 
traditions with them.  This narrative was maintained through the 1930s, when abstract art and 
surrealism influenced Japan.   Suddenly, war and conflict appeared when this process was 
“interrupted for a certain time because of the last war” but quickly “recovered their activity since 
1945.”92   
This narrative has several elements to its mis-remembering.  First, it erases any 
influences from the Asian continent, even though anyone with even a cursory knowledge of 
Japanese art would know that Chinese and Korean art had an immense impact on it.  Many of the 
earliest pieces in the exhibit itself included show clear influences from the continent. Second, by 
focusing solely on internal development of art and then its interaction with the West, the vast 
                                                 
91 The Organizing Committee for the Games of the XVIII Olympiad, Masterpieces of Modern Japanese Art: Art 
Exhibition during Tokyo Olympics (Tokyo: The National Museum of Modern Art, 1964), 7. 
92 Ibid., 10. 
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volume of art that focused on the empire and conflict in Asia, such as the Sino-Japanese and 
Russo-Japanese wars, was erased.  Third, by carrying that narrative into the 1930s and then 
quickly introducing the “last war,” the open warfare between Japan and China had started in the 
early to mid 1930s is excluded from the definition of that war.  This reduced the conflict to only 
post Pearl Harbor and its enemies to the white Westerners.  While perhaps not intentional, the 
effect was that Japanese atrocities and aggression in Asia were removed from the story, while 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the final acts by the West that ended the war—could assume the main 
site of violence and memory. 
The main exhibit was the “Exhibition of Japanese Old Art Treasures” and consisted of 
paintings, clothing, potter and the like from antiquity to around 1800 CE.  Many pieces on 
display were defined as national treasures.  The very nature of the exhibit excluded any artifacts 
related to Japan’s troublesome and problematic recent past.  Instead, it could deploy a self-
orientalizing script for domestic and foreign consumption.  However, this was not as straight 
forward as it might appear on the surface.  During the war, especially for the Allies, much of 
Japan’s ills were blamed on bushido and modern day warlike samurai.  One might expect, 
therefore, that the older treasures would therefore focus solely on archaeological items such as 
pots and old tools or on the court culture of the late first millennium—both would allow the gaze 
of history to gloss over the centuries of samurai rule and warfare before the modern period.  
However, samurai related artifacts featured prominently in the exhibition: paintings, full suits of 
armor and even the notorious samurai sword—although many of the swords were displayed 
disassembled, perhaps to emphasize their beauty as works of fine craftsmanship and art rather 
than as weapons of war.93  Guntō, or swords produced for the modern Japanese military, were 
                                                 
93 Tokyo National Museum, Exhibition of Old Japanese Art Treasures in Tokyo Olympic Games (Tokyo: Benridō, 
1964), n.p.  See exhibits 354-407. 
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absent; they are generally not considered works of art in the way the hand forged swords of the 
masters are and they are also from the wrong time period for inclusion.  While this may seem 
contradictory to the message of peace and forgetting the war, I believe it is not.  The newspapers 
regularly reported on what foreigners were buying while in Japan and samurai swords were 
frequently listed.  The image of the samurai had been divorced from its early 20th century 
reinvention as modern military soldier and returned to its safely Oriental past of mysticism and 
exoticism.  The samurai therefore became a safely useable symbol of an older, less threatening 
Japan, while at the same time keeping it as a vital part of Japanese identity—although safely 
defanged and refurbished as a cultural rather than political figure. 
The Japanese efforts at leaving their guests with good impressions were largely 
successful.  The OOC did a survey of Western newspapers to see their reactions to the Games—
unintentionally demonstrating whose opinions they were the most concerned about.94  While 
there were comments that the “Japanese nation is indifferent to sports” and evaluations of the 
Japanese as “lacking individual initiative”—disregarded in the report as cultural 
misunderstandings and differences by the report—overall the comments about Japan were 
positive.  The Tokyo Olympics were called “Games of Niceness.”  One comment from a Belgian 
newspaper must have been music to Japanese ears:  “(the Japanese) terrible reputation from that 
base and savage time is already in the past.” 95  Clearly the hopes of the Japanese organizers and 
officials were realized. 
The wider discourse of Japan and the Japanese nation, although not necessarily the state, 
as a peaceful internationalist also demonstrates that this was not simply the idea of the elites, an 
                                                 
94 It is also possible that the materials available for their easy perusal and review were largely from Western Europe 
and the United States. 
95 Tōkyō-to, Dai 18-kai Orinpikku kyōgitaikai Tōkyō-to hōkokusho, 300-301. 
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ideology enforced by the state or a superficial international marketing ploy.  The imagery and 
tropes employed and consumed reveal a strong, broad based national belief that Japan was a 
country based on peace and international cooperation.  The strongest complaints surrounding the 
Olympics were from those concerned about the SDF and a creeping return to militarism—a 
complaint that can only be made from the assumption of peace as the normative and desirable 
state of affairs.  The phoenix had risen from the ashes of war, reborn with a new national identity 
based on forgetting past wrongs committed and remembering atomic violence suffered.  
Japanese had successfully reinvented themselves as a uniquely peaceful country and nation, and 
performed it on a global Olympic stage uniquely suited for it. 
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
 How did Japanese envision themselves and their nation in the late 1950s and early 1960s?  
That is the question I set out to answer at the start of this project.  The answer was in the 
performance of nation for Self and Other.  The 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics provided the 
perfect stage for Japanese to perform their perception of national identity—and for it to be 
examined as they debated its meanings and definitions. 
 Through a careful examination of a wide variety of mass media sources, a relatively 
unified understanding of Self emerged.  There were complaints and disagreements, but often 
times it was over implementation rather than over the core ideal—much as Akahata complained 
about the Self Defense Forces (SDF) being in the Olympics.  Their issue was not with the ideal 
of Japan as a peaceful country, but rather that SDF participation jeopardized it.  The JOC and 
OOC were heavily influenced by the government—in no small part because so many of the 
leaders were from or had connections with the political world.  This made their policy a good 
measure of government plans and ideas.  The broad spectrum of sources examined provided an 
amalgamation of the nation.  This was important since the methodology pursued intentionally 
excluded many of the pundits of national identity that often inform such research.  What emerged 
was a remarkably unified perception of self and nation.  This is not to say there were not 
important disagreements in the political arena or elsewhere that did not appear in this work; there 
most certainly were.  Instead, what has been shown is how much national identity was shared 
across lines that are usually perceived as breaking unity, such as political orientation and 
economic status.  They might not have always agreed with each other, but they certainly 
recognized each other as members of the same nation with some important shared ideals.  Their 
use of language and imagery was too consistent for it to be otherwise.  Of course, this consistent 
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discourse of self also tended to erase the most problematic of outsiders for the Japanese nation: 
Ainu, ethnic Chinese and ethnic Koreas that were trapped within the borders of the state, but not 
included within the boundaries of the nation. 
 The Japanese were very satisfied with the Olympics and how it had unfolded.  According 
to the NHK survey, almost 90% answered that it was a positive event for Japan.1  This implies 
satisfaction with the identity put on display as they played out their roles on the global stage.  
Japan as a country of technological advancement was one of these major tropes.  The Shinkansen 
and other pieces of high technology still continue to define what it means to be Japanese.  Even 
today, its image in front of Mt. Fuji is recognizable around the world and still within use by 
Japanese.  If anything, Japan is even more associated with high technology today than it was in 
1964.  Sony, Panasonic, Honda and Toyota are all household brands known worldwide for their 
cutting edge science and applications.  The scientific training of athletes is commonplace around 
the world today, although it no longer has much significance for national identity.  This practice 
has even moved down to the true hobbyist or person working out in the gym.  The new 
techniques and training paid off for the Japanese when they won more gold and total medals than 
ever before.  While identity is frequently contested and constructed, in this case, Japanese had 
significant reasons to see themselves as being on the cutting edge of science.  Much as had been 
done in the Meiji period, Japan—state and nation—caught up quickly and were quickly able to 
challenge the West on a technological basis. 
 The contradictory nature of identity was performed by Japanese for their foreign guests 
and their own consumption as well.  The language and discourse within the official documents 
and mass media revealed a belief that Japan and Japanese stood uniquely between the West and 
                                                 
1 Tokyo Orinpikku: sono 5 nenkan no ayumi, 214. 
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non-West.  The Japanese government launched on a crash course of creating the modern city 
upon being awarded the Olympics and remade their city into something more modern, but not 
without costs as many lost their homes to the construction of sporting facilities and highways.  In 
the end, no one wanted to not have the highways, but the cost seemed very high.  The fascination 
with the images of the highways spoke to their representation of the new modern transportation 
system—not high technology, but a new way of life with personal cars and its promise of 
increased freedom.  This also speaks to the rising income of Japanese and their ability to own 
cars. 
 At the same time the Japanese were revising their capital city, the obsession with 
manners and appearing to be uncivilized revealed a deep insecurity about whom they were and 
where their place in the world was.  The language of “international standards” revealed which 
countries they stood with in their own eyes and desired to join in the future.  Acting the part of a 
modern, civilized country was crucial to this.  At the same time, the Olympic Torch Relay 
demonstrated the power of the symbol act, especially with such an important event.  Japanese 
declared themselves as the modern leader of Asia—the Oriental heirs to Western civilization. 
 At the same time, they were employing a strategy of self-Orientalization in relation to the 
West.  It was a gendered performance where the women most often served in the traditional role 
as companion and object of beauty.  Traditional beauty was also utilized in cultural exhibits to 
create a master narrative of a shared distant cultural past.  This not only appealed to the Western 
Orientalist, but also gave Japanese a sense of cultural uniqueness that supported the ideals of 
ethnic nationalism.  It had the added benefit of skipping past the near past, which was much 
more problematic. 
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 Finally, there was broad discourse of a renewed Japan—now peaceful and internationalist 
was a new thread to its national identity.  It was deployed across all segments of society.  
Invoking this trope meant looking forward rather than backward.  The memories that were 
utilized were very selective and left the Japanese nation a victim of wartime horror rather than 
complicit in Japan’s wartime violence. 
 In conclusion, this study shows that there were points in the Japanese webs of 
significance that intersected in important ways.  High technology, modern yet traditional and 
peace were all ideals that many Japanese shared in their perception of self and nation.  It also 
demonstrates a method of reaching something closer to the national voice without overly 
privileging the national elites or observers.  In addition, while the ideals have changed somewhat, 
it is interesting that the identity forged in the 1950s and 1960s is still largely with us today 
among both Japanese and many foreigners.
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